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FUTURE DIRECTIONS FOR SCIENTIFIC 
ADVICE IN EUROPE 
James Wilsdon, Robert Doubleday and James Hynard
Across Europe, science policy controversies – whether over climate, 
crops, fracking or food safety – regularly ripple across the headlines. But 
debates over the institutional arrangements for bringing scientific expertise 
into policy are more commonly confined to bureaucratic corridors, think 
tanks and seminar rooms. So it has been fascinating (and no doubt, for 
some inside the Berlaymont, rather surprising) to observe the intensity of 
discussion that has been generated over the past year about the structures 
and procedures for scientific advice within the European Commission.
The choice by President Juncker not to renew the post of chief scientific 
adviser (CSA) – a role created by his predecessor in 2012 and occupied 
for three years by the molecular biologist Anne Glover – was criticised 
by some as a backwards step, out of line with the broader march in many 
EU member states towards modern, evidence-informed policymaking. 
Others saw the move as an overdue recognition of the diversity of 
Europe’s decision-making cultures – what Sheila Jasanoff calls “civic 
epistemologies”.1 While the model of a presidential or prime ministerial 
science adviser is firmly established in countries like the US, UK, Ireland 
and New Zealand, it sits more awkwardly with the political cultures of 
Germany, France and other EU member states, which tend to rely on 
committees and more distributed sources of expertise. 
Brussels also has its own distinct political culture. In her essay in this 
collection, which is the fullest account to date of her three years as 
CSA, Anne Glover acknowledges that she was inadequately resourced to 
intervene effectively in the delicate balance of Commission decision-making. 
Vladimir Šucha, Director General of the Joint Research Centre, went further 
in a recent speech, describing the CSA as “a very difficult experiment” and 
arguing that “There’s no one person who can understand the milieu of 
28 member states”.2 
The introduction was updated in June 2015 to take account of developments in the European Commission.
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The decision to end the CSA experiment followed a public war of letters 
over the future of the role. In July 2014, a coalition of non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs), including Greenpeace, wrote to Juncker, arguing 
that: “The post of CSA is fundamentally problematic as it concentrates 
too much influence in one person…”.3 Soon afterwards, a letter in support 
of the CSA role was sent to Juncker, signed by forty scientific organisations 
and 773 individuals, which said “we cannot stress strongly enough our 
objection to any attempt to undermine the integrity and independence 
of scientific advice received at the highest level of the European 
Commission.”4 Further letters of support were sent by several scientific, 
business and civil society organisations, while a second, larger coalition of 
NGOs elaborated their opposition.5
The Moedas review
It initially appeared that President Juncker would renew the mandate of 
the CSA. Quizzed on the topic in July 2014 by British MEP Julie Girling, 
he indicated as much.6 And in his mission letter to Carlos Moedas, the 
incoming Commissioner for Research, Innovation and Science, Juncker 
emphasized the need to “make sure that Commission proposals and 
activities are based on sound scientific evidence”.7 But when the Barroso 
Commission left office at the end of October, Anne Glover’s formal mandate 
ended, and the CSA role was placed in limbo.8 This sparked fresh coverage, 
particularly in the British media, where there was limited engagement with 
the substance of the issue, but (viewed through the lenses of euroscepticism 
and/or anti-environmentalism) some took it as an opportunity to attack the 
European Commission, Greenpeace, or preferably both.9 
Speaking in November 2014 to Science magazine, a Commission 
spokesperson emphasized that “President Juncker believes in 
independent scientific advice”, but had not yet decided how to 
“institutionalize” the function.10 In January 2015, Juncker handed 
responsibility for the issue to Carlos Moedas, asking his Commissioner for 
Research, Innovation and Science “to reflect and present options to me 
before the summer on how to better institutionalise future scientific 
advice to the Commission.”11 Interviewed by Nature in March 2015, 
Moedas confirmed that he would “look for the most appropriate system 
for the commission — as opposed to the system that works best in the 
UK, or in any other particular country.”12 
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Beneath headline disagreements over the CSA, there are legitimate debates 
to be had about the most effective arrangements for scientific advice in the 
Commission. Roger Pielke Jr., a US science policy expert, argues that the 
decision to scrap the CSA “has actually done the scientific community 
a favour. For the past three years, most scientific organizations and 
their leaders seemed perfectly content with a symbolic, ineffectual CSA 
in the Commission. However, the termination of the office has forced 
a conversation that probably should have been occurring in far more 
prominent settings”.13 
A related point is made by the legal scholar Alberto Alemanno, who argues 
that “it is up to the new European Commission to prove the merits 
and, more specifically, the rationale for having yet another source of 
scientific advice in the EU.”14 As Alemanno points out in his introduction 
to a special issue of the European Journal of Risk Regulation on this topic,15 
it is important to place the CSA in context: numerous advisory mechanisms 
and bodies like the Joint Research Centre existed within the Commission 
long before the creation of the CSA role, and continue to exist today. 
So the Moedas review did not start with a blank sheet of paper, but sought a 
better way of joining up these various structures, drawing on best practices 
across the Member States, and learning from the progress made and 
obstacles encountered by Anne Glover during her tenure.
Watchdogs of the system
On 13 May 2015, over a lunch in Brussels for Nobel laureates, President 
Juncker and Commissioner Moedas unveiled their plans.16 The CSA will be 
replaced by a new “Scientific Advisory Mechanism”, consisting of a seven-
strong “high level group” of experts, who will be appointed before the end 
of the year. These experts, described by a senior official as “watchdogs of 
the system”,17 will be fully independent but supported by a team of around 
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twenty-five staff. This semi-autonomous secretariat will be based in DG 
Research and Innovation (rather like the Economic Policy Committee’s 
relationship to ECOFIN). Further resources of “up to €6 million” will be 
offered to Europe’s national academies to enable them to play a greater role 
in the provision of advice.18 Good working links will also be developed to 
the Commission’s in-house science service, the Joint Research Centre.
The overall objective of the new advisory mechanism will be to ensure that 
scientific advice given to the Commission:
• is independent of institutional or political interests;
• brings together evidence and insights from different disciplines and 
approaches;
• takes into consideration the specificities of EU policy making (e.g. 
different national perspectives and principles of subsidiarity); and
• is transparent.
In his remarks to the media on 13 May, Commissioner Moedas explained 
that he hopes to better match supply and demand for scientific advice.
Supply for scientific advice comes from academies, comes from learned 
societies, from the scientific community itself, and it comes definitely from 
in-house, from the European Commission and the JRC…So what we decided 
is that we would put resources into organising this supply…to make it 
possible to have scientific advice coming from these constituencies, these 
learned societies, these academies.”19 
On paper, as the following diagram shows, this is an elegant solution to a 
tricky design brief. Involving the academies is a particularly smart move, as 
it will allow the high-level group to draw on a far deeper pool of expertise. 
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Figure 1: The European Commission’s new Scientific Advisory   
 Mechanism20 
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to combine insights from several disciplines, which suggests at least one 
social scientist and one engineer joining natural scientists in the mix. And 
of course, connecting science to policy is a serious craft in itself, so a Nobel 
Prize may be less of a trump card than a few years of experience chalked up 
in a policy role.
The purpose of this collection
At this important juncture for European scientific advice, this book of 
essays is intended to provide a constructive set of contributions to debates 
that will continue over the next year, as the new mechanism is put in place 
and begins its work.
Robert Madelin opens the collection by reminding us that “our current 
and future challenges will only ever involve more science, not less”. 
He argues that there must be a commitment to embed science into the 
democratic process through the framework of Responsible Research and 
Innovation: to promote “early upstream public engagement aimed at 
bringing science more actively into the public debate on options and 
values from which any decision-making must derive its legitimacy.”
Anne Glover and Jan Marco Mueller echo this point, noting that digital 
technologies can enable greater citizen engagement. The Commission’s 
reliance on formalised committees has contributed to a disconnect with 
its constituents. They call for the creation of “forums in which citizens 
can discuss political choices based on the evidence”, and highlight the 
leadership that Europe’s science museums can offer in this regard.
The contribution from the Joint Research Centre calls for learning from 
science and technology studies; the creation of EU and global communities 
of practice; and Policy Labs which incorporate different disciplines and 
provides a space for experimenting with the latest policy innovations.
Switching focus to the European Parliament, Paul Rübig describes how 
the Science and Technology Options Assessment Unit (STOA) has recently 
committed to “an increased emphasis on foresight and informing the 
agenda-setting phase of the policy cycle, supported by more effective 
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and timely communication and the strengthening of political and 
scientific networks”. There is a real appetite to promote evidence-informed 
policy through innovative techniques, foresight, and engagement with the 
democratic process.
In her second essay, Anne Glover reflects with admirable openness and 
honesty on her time as CSA. A picture emerges of an under-resourced office 
with a poorly-defined remit. Glover acknowledges that “the CSA model 
is, of course, only one option to provide direct scientific advice to the 
President” and suggests that President Barroso “felt more comfortable 
with a committee-oriented approach to science advice”.
Doug Parr argues that a CSA role is flawed even in the best of 
circumstances. The concentration of the advisory function in one person 
risks a lack of accountability and transparency, when “society needs broad 
based, open evidence gathering to act as a bulwark against a policy 
stitch-up in favour of vested interests”. Kari Raivio, on the other hand, 
describes how he has recommended the creation of a CSA role in Finland in 
order to build “trust between the different cultures of government and 
science [through] patience and diplomacy”.
Jos van der Meer focuses instead on the role of national academies of 
science, whose “potential contributions … to the policy making process 
are not always maximised.” The European Academies Science Advisory 
Council (EASAC) tries to remedy this by “facilitating the sharing of 
expertise and resources between the science academies of the EU, 
Norway, and Switzerland.”
Savouring the mix
In their essay, Wolfgang Rohe and Jeannine Hausmann describe how private 
foundations, as financially and politically independent actors, “can trigger 
social processes of change that transcend party boundaries, contribute 
to the pluralization of debates, and provide evidence-based arguments 
that drive the agenda”. Ottmar Edenhofer and Martin Kowarsch liken 
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this role to one of cartography, “explor(ing) the political solution space 
through mapping out different pathways and their trade-offs or 
overlaps”. Crucially, final decisions must still be taken by policy makers.
The social sciences have a key role to play in framing and informing policy 
decisions. Ulrike Felt argues that Europe is inclined to overly technocratic 
ways of thinking which elevate the “Innovation Union” without making 
full use of the contribution of the social sciences, whose “integration 
will allow policy makers to profit from the added complexity in 
analysis and in the identification of potential solutions to problems.” 
Similarly, Andy Stirling offers a more expansive vision of the role of social 
science in helping European science and innovation policy to break 
free “of burgeoning instruments of justification and legitimation. 
Monovocal talk of sound ‘sound science’ or ‘evidence based policy’ (as 
if these determine particular decisions), are neither politically nor 
scientifically credible.… Like science itself, knowledge and innovation 
democracies are best seen not as destinations, but as struggles. And it 
is arguably in celebrating and nurturing such democratic struggles 
that the most pressing imperatives can be found.”
Holger Strassheim and Rebecca-Lea Korinek point out that policy makers 
must avoid thinking that behavioural governance, often known as 
“nudging”, is an easy short cut to good policy outcomes. However, the 
effort “might be worthwhile if it helps to redesign public policy beyond 
rational choice models, by cautiously taking into account the human 
factor.”
Claire Craig and Mike Edbury argue that improving understandings of risk 
is also worth the effort despite the frequent assumption amongst decision 
makers that “acknowledging uncertainties and the breadth of opinion 
and debate on an issue will inevitably lead to delay and complexity”. 
Finally, Jörg Hacker and Stefan Artmann focus on the biosciences in order 
to elucidate the role that science advice should occupy. It can “raise the 
probability of achieving a compromise” between stakeholders in a policy 
by acting as an “impartially sympathetic referee”.
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The scientific states we’re in
Debates in Brussels and across Europe about the politics and practices 
of scientific advice form part of a broader and intensifying international 
discussion of these issues. At the end of August 2014, scientists and 
policymakers from forty-eight countries gathered in Auckland, New Zealand 
to debate the science and art of scientific advice.21 Jointly hosted by Sir 
Peter Gluckman, Chief Science Advisor to the Prime Minister of New 
Zealand, and the International Council for Science (ICSU), the Auckland 
summit was the largest ever meeting of its kind, attracting science advisers, 
advisory bodies and academic experts from Albania to Zimbabwe, and a 
host of countries in between. 
Over two days of intense discussion, participants debated structures and 
methods for the provision of scientific advice in emergency situations, 
across national and disciplinary boundaries, and on contested topics, 
where science, values and politics collide. The meeting ended with a call 
to strengthen collaboration between advisory systems, an agreement to 
formalize the network, and a commitment to meet again in 2016. 
The Auckland process has now resulted in the creation of a new 
International Network for Government Science Advice (INGSA).22 This 
will provides a forum for policy makers, practitioners, academies, and 
academics to share experience, build capacity and develop theoretical and 
practical approaches to the use of scientific evidence in informing policy 
at all levels of government. INGSA is committed to diversity, recognizing 
the multiple cultures and structures of governance and policy development 
and does not seek to endorse any particular form or structure of science 
advice. It will operate under the general aegis of ICSU, with the Office of 
the Chief Science Advisor to the Prime Minister of New Zealand hosting its 
secretariat.
Alongside the umbrella provided by INGSA, the OECD’s Global Science 
Forum has recently published a review of scientific advice across its 
member countries;23 national governments including Finland and Japan are 
reviewing the organization of their systems;24 at an international level, fresh 
expert assessments are underway, such as IPBES (the Intergovernmental 
Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services);25 and new advisory 
committees have been established, for example a Scientific Advisory Board 
to the United Nations.26
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Across the diversity of advisory mechanisms and processes that now 
operate worldwide, common challenges persist: how to protect the 
independence of advice while ensuring that it is listened to; how to develop 
a trusted relationship with policymakers, while maintaining transparency 
and accountability in the eyes of the public and the science community 
alike; and how to undertake appropriate quality assurance. 
The science of scientific advice
How far can we go towards defining and codifying a ‘science of scientific 
advice’? At the Auckland meeting, several common challenges were 
identified which Europe’s new Scientific Advisory Mechanism will also need 
to reflect on in its own institutional and political context.
i) How to meet the demands and rhythms of the policy process
As Commissioner Moedas has recognised, debates about scientific advice 
often focus on the ‘supply-side’ of the science-policy interface. But the 
‘demand-side’ is equally important: advisory bodies need a sophisticated 
understanding of how policymaking processes work, and the pressures and 
constraints under which politicians, officials and decision makers operate.
Policy challenges arise across different time horizons, requiring very 
different responses. Modes of scientific advice that are most useful in 
emergency situations will rarely be the same as those required for long-term 
foresight or horizon scanning. Over the past decade, advisory bodies have 
had to navigate a number of crises with scientific dimensions. Examples 
include SARS, bird flu, the Great East Japan earthquake and tsunami, the 
Christchurch earthquake, hurricanes, flooding and the volcanic ash cloud 
over Europe. As a result, countries such as Japan, New Zealand and the UK 
now have improved protocols for scientific advice in emergencies.27 A key 
part of this involves communicating to the wider public, where providing 
clear advice while acknowledging areas of scientific uncertainty is the 
hallmark of mature crisis management.
Some structures, such as national academies, are better suited to providing 
formal advice against a longer time horizon, typically by convening expert 
panels and producing detailed reports. Others, such as chief scientific 
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advisers, may find it easier to provide rapid, informal advice in emergencies, 
by gathering inputs from a range of sources or forming ad hoc working 
groups. Responding to the different rhythms of policymaking, and striking 
the right balance between formal and informal inputs, are crucial aspects of 
effective scientific advice.
ii) The need to distinguish between ‘science for policy’ and ‘policy for 
science’
In many systems, advisers or advisory bodies combine a responsibility 
for the use of scientific evidence in policymaking (‘science for policy’) 
with a role in determining the budgets and structure of the research and 
innovation system (‘policy for science’). The lines between these can easily 
become blurred, not least because areas of ‘science for policy’ will have 
implications for particular research priorities or the funding structure. 
However, where possible, it is often useful to keep the two roles distinct, to 
avoid limiting the advisory remit by being seen primarily as a lobbyist for 
resources for science. 
Given their proximity to the scientific community, it can be a challenge for 
scientific advisers to extend the same commitment to impartial evidence 
to the management of the research system that they bring to other areas 
of policy. But it can be done: former US presidential science adviser John 
Marburger won plaudits for his willingness to ask tough questions about 
the evidence base for research funding in a 2006 speech, which led to the 
creation of the National Science Foundation’s programme on the ‘science 
of science and innovation policy’.28 Such efforts should focus not only on 
the economic case for research funding, but also on its social and public 
value, and on opening up debates about research priorities to more diverse 
perspectives.29
iii) The need for advisers to act as intermediaries, brokers and 
communicators
Scientists are typically appointed as advisers or expert committee members 
because of their deep expertise and standing in a particular field of 
research, but (except in technical committees) they may only rarely be 
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asked to provide advice which draws on their narrow area of expertise. 
More often, their role is to act as intermediaries, able to translate, aggregate 
and synthesize varied perspectives and sources of evidence.30
Roger Pielke Jr. identifies several roles that scientists can play in 
policymaking, and suggests that the most crucial of these is the “honest 
broker”, who is able to help decision makers to choose wisely between 
the available options on a given topic.31 It is important for advisers to be 
clear when they are moving from “honest broker” mode into more explicit 
advocacy of a particular policy position (as inevitably happens from time to 
time), as a failure to do so can undermine trust. 
Another aspect of the intermediary role is to look beyond the scientific 
content of a particular issue and communicate the broader methodological 
principles and concepts that underpin scientific evidence. William 
Sutherland and colleagues suggest twenty key points (such as “no 
measurement is exact”, “correlation does not imply causation” and 
“randomization avoids bias”) that policymakers and the wider public 
should bear in mind when interpreting scientific claims.32 
iv) The difficulty of resolving value conflicts through appeals to facts
Advisers and advisory bodies spend a lot of their time engaged in debates 
that reflect what some have dubbed ‘post-normal science’: where facts are 
uncertain, values are in dispute, stakes are high and decisions are urgent.33 
Arguments over climate change and GM crops are two obvious examples, 
but there are many others. 
Any issue where science is an important factor, but where values, ethics 
and politics are also in tension, is unlikely to be resolved through a simple 
statement of the scientific evidence.34 To assume a linear relationship 
between evidence and policymaking is often a mistake, and advisers 
need to recognize the many ways in which evidence, values and political 
judgments combine to produce decisions. As Sir Peter Gluckman argues, 
this is not to deny that science “should hold a privileged place” among 
the types of knowledge that may be meaningful to policymakers, but this 
privilege is fragile and depends on not overstating what is known, and on 
acknowledging scientific limits and uncertainties.35
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v) An increased reliance on multidisciplinary & interdisciplinary expertise
There is a growing recognition across advisory systems that identifying 
solutions to cross-cutting policy problems will require input not only from 
natural scientists, but also from engineers, social scientists and other 
experts. Some argue for ‘chief social scientists’ or ‘chief historians’ to be 
appointed alongside chief scientists, but creating separate structures ducks 
the more important challenge of how to integrate an appropriate mix of 
advice and evidence from a wide range of disciplines.36
In this context, it is helpful to distinguish between multidisciplinarity, which 
is usually about building better links between different disciplines, each of 
which continues to rely on its usual methods and modes of enquiry, and 
genuine interdisciplinarity which encourages various disciplines to cross 
subject boundaries, thus enabling, as Andy Stirling argues, “more radical 
interactions between different styles of knowledge, fostering potentially 
transformative solutions.”37
Similarly, effective advisory systems now draw their evidence from a wide 
range of methods, including scientific studies, randomized controlled 
trials, statistical data, socioeconomic models and forecasts, opinion polls, 
observational studies, and more qualitative modes of social analysis and 
public engagement. The growing availability of online ‘big data’ also has the 
potential to supplement and enrich existing methods. 
Approaches to scientific advice that draw on a more diverse range of 
disciplinary and methodological inputs may in turn lead to less emphasis 
on reaching a ‘consensus’, which may obscure legitimate scientific 
disagreements and uncertainties, in favour of more ‘plural and conditional’ 
modes of advice. 
vi) The need to link scientific advice to wider developments in evidence-
informed policymaking
In a number of countries, governments are showing a renewed enthusiasm 
for evidence-based policy and more ‘experimental’ approaches to 
policymaking, in which scientific methods, such as randomised control 
trials, are used to inform policy options.38 Examples include new work on 
evidence and policy in the Chinese Academy of Sciences, a new behavioural 
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sciences unit in the US Office of Science and Technology Policy, expanded 
work on behavioural sciences in the Joint Research Centre and a UK 
government network of ‘What Works’ evidence centres.39 A resurgence 
in the field of intervention research has seen it move beyond health and 
human services into new areas of policy testing as well. These efforts are 
often being driven from the demand side by policymakers and civil servants, 
and may operate separately from structures for scientific advice. But the 
synergies between these agendas are obvious, and scientific advisory bodies 
should position themselves at the forefront of this agenda. 
vii) Opportunities to link science policy research more closely to practice
Advisers and advisory panels need to draw more systematically on research 
in political science, social psychology, behavioural economics, and science 
policy which investigates “why certain kinds of knowledge are acted 
upon, and others are not.”40 This requires concerted efforts from both 
sides – academics and practitioners – to connect the latest scholarship to 
advisory processes and practices. 
In a recent essay, Sheila Jasanoff distils insights that can be drawn from 
three decades of research in the field of science and technology studies 
(STS). She acknowledges that the questions raised by STS sometimes can 
be “associated with unproductive wheel-spinning and relativism”, 
but insists that “the wheels, in my view, can spin with traction.” In 
democracies, no institutions should place themselves beyond critique: “If 
judges may not presume to stand above the law, still less should science 
advisers seek to insulate themselves from the critical gaze of the 
science of science advice.”41
viii) The need to strengthen exchange and learning across different 
systems
The INGSA network is a response to calls for a more open and inclusive 
global forum for such discussions.42 There are links here to wider agendas 
around ‘science diplomacy’ and collaboration in pursuit of shared science 
policy goals. Follow-up summits on scientific advice are already planned 
in Brussels in 2016 and in Japan in 2018. Every system can benefit from a 
process that brings together advisers, policymakers, practitioners, experts 
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and others on a regular basis to reflect on progress, share ideas and chart 
future agendas. This is an area where Anne Glover made tangible progress 
during her tenure as CSA, and the network of Member State science 
advisers and equivalents that she established should be maintained and 
expanded by the new mechanism that is being put in place.43
Experimental governance
The Commission’s first CSA was an experiment: some feel that it failed; 
others that it was never set up to succeed. But the new Scientific Advisory 
Mechanism is no less of an experiment. If the Commission is to live 
up to its ideals of evidence-informed policymaking, then in three years 
time, it should undertake a robust and independent evaluation of the 
new mechanism, comparing its progress, successes and any difficulties 
encountered with Anne Glover’s experience as CSA. As the recent OECD 
report points out, if we are to strengthen scientific advice, we need to 
undertake and embed more systematic analysis of what works and what 
doesn’t.44
For now though, the focus must be on putting the new mechanism in place 
and ensuring that it is fully equipped to meet the challenges of 21st century 
scientific advice. A search committee to identify members of the high-level 
group will start work any day now. After a turbulent year, the Commission 
has an opportunity to put in place a genuinely world class, interdisciplinary 
and independent advisory system. Europe’s scientists, its policymakers – 
and above all, its 500 million citizens – deserve nothing less.
James Wilsdon is Professor of Science and Democracy in the 
Science Policy Research Unit (SPRU) at the University of Sussex 
(@jameswilsdon). Robert Doubleday is Executive Director of the 
Centre for Science and Policy (CSaP) at the University of Cambridge 
(@robdoubleday). James Hynard is a researcher at the Centre for 
Science and Policy (@JamesHynard).
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SCIENCE AS THE FUEL OF THE PUBLIC 
POLICY MACHINE
Robert Madelin 
As a historian working in public policy, I have been consistently surprised 
by the way in which science gets ignored so easily, and often so routinely, 
in the actual practice of public policymaking. Over my own career almost 
all of my work has involved complex trade-offs that most frequently involve 
some kind of scientific knowledge in one way or another. While few would 
disagree that our current and future challenges will only ever involve more 
science, not less, in practice scientific advice frequently falls by the wayside 
when actual decisions are taken. The challenge of giving science its right 
place in public policymaking must be looked at again now, perhaps more 
urgently than ever. 
Current calls for a major modernisation of the state, sometimes called the 
Fourth Revolution, offer an opportunity to improve the way we make public 
policy, as part of an urgent agenda of active reform and reinvention.1 Yet 
many scientific claims are not always fully, nor indeed easily, reconciled with 
a democratic, values-based society. The question is thus how to reposition 
science not just so that it is more powerful, but – perhaps more crucially 
– so that it is more trusted. I will argue here that a modern and efficient 
policy machine should have scientific knowledge as a central component of 
decision-making, but with due consideration of society’s value preferences 
and democratic political judgment. 
In science we trust?
One does not need to look far into history to see why science might not 
be trusted. In the area of GM organisms, the science says that there is 
no specific scientific evidence of risks to human and animal health or 
the environment, yet most European parliaments have voted against the 
introduction of such organisms. Another example worth citing is the effect 
of electromagnetic radiation. Although several major studies have found 
that the use of mobile phones does not increase the risk of brain tumours, 
concern about radiation from masts and high-voltage cables continues to be 
widespread. 
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Other factors that add to a lack of trust are disagreements about 
methodologies that are not easy for the layman to follow, and what some 
see as the disproportionate importance given to outliers in the scientific 
literature. Also, perceptions that there is insufficient transparency about 
clinical trials, together with the asymmetry in financial means between 
those who might benefit commercially and those who are meant to oversee 
scientific evidence, only further add to public mistrust.
Inside government institutions, the position of a chief scientific adviser 
is also instructive. In one EU member state it took more than 50 years 
to establish such a role and have it supported with a network of senior 
scientists inside government. As I write, the usefulness and future of such 
a position at the EU level, and possible alternatives, are subject to intense 
debate. As Sir Peter Gluckman, Chief Science Advisor to the PM of New 
Zealand, so accurately notes, public trust in such a position can be very 
easily granted or withdrawn.2 
Acknowledging uncertainty
In order to build public trust in the capacity of science to inform 
policymaking and reposition science more effectively within public bodies, 
a new approach to using science as evidence is needed. Such an approach 
must break away from the common reductionist notion that scientific 
evidence can simply be linearly translated into public policies. Instead, 
scientific evidence must be correctly embedded into the democratic 
processes by which accountable public policy is made. A recent report by 
the National Research Councils of the US National Academies offers key 
elements of a new vision in which scientific evidence sits alongside both 
society’s value preferences and political judgment when it comes to policy 
decisions.3 
What does this mean in practice? First, the use of objective evidence must 
be significantly strengthened. This requires the more systematic production 
and uptake of high-quality scientific evidence, in all its varieties, on issues 
that society cares about. This must be accompanied by clear communication, 
not only of the results but also of the associated uncertainties and unknowns. 
The ability to speak openly and clearly on such issues is a vital skill that is not 
sufficiently developed across the board, not least because participants in the 
conversation speak to each other too rarely. 
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The sometimes radically different timescales involved in establishing 
evidence and making policy decisions must be designed into any effective 
system of advice. This also requires a much closer symbiosis between those 
who need and those who give advice; scientists can rarely reach consensus 
on new questions over a weekend, and policymakers often cannot wait for 
long periods for an academic consensus to be formed. Harold Macmillan 
famously noted that politics is almost always a response to events; to 
anticipate what evidence might be needed long periods in advance is 
seldom possible. These problems can be mitigated to some degree by using 
foresight systematically as a tool to think ahead, as well as having a well-
functioning ‘always-on’ system of scientific advisory networks.
Second, the training of civil servants must be overhauled to equip officials 
not only with the ability to understand and engage with scientific evidence 
and uncertainty, but also with a deeper understanding of the many cognitive 
biases we all face when reasoning. Daniel Kahneman’s insights – now more 
than 30 years old – help us to understand the shortcuts we take when faced 
with unintuitive evidence.4 Better basic training in science together with 
a deeper understanding of the limits and biases of cognition can help to 
develop new reflexes of critical analysis in policymaking, especially when 
faced with the all-too-common pressure of urgent decisions. 
Beyond evidence-based policymaking
But more objective evidence and more training will not be enough. It is 
important to situate scientific evidence in the context of society’s value 
preferences and political judgments in a democracy. Science should sit 
neither above nor below, but alongside values and politics. This is tricky 
to achieve in practice – and not only in Europe. But the ‘evidence change 
agenda’ has been hijacked at EU level by an over-simplistic debate between 
those arguing that ‘values trump evidence’ and those using the reductionist 
mantra of ‘evidence-based policy’ to advance a merely deregulatory goal. 
As a society we are not good enough at having a calm debate about the role 
of science in policymaking. How do we get away from a sound-bite-driven 
discourse on science in times of ever-increasing attention scarcity? 
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To begin with, we need to gather evidence more broadly from all sources – 
including from citizens – and then discuss more openly how to weigh and 
balance the different aspects. A credible, robust and open policymaking 
approach, using citizen-friendly digital tools, will play an important role in 
enabling the kind of high-quality debate that is needed to find trusted and 
sustainable solutions. While inconvenient scientific truths will inevitably 
form an important element of a sober debate, politics remains the art of 
the possible, and political decisions are seldom wholly divorced from a 
debate around values. It must be conceivable that even if science points in 
one direction, society might decide to go in another – provided this is done 
on the basis of a quality debate around values, and not by discrediting or 
distorting the scientific evidence.
Recent history has provided examples of such decisions. The German 
government’s decisions to phase out nuclear power, or the setting of 
minimum retail prices for alcohol, provide some examples of values-based 
political decision-making.
At the European level, some structures exist that can facilitate the necessary 
debates. In the domain of research ethics, there is the European Group on 
Ethics in Science and New Technologies (EGE), and also numerous ethical 
committees for research projects. The new paradigm around Responsible 
Research and Innovation (RRI) offers another route to the indispensable 
notion of see-through science.5 RRI effectively involves anyone with an 
interest early on in a dialogue. Rather than being the mere communication 
of science, it is early upstream public engagement aimed at bringing science 
more actively into the public debate on options and values from which any 
decision-making must derive its legitimacy. 
Four types of risk
A conflict around science as evidence can sometimes arise because 
scientists are ultimately also people, and in the end none of us is truly 
objective. However, by virtue of their training, scientists may well have a 
deeper understanding of what pitfalls there are when drawing conclusions 
from a given set of facts. Scientists also have a culture of peer review that 
is largely absent from other spheres of public life, and on which much of 
the trustworthiness of the scientific system relies. Yet despite these assets 
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there are four types of risk that can, and often do, limit the public’s trust in 
science.
1. Science without RRI – This is research in the proverbial ivory tower, 
which cuts itself off from the public discourse around society’s values 
that might underlie the research, and the debate on future options and 
the moral and ethical consequences which the research might imply. 
RRI is research which is built around robust mechanisms and a genuine 
desire for open engagement with a broad range of stakeholders. 
2. Scientists without respect for the public – Some fall into the trap 
of arrogance or, worse, denigrating, anti-democratic behaviour by 
treating the general public as ignorant, and unworthy or incapable of 
any meaningful debate. Many politicians have understood that treating 
their electorate with respect is a prerequisite for democratic legitimacy. 
Using science as evidence in policymaking similarly requires that those 
who seek to understand the future consequences of policies are not 
intellectually bullied into blind-faith acceptance of the science. While it 
is clear that a scientifically literate society will be better able to debate 
evidence and choices, trust can easily be destroyed if the public is 
disparaged or patronised. 
3. ‘Truth twisted by knaves to make a trap for fools’ – A third risk arises 
when businesses or interest groups interpret scientific facts beyond the 
truth they contain. Trust requires not just transparency but, perhaps 
more importantly, the absence of deception. Where such deception is 
not accidental, but is used to support ulterior motives, trust in both 
the science and its use for public policy can be eroded – perhaps 
irreversibly. 
4. Scientists themselves behaving badly, or being thought to do bad 
science – Science is, of course, not entirely free from rotten apples in 
the form of practitioners guilty of professional misconduct. Perhaps 
worse than the distortion of science, fraudulent science is another 
type of deception which affects trust in the entire discipline. Here, 
in particular, the media – including the scientific media – need more 
diligence. It is in relation to this threat to the credibility of the scientific 
enterprise that there is a benefit to having scientists inside the machine, 
including inside the media machine. 
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But even honest science may be mistrusted, often because of where it gets 
its money from – a form of guilt by association. Clear rules for conflicts 
of interest exist and must, of course, be applied, together with all the 
necessary elements of transparency and independent peer review that lie 
at the heart of science. But in a model where we expect the private sector 
to contribute significantly to investments in research, privately funded 
research will inevitably generate some of the knowledge which will inform 
policies. To be trustworthy, this research must be subject to the highest 
standards of scientific practice.
Towards trusted science
With all these risks to the trust placed in science what, then, makes for 
trusted science? Ultimately, countries and institutions that allow free speech 
for scientists form the bedrock of trusted science. It is only in settings 
where scientists are free to discuss openly that the necessary conditions 
for open, democratically legitimate scientific discourse can take place. 
Free speech also means that scientists should be able to admit to errors, to 
allow us to distinguish honest mistakes from systematic deception; even in 
countries where free speech is the norm, institutions are not always as open 
to dissenting voices as necessary. 
In conclusion, science needs help from everybody to become stronger 
and more trusted. Greater scientific literacy in society at large, but also 
inside institutions, is essential. Systematic access to independent scientific 
opinions is needed inside institutions, including policymaking institutions 
as well as the media. RRI must be thoroughly mainstreamed throughout the 
scientific enterprise. 
Robert Madelin is Director-General of DG Connect in the European 
Commission (@eurohumph).
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EVIDENCE AND POLICY IN THE  
EUROPEAN COMMISSION: TOWARDS A 
RADICAL TRANSFORMATION
Anne Glover and Jan Marco Müller
As the world around us becomes increasingly complex, the task of 
developing a new policy can easily spread across the portfolio of five, ten or 
even more Directorates-General (DGs) within the European Commission; 
policy on biofuels is a perfect example. As a consequence, the time has 
passed where each DG could gather and consider scientific evidence in 
isolation. At the same time, disruptive technologies and social innovations 
are changing our way of life at an accelerating speed, and policymaking is 
not immune to this. 
As a consequence, decision-making increasingly depends on advice given 
by science and technology in order to deliver the most innovative and 
effective policies. However, there is also an increasing uneasiness among 
both citizens and politicians that policies are becoming too technocratic, 
with solutions being ‘dictated’ by experts rather than taking into account 
the beliefs of the wider public. This is not a problem with the evidence per 
se – this remains the same regardless of ideologies and public opinion – but 
a problem with how evidence is used and communicated.
Thanks to modern information technologies, evidence can now be delivered 
in real time and from a multitude of sources, including big data gathered 
by citizens on their smart phones. This creates new opportunities for the 
involvement of citizens in policymaking (so-called ‘open policymaking’). 
At the same time, this has increased the need to differentiate ‘junk’ science 
from trustworthy science, while also increasing the pressure on the 
Commission to be as transparent and interactive as possible. 
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Stuck in the past
The policymaking procedures of European institutions (and in fact, of most 
political bodies around the world) are still rooted in the 20th century, relying 
as they do on formalised committees, stakeholder consultations and expert 
groups. In EU policymaking this process is known as ‘comitology’ – a word 
that in itself symbolises why citizens have fallen out of love with Europe. At 
most, there are web-based ‘public consultations’, which sometimes gather 
embarrassingly few comments from across the EU. Take for example a 
consultation carried out in autumn 2014 on the review of the Commission’s 
impact assessment procedure, one of the key elements in its policymaking. 
This gathered just 162 responses from the 508 million citizens of the EU. 
Despite these processes being public, citizens are largely disconnected 
from them, and this disconnection feeds the populist narrative of ‘Brussels’ 
meddling with everybody’s lives without asking what citizens want.
Despite the demand from society to be more transparent and interactive, 
the evidence-gathering process of the Commission is largely opaque to 
citizens. Currently there is no harmonised procedure for the gathering, 
use and communication of scientific evidence, and legislative documents 
emanating from the different DGs do not necessarily describe all their 
sources of evidence – and if they do, there is often no justification of how 
the choices made relate to the evidence.
Each DG has its own sources of evidence, which may include the 
Joint Research Centre (JRC), various EU agencies, standing scientific 
committees, ad hoc expert groups, as well as contract work done by third 
parties. There is, however, little guidance on which of these to use, when 
and how. Moreover, DGs have a tendency to use the resource they are 
familiar with: for example, making effective use of ‘their’ agency only, even 
when other EU agencies could make important contributions. Working 
methods also vary considerably, which decreases transparency and makes 
scrutiny difficult. In many cases, desk officers rely on costly third-party 
contractors to collect and analyse data, ignoring the fact that there is an 
in-house science service, the JRC, with 3000 staff and an annual budget 
exceeding €300 million.
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There are Commission guidelines,1 published in 2002, on how to collect 
and use expertise. These lay out in an elaborate way the principles of good 
evidence gathering. However, these principles are not always respected 
in practice, and the fact that these guidelines have not been revised in the 
last 12 years might suggest a lack of interest in improving the processes 
of evidence gathering. The ongoing revision of the guidelines for impact 
assessment does, however, provide an opportunity for change.
Inefficient evidence
The lack of standard procedures around evidence gathering and analysis 
leads to decreased efficiency and increased cost. Moreover, it makes the 
evidence gathering prone to political intervention, in that evidence is more 
likely to be gathered in a biased manner with the aim of suiting a particular 
political view – ‘policy-biased evidence’ rather than ‘evidence-based policy’. 
One of the consequences is that the impact assessments prepared to 
accompany policy proposals may be deliberately limited in the options they 
consider, with the aim of achieving a desired outcome. Although the Impact 
Assessment Board provides some form of peer review, it mainly focuses on 
the overall process of the impact assessment, the methods used and the 
reporting. It does not carry out a scientific review of the data and evidence 
used, the sources of these data, or the choices made in the selection of 
evidence. This increases the risk of regulatory failure and public criticism. 
The lack of openness in evidence gathering has also resulted in impact 
assessments being focused far more on risks than on opportunities, leading 
to a rather stringent interpretation of the precautionary principle (which, 
in itself, remains valid but can be misused to block progress rather than 
allowing us to innovate by managing associated risks).
Like many public bodies, the Commission struggles to be forward-looking 
and is often caught by surprise by technological and societal innovations. 
Few DGs are able to define their needs for evidence beyond a two-year time 
frame. Historically, foresight activities have been carried out in various 
corners of the Commission, but not in a coherent and shared manner. 
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Even when Commission proposals are based on the best possible evidence, 
the evidence often gets diluted in Parliament and Council. While politicians 
must have discretion as to whether they want to follow the evidence or not, 
it is worrying that the European Council has no science service, and the 
majority of Member States do not have a formally appointed government 
science adviser. Moreover, the Research Service of the European Parliament 
was only established in October 2013 and is still in its infancy. All this 
increases the risk that politicians will make decisions on very technical EU 
legislation without access to the necessary expertise. 
An evidence structure unfit for purpose
In the JRC, the Commission has an enormous in-house resource at hand. 
The JRC is not only the second-largest DG, but is probably the only 
governmental science service in the world which has the rank of a ministry 
(i.e. a DG in Commission terms). The JRC produces internationally-
recognised, high-quality science based on first-class infrastructures, and 
delivers scientific-technical support to the policy DGs of the Commission 
in a manner that is independent of national or commercial interests. 
Although the JRC can publish without restrictions, it is not entirely free of 
political pressure, being subject to a Policy Commissioner and operating 
in a ‘customer relationship’ with other DGs. However, the JRC is widely 
unknown outside the Commission (except in some scientific circles) and 
internally there is still a lack of awareness of what it can do. The fact that 
more than 90 per cent of JRC staff are located outside Brussels does not 
help to foster interaction. 
Some DGs (such as DG Health and Consumers, and DG Research and 
Innovation) have scientific advisory committees, while others do not. With 
a few exceptions (e.g. the Chief Economist in DG Economic and Financial 
Affairs), DGs do not have science advisers. The existence and mandate 
of advisory committees seems to be ad hoc and a result of historical 
developments. For instance, it is unclear why the mandate of the European 
Group on Ethics covers only science and new technologies, but not business 
ethics.
The strong scientific expertise existing in EU agencies such as the 
European Medicines Agency, the European Environment Agency or the 
European Food Safety Authority is not fully exploited. The EU agencies 
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themselves feel that they could do much more to support the European 
Commission with evidence – if they were asked. However, interaction is not 
straightforward because the agencies are very diverse in their mandates and 
setups, and each agency has its own rules and membership. In addition, the 
proliferation of EU agencies has led to a certain duplication of competence 
and activity, and has perhaps justifiably triggered criticism from Member 
States.
The Chief Scientific Adviser (CSA) established by President Barroso in 
2012 and then discontinued by President Juncker in 2014 gained high 
public visibility and quickly developed into a champion for the use of 
scientific evidence by the Commission, both as a ‘voice of science’ at the 
political level and as a ‘scientific ombudsman’ for third parties. The CSA 
was instrumental in establishing for the first time a network of government 
science advisers across the Member States (the European Science Advisers 
Forum) and supporting the new EU Agencies Network of Science Advisers, 
which aimed at better coordination. 
The CSA also established a formal Foresight Network in the Commission, 
which currently involves 21 different DGs and more than 200 participating 
staff. The fact that it was possible to put in place such a network of 
foresight experts, without adding any structural or administrative burden, 
is proof that transversal initiatives are possible in the Commission. The 
will and interest to cooperate exists at working level; it just needs to be 
unleashed through a top-level mandate.
Radical transformation is possible
As a matter of principle, evidence needs to be procured from the widest 
possible range of sources and used and communicated in an unbiased 
manner. There must be complete transparency on what questions are used 
to request evidence, where the evidence comes from, how it is analysed, 
how it is prioritised and what the conclusions are. The same standards 
must apply across all Commission services. At the end of any process there 
will always be a democratic political decision – which may or may not go 
against the evidence – but the evidence-gathering process itself must not be 
compromised by a politically desired outcome, as this reduces options and 
exposes an Achilles heel to potential critics. 
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A restructured and prioritised JRC could play a more central role in the 
policymaking process. As the Commission’s ‘evidence service’, the use or at 
least the consultation of the JRC should be compulsory for all Commission 
departments. This would increase coherence and reduce the costs of 
external advice. In order to fulfil this role, the JRC would carry out research 
and coordinate wider scientific networks across Europe and worldwide, as 
well as having direct access to the results of research projects funded by 
Horizon 2020. To achieve this, the JRC needs to retain its current flexibility 
to operate as a scientific body within the Commission framework. 
At the same time, the JRC itself must become better aligned with the 
needs of the Commission and the demand for a fit-for-purpose regulatory 
environment. The JRC must be proactive, rather than reactive, when 
providing inputs into the policy agenda. Inevitably, the JRC and its political 
masters will have to prioritise strategically what support it can provide 
within its given resource envelope. As the ultimate goal of the JRC is to 
support better regulation, a strong link to the Commission’s First Vice-
President in charge of regulatory fitness should be established. In that 
sense, the evidence service (JRC) should be treated in the same way as the 
legal service (SJ) and the procedural service (the Secretariat-General), as 
all three serve a Commission-wide purpose.
A strengthened role for science advisers
While the new Commission has decided to discontinue both the function 
of the CSA and the President’s Science and Technology Advisory Council 
(STAC), it is evident that only having a technical science service like 
the JRC is not enough. A good level of scientific literacy is required in 
the policymaking parts of the Commission, in order to be able to frame 
evidence needs. Such expertise exists in many DGs, but not in a coherent 
manner. In our view, each DG with a political mandate should have a science 
adviser, ideally attached directly to the respective DG. The task of the 
science adviser would be to identify the needs for scientific evidence within 
the DG, formulate the related questions and serve as liaison with the JRC 
and external evidence providers. Such science advisers could initially be 
introduced in a budget-neutral manner, e.g. by seconding staff from the JRC 
or by identifying suitable individuals among DG staff. 
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The science advisers from the different DGs would form an internal network 
which would allow quick identification of policy files with a cross-DG 
dimension, and enable a coherent framing and handling of the relevant 
evidence. Likewise, there is a need for a scientific expert on the Impact 
Assessment Board who would have the task of carrying out a sanity check 
on whether proposals are based on sound and timely evidence, and whether 
they have the potential to unleash innovation rather than hamper it.
There is still an open question as to how the President or other 
Commissioners can quickly access scientific advice when required, and how 
to ensure that the voice of science is ‘in the room’ when political decisions 
are taken. The experience of the CSA role in the Barroso Commission 
demonstrated the need to have some sort of ‘scientific ombudsman’, i.e. a 
port of call when citizens or interest groups think that the Commission is 
ignoring the scientific evidence. As this might imply complaints about the 
work of the JRC, it would be healthy to keep this role separate from the 
JRC.
Finally, the Commission should continue to play a leading role in the 
emerging network of government science advisers in Europe (the European 
Science Advisers Forum), with the aim of fostering consensus-building 
around the scientific evidence underpinning European policies, and aligning 
science advice to the Commission with that given to Member States. This 
would ensure better-informed debate in the European Council, and would 
allow politicians to focus debate on political choices, rather than on how to 
interpret the evidence.
Making the gathering and use of evidence transparent
In line with President Juncker’s call for more transparency of the 
Commission, we suggest establishing a Commission-wide ‘evidence portal’. 
Every DG which requires scientific evidence for the development of a policy 
would publish on this portal open ‘calls for evidence’, with the support of 
the science adviser within that DG. All evidence providers – which could 
be national academies, universities, businesses or NGOs listed in the 
Commission’s registry of expert groups, as well as the JRC itself – could 
then submit their evidence via the portal. All evidence submitted (with the 
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possible exception of commercially sensitive information), as well as its 
sources, would be open and transparent to everyone. 
The JRC could then review the evidence and make a quality-based analysis 
using its expert knowledge, which would then be submitted to the relevant 
DG and made public. The DG would then develop policy options and take a 
political decision about which evidence to take into consideration, and which 
not, the decision being made transparent on the portal. The DG would need 
to explain why certain evidence has or has not been taken into consideration, 
thus making it transparent to citizens why a political choice has been made. 
This would also ensure feedback to the evidence providers themselves, as 
most of them currently have the impression that their evidence disappears 
into a ‘black hole’, which makes it difficult to design scientific evaluation 
systems that provide an incentive for policy-support work.
Empowering citizens to take part in the political debate
These measures would enable a much more open and informed debate with 
citizens – preventing the Commission from hiding behind a technocratic 
approach to evidence. It would also be fully transparent to citizens when 
economic, social, ethical or political imperatives override the scientific 
evidence. This would bring much more honesty into debates, and avoid the 
impression that science and technology ‘dictate’ a particular outcome, or 
are being given more weight than democratically elected governments and 
parliaments. Similarly, it would avoid evidence being used to justify certain 
decisions which are in reality being taken for a political reason. 
Public debate would focus on the political choices to be made, while 
taking the evidence base into consideration. To foster societal debate, the 
Commission should support web-based platforms that inform citizens, in 
an unbiased manner, about the risks and opportunities of new technologies, 
and empower them to make up their minds. Also, there is a need to 
stimulate initiatives such as an EU Science Media Centre, to help scientists 
to communicate more effectively with the media. Last but not least, there is 
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a need to create forums in which citizens can discuss political choices based 
on the evidence. Europe’s largest science museums – which are among 
the most highly trusted institutions in Europe – have already offered the 
Commission the use of their facilities to organise such debates, physically 
and online.
The start of the new Commission is an ideal moment to transform the 
scientific advisory and evidence-gathering system, with the aim of 
enhancing regulatory fitness and transparency, reconnecting citizens with 
the European project and restoring confidence in the EU’s institutions. 
The new Commission has the opportunity to set the gold standard for 21st 
century public administration.
Professor Dame Anne Glover CBE is Vice-Principal of External 
Affairs and Dean for Europe at the University of Aberdeen, and was 
the former Chief Scientific Adviser to the President of the European 
Commission, 2012–2014 (@AnneGlover_EU).  
Jan Marco Müller works on international, interinstitutional and 
stakeholder relations at the Joint Research Centre, and was 
previously Chief of Staff to the European Commission CSA.
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42  EVIDENCE AND INSTITUTIONS
THE IN-HOUSE SCIENCE SERVICE:  
THE EVOLVING ROLE OF THE JOINT  
RESEARCH CENTRE 
Vladimír Šucha, David Wilkinson, David Mair, Martin Ahbe and 
Stephen Davies
The European Commission’s Joint Research Centre (the JRC) operates 
daily in the so-called ‘post-normal science’ environment, where facts 
are uncertain, values are in dispute, stakes are high and decisions are 
urgent, across several policy areas, such as biofuels, shale gas, endocrine 
disruptors, nanomaterials, GMOs and banking structural reform.1 
The JRC is a boundary-crossing organisation at the interface between 
science and policy, having a foot in both the scientific community and, as 
one of the departments of the Commission, the policy community. Its work 
programme is developed with the other departments and formally adopted 
by the Commission each year. the JRC therefore produces much of the 
knowledge needed to develop and implement EU policy.
What is the JRC?
As the Commission’s in-house science service, the JRC has a key role in 
putting evidence at the centre of EU policymaking, by producing evidence 
for policy in an impartial, transparent manner. We do this with around 2000 
scientific and technical staff, in six locations across Europe, across a broad 
range of disciplines. Our research capacity includes, for example, around 40 
large-scale research facilities (such as the Vehicle Emissions Laboratory); 
online databases (such as the Emission Database for Global Atmospheric 
Research); knowledge centres (such as the one for energy efficiency) and 
observatories (such as the Bioeconomy Observatory); as well as more 
than 100 economic, bio-physical and nuclear models. In order to maintain 
our scientific excellence and to serve as a science hub, we are actively 
involved, not only in Europe but worldwide, in more than 100 networks and 
cooperate with over 1000 research organisations.2 
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The JRC is embedded within the Commission and thus, for example, we 
are fully involved in the policymaking process, providing knowledge both 
informally (e.g. in discussions with policy colleagues formulating a new 
proposal) and in a formal manner (e.g. responding to an inter-Commission 
consultation). Our integrity is crucial, as well as our independence from 
national, commercial or civil society interests, and our recognised status 
as an unbiased and policy-neutral science service. This is particularly 
important in complex policy issues where the science is contested, or 
where policy decisions will have significant economic consequences. Other 
Commission departments which are responsible for a particular policy field 
need the JRC to take a policy-neutral position, to provide ongoing support 
and to be transparent in the analysis, data and models we provide.
Our expertise is used in a number of ways across the range of EU policies 
(including agriculture, economics, industry, energy, climate, environment, 
transport, consumer protection and security):
1. Direct support to a policy department, e.g. for an ex-ante impact 
assessment accompanying a policy proposal or for the implementation 
of a Directive.3 
2. Reporting directly to Commissioner Tibor Navracsics, who is one of 
the voices of science for policy at, for example, debates between all the 
Commissioners.
3. Providing support to EU Member States and fulfilling international legal 
obligations, also on behalf of the EU, to international organisations.4 
Our activities cover:
• Policy anticipation: via horizon scanning and foresight studies to 
identify emerging issues, anticipate future policy needs and contribute 
to the agenda setting of the Commission and beyond.
• Policy formulation: providing the evidence that enables the 
Commission to assess the impacts of various policy options. 
For example, policy initiatives published by the Commission are 
accompanied by an impact assessment evaluating the potential 
economic, social and environmental consequences of the initiative. This 
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impact assessment gives decision-makers (scientific) evidence on the 
need for EU action and the advantages and disadvantages of alternative 
policy choices. These policy initiatives are then scrutinised by and 
negotiated with the other EU institutions.5 
• Policy implementation: following adoption of any legislation by the 
European Council and Parliament, and transposition into national 
law by EU Member States, the JRC supports the monitoring of its 
implementation, for example through the development of indicators; 
remote satellite sensing; maintenance of databases and information 
systems; development of reference materials, measurements and 
standards; and running of EU Reference Laboratories, observatories 
and networks.
• Ex-post policy evaluation: where the JRC undertakes assessments of 
the effectiveness, efficiency and added value of EU policies.6 
In 2013, we produced 1244 policy-support deliverables, 311 tangible 
policy-support impacts and 634 articles in peer-reviewed journals.7 
Science in EU policymaking
EU policymakers are increasingly confronted with a wide array of 
intractable problems such as climate change, economic inequality, ageing 
populations, energy and food security, and water scarcity. They need their 
decisions to be informed by the best available science from across multiple 
disciplines, as these challenges no longer arrive in neat discipline-shaped 
or department-shaped boxes. This is crucial because the wrong policy can 
result in grave economic and social costs, and erode trust in governing 
institutions. The good news is that never before in human history has so 
much scientific knowledge been produced, and never has it been so easily 
accessible. We now have a better understanding of our planet, our economy, 
our society and of ourselves than at any other time in history. 
We know that policy is not developed on the basis of science alone. Indeed, 
this should never be the case; in a democracy, science is only one part of 
policy development, which is ultimately decided by the values of society 
as a whole. Science can, however, help to put policy decisions on a sound 
factual basis and to focus political debate on the values at stake rather than 
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on disputing the facts. Since science has a cultural and political authority, 
it also has a responsibility to examine the impacts of policy decisions. In 
addition, science can help to mitigate the risks in policymaking; identify 
innovative policy alternatives; provide early warnings of new challenges 
thrown up by the latest science and technology; deploy systems thinking to 
help policy escape from ‘silo thinking’; and help to combat short-termism 
in policymaking. Science can thus support the proper functioning of the 
political decision-making process mediated through democratic institutions.
As an illustration, consider the challenge of developing a coherent policy 
balancing competitiveness with environment and safety, requiring trade-
offs to be made. For example, reducing car emissions makes engines 
more expensive, and there is a balance to be struck by choosing the point 
where the costs start to rise very steeply for relatively little improvement 
in the level of emissions. This point can only be identified though a proper 
scientific analysis of the issues. 
Challenges for effective science advice
Clearly the link between science and policy is not straightforward, and there 
is a vigorous debate on how policymakers use, or do not use, scientific 
evidence. Whilst there is extensive literature on the supply-side, there is less 
known from the demand-side perspective, i.e. on what policymakers actually 
need and how they use scientific evidence, especially in EU Member States.8 
DG JRC, as part of the Commission, is well placed to contribute to both the 
supply and demand sides of this debate.
From our own analysis, we have identified three main challenges facing the 
JRC and policy development more generally, namely timing (of research and 
policy cycles), the role of the JRC (honest broker rather than advocate or 
pure scientist) and communication (between scientists and policymakers).9 
It matters a lot when our advice is given, how and by whom it is given, and 
where it is given. To be effective, the JRC has to provide its input at the 
right time and in the right way, since there is no value for the Commission 
in providing an excellent scientific report if it comes too late to inform 
policy development and is too long and complicated for policymakers to 
quickly grasp. Scientific evidence is also effectively provided via both formal 
and informal channels.
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Scientists also need insight into human behaviour, empathy with 
policymakers, an understanding of the role of emotion and values in policy 
decisions, and a grasp of the policy context.10 Insights of this type can be 
provided by the discipline of Science and Technology Studies. For example, 
in addition to having a good understanding of the policy context, the most 
successful scientists informing policy do this by developing a good dialogue 
with policymakers; empathising with the constraints they are subject to; 
recognising that policymakers, flooded with a myriad of other scientific, 
lobby-group and think-tank papers and postings on social media (Twitter, 
blogs, etc.), rarely read academic journals nor a lengthy report; accepting 
that policymakers’ decisions are not solely based on scientific evidence; 
and tailoring their advice within the policy context. Scientists must also 
recognise that the vast majority of policymakers do not have a scientific 
background.11 
A particular challenge is the use and misuse of science in policy debates. 
We know that scientific viewpoints are given to policymakers by many 
stakeholders, giving rise to a flood of inputs which can sometimes create 
conflict or confusion. This can also lead to the facts and science itself being 
questioned, and to ‘cherry-picking’ – i.e. selecting evidence that supports 
a pre-determined policy viewpoint (also known as ‘policy-based evidence’). 
Since stakeholders tend to want a high degree of certainty, they may use 
the uncertainties that are part and parcel of scientific evidence to question 
the validity of the science. Such questioning, or interpreting the scientific 
evidence in different ways, may dilute consideration of the values at stake 
and lead to a general distrust of science.
The JRC’s evolving role in EU policymaking
The JRC has the ambition to become one of the world’s leading 
organisations in the practice of transforming scientific knowledge 
into evidence to support policymaking. We aim to be at the heart of 
policymaking in the European Commission by providing relevant knowledge 
and science-based tools and methods that can be used to develop, roll out 
and assess policies, as well as to anticipate emerging societal challenges. To 
this end, we are currently considering how to better support this evidence-
based policy culture, as outlined below.
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In the EU there is no standard approach to science advice to policy – nor 
should there be one. The myriad ways in which science is used to inform 
policy across Europe can only benefit from having a debate on what works. 
Broadly there are five different models in the EU:
• Collegial and hierarchical bodies such as various forms of councils, 
committees, etc.
• Research-based organisations, ranging from policy-oriented think tanks 
to intermediary agencies
• Networks such as those of universities and research institutes
• Scientific academies and foundations 
• (Chief Scientific) Advisers attached to a Prime Minister’s or President’s 
office.
A distinction can also be made on whether consultation of a scientific advice 
body is compulsory as part of the parliamentary process (as in Estonia and 
France, for example) or not (e.g. Austria and Belgium). If not, scientific 
advice may, in some instances, be requested by individual parliamentarians 
or committees (e.g. in Germany). Europe can thus be characterised by 
the sheer diversity of models for scientific advice: Ireland and the United 
Kingdom have a government chief scientist; Croatia has advisers attached 
to both the President’s and Prime Minister’s offices; in some Member States 
(e.g. Denmark, Poland and Hungary) this role is fulfilled by the President of 
the National Academy of Sciences; others (e.g. Germany) have one or more 
scientific advisory boards; while Spain and Sweden use senior ministry 
representatives. It is not uncommon for a combination of these different 
approaches to be used in the same Member State. A further level of science 
advice occurs in those Member States with a federal structure (e.g. Austria, 
Germany and Belgium), where decisions are taken at both regional (e.g. 
Länder) and federal level.
Consider, for example, the practice within the Commission, where in 
addition to the JRC there are projects funded via the Horizon 2020 
programme which are required to bring out more the policy relevance 
of their work; external consultants undertaking studies for a specific 
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Directorate-General; various (scientific) committees; EU agencies (e.g. 
European Food Safety Authority, Fundamental Rights Agency); and 
Directorates-Generals having some research capability (e.g. DG Economic 
and Financial Affairs), or directly managing entities or networks (e.g. 
European Migration Network for Home Affairs) or having direct links 
with research institutes (e.g. European University Institute for Climate 
Action and for Energy). On top of this, there are numerous external think 
tanks, lobbyists, associations (e.g. within specific industries), NGOs, 
international organisations, etc. who also provide their insights to inform 
EU policymaking.
Developing a community of practice across the EU (and globally) would 
strengthen cooperation and exchange of best practice at all levels of 
decision-making in the EU (within cities, regions, Member States and EU-
wide). This could then lead to more effective policies with smarter and more 
efficient spending of taxpayers’ money, in a way that brings fairness and 
promotes growth and jobs. As a complementary activity, organising summer 
schools on science advice to policy, in collaboration with other leading 
organisations, would provide an opportunity to both discuss and provide 
training in the latest state-of-the-art analysis and thinking on science advice 
to policy. 
Improving the use of evidence to inform policy development 
The Commission, like many other organisations, is faced with an 
increasingly vast amount of knowledge obtained from various sources. In 
order to improve our knowledge management practices, the JRC is creating 
European Knowledge Centres whose purpose is to be the reference for 
all stakeholders (policymakers, industry and academia) in a given policy 
field, with state-of-the-art knowledge and information to help policymakers 
establish what works. Such centres would provide a comprehensive, 
quality-checked, accessible repository for data, knowledge, methodologies 
and tools, and would also offer a qualitative and quantitative, forward-
looking perspective via modelling and foresight studies. Examples of such 
knowledge centres would be for Disaster Management, Energy Efficiency, 
Financial Aspects and Food Authenticity. As a complementary, related 
development, the systemic change in the modus operandi of research 
via Science 2.0 provides possibilities to have the best scientific evidence 
available to inform policy.12
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Another important area where the JRC is ideally placed is in the promotion 
of policy coherence, such as inter alia concerning the environmental 
dimension in economic and competition policies. As outlined previously, 
policy challenges are now increasingly interdependent and systemic, and 
cannot be addressed by a single policy field only. Indeed the structure of 
the current Commission specifically aims to break down ‘silo thinking’ and 
to promote collaborative working in order to achieve more consistent and 
coordinated policy development.13 The JRC has a clearly identified role as 
a service providing support across the Commission through its knowledge 
and expertise.14 Because the JRC does not have a policy-development 
mandate it can, for example, provide the broader perspective for the 
development of a comprehensive policy, identifying and incorporating the 
linkages between different policy fields. 
Fresh insights into the way we develop policy might be learnt from a Policy 
Lab which integrates different disciplines, including horizon scanning, 
foresight and behavioural sciences, and uses the latest policy-innovation 
techniques to tackle complex systemic problems. Currently there are such 
labs in Denmark, Finland and the United Kingdom, as well as in the USA 
and the World Bank.15 They provide a forum for policymakers to develop 
innovative, integrated solutions; use foresight studies to tackle complex 
problems and identify forward-looking solutions; and address behavioural 
change that can help to focus on policy impacts for EU citizens in a 
practical way. 
The way ahead
The JRC has made progress in its understanding, and in developing its 
capacity to improve how it provides scientific evidence to inform policy. 
This has also included developing good contacts with some of the leading 
experts and institutes in this field, not only in Europe but worldwide. 
Indeed, even though institutionally the JRC lies within the Commission, still 
we face the same or similar challenges as other policy-informing entities 
which are external to policymaking bodies. There is thus a need to mutually 
share all our experiences. 
We consider that practitioners who provide science advice to policy require 
different skills from those of a pure scientist. Indeed the role may not be 
suited, or indeed relevant, to all scientists. Owing to the JRC’s institutional 
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setup, we have skill sets ranging from pure scientists to those who bridge 
the science–policy interface. 
But to enhance still further the capacity of science to inform better policy, 
there is a need for a broader, cross-disciplinary understanding of the 
policymaking process and the role of scientific evidence in this. Clearly 
there is no deficit in the amount of knowledge that can be supplied, but 
we require more understanding of the need for scientific evidence, how 
it is actually used, plus the constraints from the demand side (i.e. by 
policymakers). Likewise, policymakers themselves could benefit from 
understanding better how knowledge is produced and how it can be used to 
inform policy development. 
Whilst there are challenges to more effective use of science to inform 
policymaking, nevertheless it becomes more and more a necessity for our 
societies. The scientific expertise and competence of the JRC mean that we 
can provide the best available evidence to inform policy development and 
apply scientific rigour when analysing research conducted elsewhere. 
Professor Vladimír Šucha (@VladimirSucha) is Director-General of the 
JRC (@EU_ScienceHub), David Wilkinson is Director of the Institute 
for Environment and Sustainability, David Mair is the Head of Economy, 
Growth, Safety and Security Unit (@DavidMair4), Martin Ahbe is the 
Senior Expert, Policy Support Coordination Directorate, and Stephen 
Davies is the Policy Analyst, Economy, Growth, Safety and Security Unit.
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1. ‘Post-normal science’ is a concept developed by Silvio Funtowicz, a former the JRC 
scientist, and Jerome Ravetz. See S. Funtowicz and J. Ravetz, ‘Post-Normal Science’, 
International Society for Ecological Economics, February 2003. 
2. Further details, including outputs, are available from the the JRC Science Hub at 
https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/
3. Re the former, for example, to support the revision of a Directive on Deposit 
Guarantee Schemes in the banking sector. See http://ec.europa.eu/finance/bank/
guarantee/index_en.htm. Re the latter, such as developing Best Available Techniques 
Reference Documents (BREFs). See http://eippcb.jrc.ec.europa.eu/reference/
4. Such as for crisis monitoring and provision of information (e.g. regarding forest 
fires and floods) and in the nuclear sector, and the Euratom Treaty Chap. III Art. 36 
and 39, Recommendation 2000/473/Euratom and Council Decisions 87/600 and 
05/14929, including for the International Atomic Energy Authority.
5. Notably the Council of the European Union and the European Parliament. Further 
details on the EU’s decision-making process may be found at http://europa.eu/eu-
law/decision-making/procedures/
6. As part of the Commission’s Regulatory Fitness and Performance programme 
(REFIT), which aims to make EU law simpler and reduce regulatory costs, thereby 
contributing to a clear, stable and predictable regulatory framework supporting 
growth and jobs. See http://ec.europa.eu/smart-regulation/refit/
7. DG JRC Annual Activity Report 2013, available at http://ec.europa.eu/atwork/
synthesis/aar/doc/jrc_aar_2013.pdf 
8. See, for example, the outcomes of the Science Advice to Governments conference 
in August 2014, available at http://www.globalscienceadvice.org/ and Doubleday, 
R. and Wilsdon, J. (2013) ‘Future Directions for Scientific Advice in Whitehall’ for 
a perspective from the United Kingdom, available at http://www.csap.cam.ac.uk/
events/future-directions-scientific-advice-whitehall/
9. These terms (honest broker, advocate, pure scientist) for science advice to policy 
were coined by Roger Pielke; see http://rogerpielkejr.blogspot.be/. ‘Knowledge 
broker’ is also a term commonly used: see, for example, Peter Gluckman in Nature 
507, 163–165 (13 March 2014). A trusted honest (or knowledge) broker can play a 
crucial role in informing and providing clarity to policymakers, in a transparent, 
tailored and independent manner, about the status and findings of the latest 
scientific evidence, including the uncertainties, consensus and minority views. 
‘Pull’ communication techniques (i.e. providing the means to proactively access 
information) rather than ‘push’ (i.e. sending information directly) are deemed to be 
more effective.
10. Recently the JRC has established a unit looking at behavioural insights, which will 
also consider the aspect of science advice to policy. We also have good relations 
with many institutes looking at science advice to policy from several angles.
11. For example, of the 736 MEPs in the last European Parliament up to April 2014, just 6 
trained as scientists. 
12. http://www.science20.com/ 
13. European Commission Press Release IP/14/984 of 10 September 2014.
14. Mission letter to Commissioner for Education, Culture, Youth and Sport, 10 
September 2014.
15. They are also being developed by France, New Zealand and Canada.
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SCIENTIFIC FORESIGHT AT THE  
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
Paul Rübig
The Science and Technology Options Assessment unit (STOA) exists to 
provide members and committees of the European Parliament (EP) with 
independent expert assessments of scientific and technological options for 
particular policy areas. STOA was officially launched in March 1987 as an 
18-month pilot project; it was subsequently authorised to continue its work 
on a permanent basis and the STOA Panel was created.
In the years that followed, STOA’s development went through a founding 
period, in which the practice of parliamentary technology assessment, and 
its associated methodology and tools, were established at the EU level. 
Following a restructuring of STOA in 1994, a new framework for project 
work was established. Finally, after further reforms in 2003–2004, a third 
period ensued with a better focus on strategic science and technology 
issues, and an emphasis on ensuring relevance to parliamentary work. 
During this latter period, STOA multiplied and diversified its products and 
activities, while paying increasing attention to communication and visibility.
The structure of STOA
Political oversight of STOA’s work is ensured by a panel of 15 Members 
of the European Parliament (MEPs), which decides on STOA’s research 
priorities and approves studies. The panel comprises the EP Vice-
President responsible for STOA, four MEPs appointed by the Committee 
on Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE) and two MEPs from each of five 
other committees, namely Employment and Social Affairs; Environment, 
Public Health and Food Safety; Internal Market and Consumer Protection; 
Transport and Tourism; and Agriculture and Rural Development. The 
STOA Panel constitutes itself at the beginning and the middle of each 
parliamentary term.
Panel meetings are prepared by the STOA Bureau, which comprises four 
members: the EP Vice-President responsible for STOA, the STOA Chair 
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and two Vice-Chairs. The STOA Bureau and Panel are assisted in their 
work by the STOA Secretariat, which belongs to the European Parliament’s 
Directorate-General for Parliamentary Research Services (DG EPRS).
STOA’s mission, products and activities 
STOA’s mission is firstly to provide the EP’s parliamentary bodies with 
independent, high-quality and scientifically impartial studies for the 
assessment of the impact of new technologies, and identify the options for 
the best courses of action to take. A second element of its mission is to 
“organise forums in which politicians and representatives of (science) 
and of society as a whole shall discuss and compare scientific and 
technological developments of political relevance”.1 
In fulfilling the first part of its mission, STOA assigns great importance 
to identifying and assessing a comprehensive range of options for policy 
action in relation to the introduction of new and emerging technologies. 
It also provides MEPs with state-of-the-art information about the current 
status and deployment prospects of these technologies. In recent years, 
STOA’s studies have included scenarios for an eco-efficient energy and 
transport future; the sustainable management of natural resources; 
developments in ICT; future prospects in healthcare and new technologies 
in the life sciences; and science, technology and innovation policy.
STOA works with external experts in a number of policy areas in order 
to produce these studies. These experts include universities, research 
institutes, consultancies and individual scientists. STOA’s studies are 
publicly available so that the wider public can profit from the information 
and insights they contain, and engage in a dialogue on their implications. 
Without compromising scientific robustness and accuracy, the studies 
are written in a language accessible to the layperson.2 One or more Panel 
members oversee the execution of each study to ensure the relevance of 
the outcome for parliamentary work. Interim and final results of studies 
are regularly presented by experts during meetings of parliamentary 
committees and the STOA Panel.
STOA fulfils the second part of its mission by organising workshops, both 
in relation to the studies and as ad hoc events. The latter are often co-
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organised with external organisations, including the European Commission’s 
Joint Research Centre (JRC), European and international organisations, 
and professional scientific associations. STOA workshops are open to the 
public and are advertised via STOA’s website, so that people from outside 
the Parliament can also participate. Workshops are attended by MEPs, their 
assistants and other EP staff, as well as representatives from other European 
institutions, scientists, stakeholders and the wider public, in numbers ranging 
from several dozen to the hundreds, depending on the subject.
Material from these workshops, including background papers, presentations 
and conclusions, are posted on STOA’s website. The events are routinely 
webstreamed, and video footage is posted on the website for those who 
cannot physically attend but want to follow them. More recently, STOA has 
been extensively using the social media possibilities offered by DG EPRS 
(Twitter, blogs, etc.) to advertise the events it organises, communicate with 
the public during the events, and disseminate their outcomes.
Since its first edition in 2003, the STOA Annual Lecture has constituted the 
high point of STOA’s annual activities. It features eminent scientists – often 
Nobel laureates – speaking about subjects of political relevance, ranging 
from climate change and sustainability to the challenges of the Information 
Society and path-breaking advances in the life sciences. The Annual Lecture 
is attended by numerous scientists and stakeholders, MEPs and staff, and 
hundreds of ordinary citizens. The use of webstreaming and social media 
ensures much wider accessibility and public participation.
Inspired by similar initiatives in some national parliaments, STOA has 
also organised three rounds of an MEP–scientist pairing scheme, to 
enhance mutual understanding between scientists and policymakers and 
help them establish lasting, mutually beneficial links. The scheme, whose 
fourth round will be launched in the first months of 2015, is intended to 
help policymakers better understand the working methods of scientists 
and the real-life aspects of the process by which scientific knowledge is 
obtained. On the other side, the scheme helps scientists to comprehend 
the intricacies of the policymaking process, the way scientific advances are 
perceived by policymakers and how scientists can more effectively influence 
policymaking.
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During the seventh term of the EP (2009–2014), STOA carried out 24 
projects and organised more than 60 events, namely 21 project-linked 
workshops, 36 ad hoc workshops and 5 Annual Lectures. STOA welcomed 
more than 6,000 participants to these events. In addition, 13 pairs of MEPs 
and scientists were involved in the third round of the pairing scheme.
Looking to the future
Taking advantage of the long-term, strategic character of its work, and 
putting it in the context of the current political discourse, the outgoing 
STOA Panel recently endorsed an ‘Action Plan for the Future’.3 This calls 
for the recognition of STOA as the “permanent structure of the European 
Parliament with an explicit foresight role in the area of science and 
technology (...) firmly anchored (...) in the agenda-setting phase of the 
policy cycle”. This is particularly important at a time when the Parliament 
is vigorously claiming a more active role in applying scrutiny to the full 
policy cycle, including the early, agenda-setting phase.
In line with this political decision, the former Science and Technology 
Options Assessment unit, which served as the STOA Secretariat, was 
renamed the Scientific Foresight (STOA) Unit. This comprises two services, 
namely the STOA Secretariat and the newly created Scientific Foresight 
Service. Although there had been a number of ad hoc forward-looking 
exercises within the EP in recent years, notably the ongoing participation 
in the European Strategy and Policy Analysis System (ESPAS) process, the 
creation of the new service demonstrates the EP’s strategic intention to 
strengthen its capacity for scientific foresight.
The Action Plan is the instrument for implementing a forward-looking 
strategy that takes into account the evolving reality in which STOA 
operates. In particular, the STOA Panel sees that it has to remain proactive 
and its products and working methods have to keep pace with the 
unprecedented speed of technological advances and parallel economic and 
political developments. These include the role of innovation in the creation 
of growth and jobs; the difficulties posed by an enduring economic and 
financial crisis; wide recognition of the pervasive role of impact assessment; 
and the need to apply parliamentary scrutiny throughout the policy cycle.
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Effectively, STOA already played a foresight role though the strategic, 
forward-looking character of its work – all that remained was to embed its 
mission in the political discourse. Interestingly, the Panel also considered 
that STOA “can experiment with novel concepts and tools, such as open 
innovation and crowdsourcing, to leverage collective intelligence and 
tap the cognitive surplus of the scientific community and the wider 
public for the fulfilment of its mission”. Simultaneously, STOA should 
“continue to act as a beacon for science and technology within the 
European Parliament and towards the scientific community and the 
public at large, especially with respect to young people”.
The Action Plan also suggests an increased emphasis on timely and effective 
communication of policy options to committees and MEPs, based on a 
solid understanding of the long-term policy framework. It is essential for 
STOA to ensure the relevance of its output for the work of committees and 
individual MEPs if it is to maintain its legitimacy within the EP in its role as 
co-legislator. STOA has to keep pace with developments, in terms of both its 
analyses and its working methods, with a special emphasis on the effective 
and timely communication of its results, and an enhanced effort to increase 
awareness of its activities among MEPs. While maintaining its capacity to 
shape the political agenda through sound scientific work, STOA has to keep 
track of the long-term, evolving policy framework at the European level, so 
as to ensure the relevance and usefulness of its interventions for European 
policymaking.
In addition, STOA should further develop close relations with parliamentary 
committees, supporting their work and providing personalised advice to 
MEPs on demand. STOA’s agenda-setting role has to be made clear to MEPs, 
and all legitimate communication channels to the parliamentary committees 
have to be exploited for this purpose. The MEPs appointed to the STOA 
Panel by the six committees represented on the Panel are expected to act 
as STOA ambassadors to their committees, raising awareness among their 
colleagues about the ways in which STOA’s expertise can inform their 
parliamentary work. This may include urging their committees to present 
proposals for STOA projects, and then having interim and final results 
of these projects presented during prime time in committee meetings. 
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Depending on the availability of human resources, STOA administrators 
could make themselves available upon demand to inform committees about 
STOA projects or provide personalised advice to MEPs, as required.
STOA has to make sure its products are well adapted to MEPs’ needs and 
expectations. In particular, long-term products should be re-balanced in 
favour of shorter timelines. STOA has already acknowledged that studies 
do not need to be lengthy or extend over a long time to be recognised as 
authoritative and convincing. All the studies launched in 2014 have an 
expected duration of less than nine months, with most being planned to last 
six months or less. STOA may further decide to produce concise informative 
products, such as state-of-play briefings, state-of-the-art technology reports, 
or policy options briefs for the benefit of interested committees and Members.
STOA will set up clear criteria for the selection of topics, format and 
content for workshops. As highlighted above, STOA organises numerous 
workshops and other events as a way of promoting dialogue with the 
scientific community and society at large. Most of these events are well 
attended and produce very useful outcomes. Nevertheless, STOA has to 
adapt the topics and format of its workshops to the evolving communication 
paradigm. Rapid and concise communication is entirely compatible with 
long-term planning; the latter has to rely on clear criteria for appropriate 
workshop topics and formats, compatible with STOA’s priorities and the 
needs of the EP.
Finally, STOA must develop its relations with the scientific and science 
policy communities. STOA intends to actively pursue the enhancement 
of existing links and the creation of new links with key European 
policymaking, research-funding and academic institutions (e.g. ERC, EIT, 
EUREKA, CoE/PACE and ENA) as well as the scientific EU agencies, with 
the aim of building a science cluster based on technology options for 2050. 
This is achieved through mutual invitations to each other’s meetings, and 
can proceed all the way to the conclusion of establishing cooperation 
agreements.
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A new STOA Panel for the eighth parliamentary term
On 22 October 2014, at the constituent meeting convened by Mairéad 
McGuinness (MEP and EP Vice-President responsible for STOA), the STOA 
Panel elected Paul Rübig (MEP) as Chairman, Eva Kaili (MEP) as First 
Vice-Chair and Evžen Tošenovský (MEP) as Second Vice-Chair for the next 
two-and-a-half years.
The new STOA Panel endorsed the further implementation of the ‘Action 
Plan for the Future’ and at the same time started a discussion about STOA’s 
research priorities for the first half of the eighth parliamentary term. The 
demands of STOA’s function have changed since its inception in 1987, 
but STOA now stands well equipped to deal with the current rapidity of 
technological change. An increased emphasis on foresight and informing 
the agenda-setting phase of the policy cycle, supported by more effective 
and timely communication and the strengthening of political and scientific 
networks, will ensure that the EP is better able to anticipate and deal with 
the issues raised by scientific and technological developments. STOA looks 
forward to informing the work of the new Parliament, drawing upon its 
previous experience and the Action Plan in order to continue to provide the 
EP with excellent scientific advice.
Paul Rübig has been an MEP for the Austrian People’s Party since 
1996 and is Chairman of the STOA Panel (@PaulRuebig).
Endnotes 
1. According to Article 1(2) of the STOA Rules adopted by the EP Bureau in May 2009 
and subsequently modified.
2. Reports can be downloaded from the STOA website (http://www.europarl.europa.
eu/stoa).
3. See minutes of the STOA Panel meeting of 17 April 2014, available at http://www.
europarl.europa.eu/stoa/webdav/site/cms/shared/3_activities/panels/2014/
STOA%20Panel%2017%20April%202014.pdf
4. ERC: European Research Council; EIT: European Institute of Innovation and 
Technology; CoE/PACE: Council of Europe/Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of 
Europe; ENA: École Nationale d’Administration.
5. At the ordinary STOA Panel meetings of 27 November and 18 December 2014.
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A MOMENT OF MAGIC REALISM IN THE 
EUROPEAN COMMISSION
Anne Glover 
At that time Macondo was a village of twenty adobe houses, built on the 
bank of a river of clear water that ran along a bed of polished stones, 
which were white and enormous, like prehistoric eggs. The world was so 
recent that many things lacked names, and in order to indicate them it was 
necessary to point.
Gabriel García Márquez, One Hundred Years of Solitude
I want to summarise the journey I made as Chief Scientific Adviser (CSA) 
to the President of the European Commission during an almost three-year 
tenure: a journey that was very rewarding, but also contained elements 
of Quixote, Kafka and Macondo. It all started with an announcement 
by President José Manuel Barroso when he stood for re-election in the 
European Parliament on 15 September 2009:1 
We also need a fundamental review of the way European institutions 
access and use scientific advice. In the next Commission, I want to set up 
a Chief Scientific Adviser who has the power to deliver proactive, scientific 
advice throughout all stages of policy development and delivery. This will 
reflect the central importance I attach to research and innovation.” 
Although there had been voices demanding a CSA in the past,2 this 
announcement came as a surprise to many, not least to the Commission’s 
own in-house science service, the Joint Research Centre (JRC).
As this was the first time the Commission would have a CSA, the 
announcement raised many questions, notably how the role would be 
implemented, what mandate it would have and how its relationship with the 
JRC would work. Soon after the announcement, the then Director-General 
of the JRC submitted a paper to the President’s Cabinet outlining different 
options to implement the idea. The paper recommended having the CSA 
as a senior adviser attached to the President, in order to deliver credibility, 
independence, ease of implementation and proximity to decision-making. 
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Six months later, on 9 March 2010, the post was formally created by a 
Commission Decision, at Director-General-equivalent level. The CSA, 
with the long-winded title ‘Chief Scientific Adviser to the President of the 
European Commission’, was attached directly to the President, without any 
intermediaries (except de facto the Head of the President’s Cabinet and the 
Member of the Cabinet in charge of science). The title and the reporting line 
made it clear that the main task of the CSA was to provide science advice 
to the President himself, not to the Commission, nor to the College of 
Commissioners, nor to individual Commissioners or Directors-General.
There was an unexplained gap of two years between the announcement of 
the role in September 2009, and my appointment in November 2011. The 
recruitment procedure was not transparent (the post was never advertised), 
but it is understood that the President interviewed various candidates and in 
the end offered the position – based on a temporary contract – to me, at the 
time working as the CSA for Scotland. On 5 December 2011 the European 
Commission issued a press release announcing the appointment, which also 
specified the new role as follows:3 
The functions of the Chief Scientific Adviser4 will be as follows:
• To provide independent expert advice on any aspect of science, 
technology and innovation as requested by the President;
• Upon a request by the President, to provide analysis and opinion on 
major policy proposals being submitted to the College touching upon 
issues of science, technology and innovation; in particular the Chief 
Scientific Adviser will provide authoritative guidance on interpretation 
of scientific evidence in presence of uncertainty, and will be involved in 
strategic emergency planning;
• To build relationships with high-level advisory groups (e.g. European 
Research Area Board), the scientific committees of the Commission, 
the EU agencies (European Medicine Agency, European Food Safety 
Authority, the European Chemicals Agency and the European Centre 
for Disease Prevention and Control), the European Group on Ethics in 
Science and New Technologies;
• To build relationships with similar structures in Member States and 
other countries;
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• To advise on novel science, technology and innovation issues arising 
both in the context of the EU and internationally; to serve as an early 
warning conduct point on issues that might arise when scientific 
progress entails either opportunity or threat for the EU;
• To communicate the scientific values on which specific Commission 
proposals are based in order to enhance public confidence in science and 
technology, and in general to promote European culture of science and 
technology widely within Europe and abroad.”
It was clear from this mandate that the remit of the CSA was to address 
science for policy, and not policy for science, so I was not to be involved 
in the development of research policies such as Horizon 2020, but would 
advise on the use of scientific evidence in other policy areas. At the same 
time, the mandate was clearly designed with both an inward-facing and 
an outward-facing aspect. The last point in particular (“to communicate 
scientific values (…) and in general to promote European culture 
of science and technology”) overlapped with the mandate of the 
Commissioner for Research, Innovation and Science and the remit of DG 
Research and Innovation (DG RTD). 
There was also an obvious overlap with the JRC, which also has a science 
for policy role.5 In particular, point 2 (“to provide analysis and opinion 
on major policy proposals”) and point 5 (“to advise on novel science, 
technology and innovation issues”) clearly seemed to step on the JRC’s 
toes. This was challenging to the established roles of the JRC and to the 
Commissioner for Research, Maire Geoghegan-Quinn, and highlights the 
need to give more thought to the establishment of a new function within an 
existing organisation to ensure that value is added rather than uncertainty 
being created.
Struggling to get off the ground
Melquíades had not put events in the order of a man’s conventional time, 
but had concentrated a century of daily episodes in such a way that they 
coexisted in one instant.
Gabriel García Márquez, One Hundred Years of Solitude
When I started work on 1 January 2012, my resources were minimal: I 
had an office, a secretary and the support of a seconded national expert 
from Portugal, who was already working for the Bureau of European Policy 
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Advisers (BEPA). I insisted that a permanent EC official should be seconded 
to my team who would know about the Commission’s procedures, and in 
particular the JRC. I identified Dr. Jan Marco Müller as an optimal choice, 
as he had served as Assistant to the Director-General of the JRC (and had 
co-authored the paper on how to implement the CSA role), but also had 
experience with the science advisory systems in Germany and the UK. The 
secondment was not easy to arrange, but was eventually approved.
The limited staff available in 2012 significantly hindered my ability to 
implement the CSA’s mandate in the first year. The large number of 
invitations and media requests put an enormous stress and workload on the 
small team, which handled all interview requests (within the typical short 
deadlines of the press), and regularly updated the website of the CSA in 
four different languages.6 The lack of staff was mirrored by the lack of an 
adequate budget; it was particularly cumbersome to get travel – ‘missions’ 
in Commission jargon – approved.
Given the limited support for outreach activities, the DG for 
Communications, Networks, Content and Technology (DG CONNECT) 
created a CSA Twitter account,7 which by the end of my mandate had more 
than 9400 followers. The choice of the Twitter handle ‘EU_ScienceChief’ 
raised some eyebrows in the JRC and DG RTD. 
A significant challenge was the fact that the CSA was not on the radar of 
any Commission procedures and was often cut off from vital information. 
With one exception, I was never invited to attend meetings of the College 
of Commissioners – unlike the DG of BEPA who sat in on a regular basis 
as a standing observer. Likewise, I was not invited to the weekly meetings 
of the Directors-General, except for one occasion when I reported on my 
experiences over the first year. Nor was I copied into messages sent by the 
Secretary-General to the Directors-General. This meant in practice that both 
the Commissioners and the Directors-General were always better informed 
than the CSA’s office. Moreover, the Commission’s internal information 
systems did not allow services to consult the CSA directly, nor did my office 
have direct access to some systems, such as the Argus system used for 
crisis management. 
More than once, this state of affairs resulted in instances where internal 
information reached me accidentally (sometimes from external sources), 
occasionally leading to embarrassing situations that reflected poorly 
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on the Commission. This included the briefings and speeches of the 
President, on which the CSA was rarely asked for input. It took until 26 
July 2012 for detailed terms of reference for the CSA role to be adopted 
and communicated to the relevant Commission services. The official note 
specified, inter alia, that: 
• The CSA will cooperate closely with all relevant Commission services 
in order to gather the evidence necessary for her advice, and these 
services are invited to contact the CSA proactively to flag issues related 
to her remit.
• The formulation of research, science and innovation policies will remain 
the responsibility of the relevant portfolio Commissioner.
• The Impact Assessment Board will invite the CSA to examine proposals 
with a policy dimension that are controversial in nature.
• The CSA may establish a Working Group looking at how to enhance the 
scientific evidence gathering by the Commission. 
• Commission services may consult the CSA on proposals with a scientific 
dimension that can be expected to be controversial in nature when 
establishing the Work Programme of the following year.
• The CSA will provide guidance to Commission services when setting up 
and managing scientific advisory bodies, and is to be consulted before 
taking any decision regarding new scientific advisory bodies.
• The CSA will explore the feasibility of setting up a high-level scientific 
advisory group for the President.
• The CSA may be invited to the weekly meetings of Directors-General 
when such meetings deal with matters falling within her remit.
• The CSA will liaise with bodies of other European institutions that 
provide science advice.
• The CSA will coordinate all Commission relations with other Chief 
Scientific Advisers, or similar functions, from the public and private 
sectors, whether national or international, and will represent the 
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Commission on networks of Chief Scientific Advisers as well as actively 
support the development of these at European and global level.
• The CSA will act as overall coordinator for scientific horizon scanning, 
anticipation and foresight activities in the Commission, and is to be 
consulted before embarking on any major exercises of this type. 
• The CSA will be a proactive ambassador for European science, 
engineering and technology.
• The CSA will contribute to the President’s speeches and briefings within 
the remit of the CSA’s mandate, and will support high-level, science-
related visits to the European Commission and visits of the President to 
scientific establishments.
• The CSA will promote science and technology and its take-up in society, 
and will actively engage in public debate about the opportunities and 
risks of new technologies. 
• The Commission services will nominate ‘CSA correspondents’ to 
interact with the CSA.
I was never requested to provide advice on the evidence underpinning 
policy proposals submitted to the College of Commissioners, and was never 
involved in providing advice on files leading to College decisions. I was not 
given the authority to “provide authoritative guidance on interpretation 
of scientific evidence in presence of uncertainty”. I did get involved, 
however, in the management of emergencies; the DG Humanitarian Affairs 
(ECHO) engaged with me proactively, and the Secretariat-General invited 
me most recently to high-level meetings on the handling of the Ebola crisis.
Tilting at windmills
It was as if God had decided to put to the test every capacity for surprise 
and was keeping the inhabitants of Macondo in a permanent alternation 
between excitement and disappointment, doubt and revelation, to such an 
extreme that no one knew for certain where the limits of reality lay.
Gabriel García Márquez, One Hundred Years of Solitude
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Several Directors-General explicitly welcomed the CSA’s role as an honest 
broker, in particular where dialogue with external stakeholders – but also 
within the Commission – had been characterised by polarised or entrenched 
positions. However, it is also true that the Commission administration as a 
whole did not embrace the CSA role, as it did not fit well into the existing 
Commission structure. 
In particular, the interaction of the CSA with the public was an issue of 
concern for the administration. I gave a lot of interviews to the media 
– which had to be cleared by the Commission’s Spokespersons’ Service – 
and spoke frequently about scientific evidence at public events, including 
on politically (but not scientifically) controversial issues such as GM 
technology. In autumn 2012, one of these speeches triggered a question 
from a Member of the European Parliament asking about the Commission’s 
position on the views I had expressed on GM technology. The answer given 
by the Commission – I was not consulted on the final text – was as follows:8 
The Commission wishes to use the opportunity to clarify to the Honourable 
Member the role of the Chief Scientific Adviser (CSA). The CSA reports 
directly to the President of the Commission and has the task to provide 
independent expert advice to the President on any aspect of science, 
technology and innovation and the potential opportunities and threats 
to the EU stemming from new scientific and technological developments. 
Likewise, the CSA has a role in enhancing public confidence in science and 
technology and to promote the European culture of science. In this context, 
the CSA has a role in stimulating societal debate on new technologies and to 
communicate the existing scientific evidence about such technologies. The 
CSA has a purely advisory function and no role in defining Commission 
policies. Therefore, her views do not necessarily represent the views of the 
Commission.”
The Commission was therefore dissociating itself in public from its own 
CSA. While the lack of buy-in from the Commission administration was 
not surprising – having an internal ‘Chief Devil’s Advocate’ would be 
uncomfortable for any administration – there was also a lack of support 
from parties where one might have expected it. For instance, despite the 
President’s genuine interest in science, our relationship was not as close 
as it could have been. While meetings with the President’s Cabinet were 
scheduled once a month, those with the President himself were much less 
frequent (which can partly be explained by the President’s busy diary 
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during the euro crisis). Most communication went via the President’s 
Cabinet, and answers from the President to requests usually took some 
time. The advice I gave to the President – on matters as diverse as space 
weather, dengue fever and the Higgs boson – was mainly proactive rather 
than at his request, and feedback on briefings was rare. The weak link with 
the Commissioner for Research, Innovation and Science was another issue 
of concern and hampered making full use of the CSA role to everyone’s 
advantage.
Also, the relationship with the JRC proved rather cumbersome, mainly 
because of the administrative distance between it and the CSA, which 
involved two intervening Cabinets. While this interaction was never a 
problem at the working level – JRC staff provided a great deal of support 
and were eager to engage with me during my visits to all JRC sites – at the 
DG level, support was rather lukewarm. There was a lack of information 
flow between the JRC and the CSA which hampered development of 
the CSA role. DG RTD took a more proactive role in engaging with the 
CSA, and supported me on several occasions, for example by funding a 
Eurobarometer Survey on foresight. With its ongoing transformation from 
a funding agency into a policymaking entity, DG RTD is also stepping 
increasingly into the science-for-policy business and saw the CSA as an ally 
for its cause, for example in creating linkages with science academies. 
The most supportive DG was DG Connect. The Director-General of Connect 
supported me from day one, interacted with me on an almost weekly basis, 
invited me to many events – including a senior management meeting of the 
DG – and provided hands-on support for many tasks the CSA team could 
not carry out because of a lack of resources. He proactively used the CSA 
as an ambassador for the digital society, brokered speaking engagements 
and served as a critical friend, being fully committed to evidence-informed 
policymaking. Had such support been Commission-wide, the impact of the 
CSA role would have been greatly enhanced. 
On 8 March 2013, the journal Science published an article entitled 
Europe’s Science Superwoman Struggles to Get Off the Ground9 which 
was written by a journalist who had shadowed me for a full day. The article, 
which can be considered as a kind of unofficial mid-term evaluation of the 
role, concluded: “Glover’s influence is hard to discern so far. […] With 
less than 2 years left until Barroso’s term expires, Glover is pressing 
hard to raise the profile of science and evidence in European politics.”
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Given that with such a small team the scope for me to act was very 
limited, innovative ideas to enlarge the team had to be developed. At the 
end of 2012, the Director-General of the European Space Agency (ESA) 
generously offered, at no cost, to second the French foresight expert Dr. 
Didier Schmitt to the CSA team. This enabled me to implement the foresight 
part of my mandate. 
Further, following the end of the contract of the Seconded National Expert 
(SNE), Professor Ana Maria Costa Freitas, in autumn 2013, I was able 
to recruit another SNE as a replacement, namely Xameerah Malik, who 
previously advised the Science and Technology Select Committee of the 
UK’s House of Commons. Malik managed the President’s Science and 
Technology Advisory Council, and played a crucial role in enhancing its 
potential. In addition, through a short trainee programme, in mid-2014 
the CSA team was enlarged by another secondment from the Belgian 
Academies, Sofie Vanthournout, who provided a direct and welcome link 
with the European Academies’ Science Advisory Council (EASAC).
Making an impact
José Arcadio Buendía would spend the day walking through the house. 
“Incredible things are happening in the world,” he said to Úrsula. “Right 
there across the river there are all kinds of magical instruments while we 
keep on living like donkeys.”
Gabriel García Márquez, One Hundred Years of Solitude
Despite the lack of resources, the CSA role had a substantial impact. 
Looking back on three years, the highlights for me include the following: 
I established and chaired the President’s Science and Technology Advisory 
Council (STAC), which had eight formal meetings following its launch in 
February 2013 – all of which were attended by the President himself. STAC 
was made up of 16 eminent scientists from across the European Research 
Area (including members from Switzerland and Israel) who covered a wide 
range of scientific disciplines.10 The Council was not designed as a technical 
advisory board, but had the aim of thinking about the ‘big picture’ role of 
science, such as its relationship with society, and its role in a future vision 
for Europe. In autumn 2013, I published a Berlaymont Paper Science and 
society: Time for a new deal, which included the first opinions of STAC, 
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entitled Science for an informed, sustainable and inclusive knowledge 
society.11 At a conference in Lisbon in October 2014 – the first and only 
time the President appeared in public with me – STAC delivered a paper on 
science and technology foresight called The future of Europe is science12 
which highlighted how Europe can make the most of science, engineering 
and technology opportunities over the next 15 years.
In June 2014, I also set up the European Science Advisers Forum (ESAF), 
a network of government science advisers, currently drawn from 15 
Member States. I launched this forum in December 2012 when speaking 
at the Competitiveness Council (the Council meeting of European Science 
Ministers), where it received great support. However, failing to get the 
direct backing of the Secretary-General or the President, I embarked 
on a programme to convince Member State governments, one by one, 
of the advantages of having a government science adviser or at least of 
nominating a person to represent the country in the new European network. 
Identifying these individuals was not an easy task given the diversity of 
cultural approaches to science advice in Europe (some Member States opt 
for the CSA model, some for the academy model, some for an advisory 
board model). Still, the efforts have paid off as more and more Member 
States have been thinking about establishing such roles. ESAF will allow 
European and national science advisers to discuss the scientific evidence 
around topics of pan-European relevance ahead of political decisions, to 
share best practice and to promote evidence-informed policymaking in the 
EU. The platform will also allow quick sharing of scientific information in 
cross-border emergencies. This will ideally enable politicians to focus their 
meetings in Brussels on the political choices, rather than losing time with 
discussions on how to interpret the evidence.
I was a member of the organising committee of the first global meeting of 
government science advisers which took place on 28–29 August 2014 in 
New Zealand, attended by science advisers from all continents, including 
many G20 nations, who discussed how to enhance science advice in the 
global context.13 This activity is now developing into an ongoing global 
network of government science advisers. 
I contributed actively to the establishment of the EU Agencies’ Network 
of Science Advisers (EU-ANSA), a network of the Chief Scientists of the 
various EU agencies which pushes for greater coherence in the scientific 
advice delivered by these agencies to European policymakers. The terms of 
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reference of this network made the CSA the Commission’s representative 
on the network, providing a link to other science advisory bodies of 
the Commission. On repeated occasions, I also spoke at meetings of 
the European Research and Innovation Area Board (ERIAB), and of the 
European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies (EGE). 
For evidence providers such as science academies and other learned 
societies, the CSA formed an easy interface with the Commission. In 
collaboration with DG RTD and the JRC, I set up a strategic partnership 
between the Commission and the European umbrella organisation of the 
national academies of sciences (EASAC), the national academies of applied 
sciences and engineering (Euro-CASE) and the academies of sciences 
and humanities (ALLEA). This has enabled the scientific community to 
deliver advice in a much more targeted and timely manner to European 
policymakers. For instance, following the temporary ban of certain 
pesticides (neonicotinoids) by the Commission in 2013, I brokered an 
independent report by EASAC on the state of knowledge regarding the 
impact of these pesticides on the health of pollinators, which was delivered 
in time for the revision of the two-year ban. 
Without being specified in my mandate, the CSA acted as a de facto 
‘scientific ombudsman’ for the Commission, being a visible and trusted 
first port of call for a wide range of stakeholders who wished to discuss 
issues related to scientific evidence with the Commission. The fact that 
the public perceived the CSA in this way showed the usefulness of having 
such a function. Also, I was engaged in examining how best to frame the 
Commission needs for evidence, how to best source that evidence in an 
unbiased manner and how to ensure transparency in the process. 
As demanded by my terms of reference, I established and oversaw 
a Commission-wide network to act as an internal coordination and 
communication tool for foresight. More than 200 staff from 21 DGs 
were assigned to the network and contributed actively. This allows the 
Commission to be better prepared to seize the opportunities presented by 
future technologies and societal change, as well as to manage potential 
risks. The network organised workshops on foresight and produced dozens 
of ‘technology fiches’ outlining current science and technology trends 
and their implications for EU policymaking. The CSA office also provided 
all aspects of science and technology foresight to the European Strategy 
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and Policy Analysis System (ESPAS),14 a joint foresight undertaking of the 
Commission, Council, Parliament and European External Action Service 
(EEAS).
During my tenure, I spoke at some 250 public events, including the largest 
general science conferences in Europe and the United States. I gave more 
than 100 interviews to the media and sent more than 1600 tweets, all 
written by myself. I also represented the President on various occasions, 
such as the inauguration of the world’s largest radio telescope (ALMA) in 
Chile in March 2013, and the launch of the first satellite of the Copernicus 
Earth Observing System from the European spaceport in Kourou in April 
2014. The CSA was in great demand to speak about European science 
issues. Having this attention helped to get across positive messages about 
European science and technology, but also the Commission’s commitment 
to evidence-informed policy-making, to a wide audience, including opinion-
leading media and social media. 
Last but not least, I have been a strong advocate – and hopefully a role 
model – for attracting women to careers in science, for example by 
speaking at a European Council event on gender equality chaired by 
Council President Van Rompuy. I frequently engaged with young people to 
stimulate their interest in science (including a memorable interview with the 
Muppets-like Captain Busta!15).
Sailing into the storm
Thus they went on living in a reality that was slipping away, momentarily 
captured by words, but which would escape irremediably when they forgot 
the values of the written letters.
Gabriel García Márquez, One Hundred Years of Solitude
On 17 June 2013, the CSA’s office and the President received an open 
letter signed by a number of scientists complaining that the Commission 
was ignoring the scientific evidence around endocrine disruptors. This 
was followed by other letters opposing it; this exchange of views has to 
be seen in the context of a wider dispute between two scientific camps in 
the field of endocrine disruptors who were bombarding each other with 
journal editorials. As I did not want to join either of the two sides, and found 
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this public discussion to be rather unhelpful for science, I invited three 
representatives of each side to meet in my office to explore consensus and 
identify areas of disagreement. 
My engagement in this politically very sensitive topic triggered the fury of 
NGOs and journalists who had for a long time accused one of the two camps 
of having conflicts of interest (based on the fact that some had worked 
for, or cooperated with, industry), and saw my response to the letter and 
my invitation to meet for a scientific discussion as giving lobby interests a 
platform.
On 11 July 2013, the CSA’s office received a first request for access to 
documents (the EU equivalent to a request under the UK’s Freedom of 
Information Act),16 submitted by French journalist Stéphane Horel, asking 
for access to all correspondence exchanged between the CSA and President 
Barroso as well as a number of industry groups, politicians and science 
advisers on the issue of endocrine disruptors.17 
The meeting of the two scientific camps took place in my office on 24 
October 2013, expressly without policymakers being present and with 
the participating scientists paying their own travel expenses (as the CSA 
office had no budget for organising such meetings). At the conclusion of 
the meeting, the participants agreed on a joint statement, and later on the 
full minutes of the meeting were published on the CSA website, in line 
with my desire for full transparency.18 DG Environment and DG Health and 
Consumers appreciated the efforts of the CSA to get more scientific clarity 
on the issues and to calm the polemic between the two camps. 
When at the end of 2013, the Commission decided to delay the endocrine 
disruptor legislation in order to carry out a full impact assessment, the 
NGOs and various media outlets constructed a story in which the CSA’s 
intervention had led to the delay. I was accused of taking the scientific 
dispute ‘to the highest levels’ by copying the President and the Secretary-
General into my messages – which in fact was my administrative obligation, 
as the CSA reports directly to the President. Several NGOs and journalists 
expressed suspicion that the CSA could override the political process by 
offering a short-track for lobbyists to bypass Commission procedures and 
undermine the work by expert committees. This grossly misinterprets 
both the role and the influence of a science adviser and, in fact, of the 
Commission President himself, who cannot dictate or override decisions 
taken in the College of Commissioners.
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Endocrine disruptors were not the only hornets’ nest I dared to stir. I also 
talked in public about the evidence regarding other political minefields, 
such as genetically modified organisms (GMOs). On 29 November 2013, 
the French MEP Corinne Lepage, in a public press conference held together 
with researcher Gilles-Éric Séralini, author of a disputed study about 
tumours in rats caused by a GM maize strain, called on me to resign as I had 
“conveyed a one-sided view” on genetic engineering. At the same press 
conference, Ms. Lepage wrongly accused me of being a former employee of 
Monsanto (a statement she later retracted following a complaint from me).19 
It is to be noted that neither the President nor the Commission at any time 
defended me in public against such damaging accusations. 
One of the issues raised by Ms. Lepage was the fact that there was no 
conflict of interest statement for the CSA publicly available. I support 
transparency and wanted to publish such a statement when joining the 
Commission, but this request was denied as the Commission administration 
feared it could set a precedent for other senior officials (only the 
Commissioners are obliged to publish such a statement). Following Ms. 
Lepage’s accusations I published – without the explicit authorisation by the 
Commission – a detailed conflict of interest statement on the CSA website.20 
On 3 January 2014, a second access to documents request reached the 
CSA’s office, this time submitted by the NGO Pesticide Action Network 
Europe, asking for all correspondence I and my team had with anybody 
on the topic of endocrine disruptors or pesticides. This was followed by 
a request by the NGO Corporate Europe Observatory on 21 March 2014, 
asking for all correspondence the office had with a list of 21 companies, 
business associations and lobby groups (interestingly, EASAC was included 
in the list), as well as any correspondence with a list of EC Directorates-
General, the UK government and the US government on issues as diverse 
as endocrine disruptors, GMOs and the precautionary principle. It goes 
without saying that the handling of these requests – which by law need to 
be responded to within 15 working days – put an enormous workload on my 
team and considerably slowed down the work of the office.
On 20 May 2014, shortly before the European Parliament elections, I invited 
several of the NGOs that had questioned the CSA role to a meeting to ask 
them how they would want to see the role improved. While the atmosphere 
of this meeting was frank and open, the NGOs declined to offer alternative 
solutions. 
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On 22 July 2014, nine NGOs wrote to the then President-designate Juncker 
asking him to abolish the CSA role.21 The NGOs alleged that “the post 
of CSA is fundamentally problematic as it concentrates too much 
influence in one person, and undermines in-depth scientific research 
and assessments carried out by or for the Commission Directorates in 
the course of policy elaboration”. They also described the CSA as being 
“unaccountable, untransparent and controversial”.
Let me analyse this criticism. First of all, consider the claim that there 
was “too much influence in one person”. The CSA never had a role in 
policymaking in the Commission, nor did the CSA have (or seek to have) 
the power to stop a policy process. The CSA never was, or meant to be, 
an evidence provider but rather an evidence translator who gathered data 
from the broadest possible range of sources and acted as an honest broker 
in translating this evidence for the President. It was entirely up to the 
President whether to take the advice offered, or not. Of course, in so doing, 
I was accountable to the President and my employer. While I did not shy 
away from politically controversial topics, the opinions I expressed reflected 
the consensus view in science, without disregarding minority opinions or 
uncertainty. My public speeches never left any doubt about the stance I took 
on various politically sensitive matters.
In particular, the anti-lobby NGOs criticised me for a lack of transparency. 
Without any doubt, transparency is an essential requirement for a science 
adviser as this allows public scrutiny of the advice given and checks on 
whether the advice indeed reflects the majority view of the scientific 
community. While it is normal that personal advice given to a high-
level politician has a certain degree of confidentiality, there is no reason 
why formal advice given (e.g. written briefings) could not be published. 
However, it was the decision of the President whether advice received 
from his science adviser could be made public or not, and regrettably, this 
approval was not given. 
Quite rightly, opponents of the CSA role wished to see greater transparency 
in the provision of advice. However, it would equally be welcome to 
understand the evidence base that the NGOs used to support their positions, 
and to see matching transparency of the advice requested and delivered 
within their organisations, some of which – e.g. Greenpeace – have Chief 
Scientists. It was bizarre to see Greenpeace UK’s Chief Scientist Doug Parr 
criticising the very concept of having a Chief Scientist22 – why is it OK for 
Greenpeace but not elsewhere?
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The NGOs’ letter triggered a big media response and an open response was 
coordinated by the UK-based organisation Sense about Science, which was 
signed by more than 700 scientists and scientific organisations.23 Others 
from the scientific, think-tank and business communities voiced their 
support for the CSA role in separate letters sent to President Juncker. These 
included BusinessEurope,24 EASAC,25 research charities and foundations,26 
and the European Federation for Science Journalism.27 Some media articles 
accused the NGOs of wanting to abolish the CSA post because of my well-
known position on GM technology.
As a result, the NGOs wrote another letter on 19 August 2014.28 In this, 
they said that they are not anti-science but believed that “continuing the 
CSA position poses a risk to scientific policy advice in general”. They 
demanded “more objective and diverse expertise (be made) available to 
policymakers than any single adviser could reasonably be expected to 
provide”. They again described the CSA role as “fundamentally flawed”.
This letter again reveals a misunderstanding of the CSA role, as it was never 
designed to replace any of the formal science advisory structures in the 
Commission, but to complement these and provide a voice able to help with 
the interpretation of evidence and uncertainty in an unbiased manner. In 
the past, science often did not speak with one voice, offering politicians a 
scapegoat which could be used to ignore scientific consensus or, worse, to 
ignore science altogether. Certainly, a single scientist cannot be an expert in 
all fields and I never claimed to be this. However, a CSA should be able to 
access the best science globally, and identify what is sound, peer-reviewed 
science and what is not.
The second NGO letter also triggered reactions from many others, which in 
a way was helpful as it thrust the CSA role into the spotlight. It was followed 
by a large number of articles in European newspapers,29 and was actively 
also picked up in the blogosphere,30 while the NGOs also reinforced their 
messages.31 
In the meantime, the High-level Working Group on Innovation Policy 
Management of the European Council delivered its final report to the 
European Council in August 2014 recommending that the CSA role in the 
Commission should not only be retained, but strengthened and enlarged.32 
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On 23 September 2014, I submitted a major briefing file to President-
elect Juncker, consisting of separate briefings about the CSA role and my 
experiences so far, comments on the President’s Science and Technology 
Advisory Council, and ideas on how to improve the role of scientific evidence 
in EU policymaking. I also stated that I would not be seeking reconfirmation 
in the role were it to be continued. I did not receive a response. 
In its first meeting on 5 November 2014, the new Commission decided to 
transform the former Bureau of European Policy Advisers (BEPA) into the 
European Political Strategy Centre (EPSC). I was informed one week later 
by email that the CSA post had ceased to exist on 31 October, and would 
not be renewed in the new structure. I was informed that I could no longer 
speak with the authority of the Commission, that no further travel by me 
or my team would be authorised, and that no future commitments by the 
CSA team could be honoured. Although not mentioned, the Science and 
Technology Advisory Council was also discontinued. Except for the creation 
of EPSC, none of these developments was proactively communicated by the 
Commission to the public.
It was a disappointment that my offers to meet with the new President or his 
Cabinet were never responded to, and it remains unclear to me from where 
the advice to abolish the role came.
Lessons learnt
The idea of a peninsular Macondo prevailed for a long time, inspired by 
the arbitrary map that José Arcadio Buendía sketched on his return from 
the expedition. He drew it in rage, evilly, exaggerating the difficulties of 
communication, as if to punish himself for the absolute lack of sense with 
which he had chosen the place.
Gabriel García Márquez, One Hundred Years of Solitude
First of all, it is important to remind ourselves that EU policies are much 
more technical than national policies; this is because the bulk of them are 
about standardisation and harmonisation, which at the end of the day boil 
down to scientific-technical matters. Science is therefore crucial at the EU 
level.
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The European Commission has very rigorous procedures and draws 
up its proposals from a wide number of sources, the JRC and the EU 
agencies being of particular importance in this context. Still, the wealth 
of competence and expertise already available is not fully valued and 
harnessed. This is partly because there are no harmonised guidelines for 
gathering, using and communicating scientific evidence which leads to 
very diverse approaches by different Commission services, and opens the 
possibility of evidence being procured and used selectively. 
Even though the Commission – with or without a CSA – has a well-
established science advisory system, this is not the case for the European 
External Action Service (EEAS), the European Parliament or the European 
Council. The EEAS does not have science anywhere on its organogram 
and does not seem to have discovered the value of science diplomacy. 
The current Parliament, elected in May 2014, consists of 751 MEPs from 
190 different national parties, all with their respective philosophies. The 
Research Service of the Parliament was established only in October 2013 
and is still in its infancy. The European Council does not have a science 
service at all, and most Member States do not have formally appointed 
government science advisers. It became clear that a CSA in the Commission 
would need counterparts (in whatever setup) in the other European 
institutions, as well as in Member State governments, to enhance evidence 
in policymaking. This is one of the reasons I devoted so much effort to 
establishing the European Science Advisers Forum as a platform for 
exchange between science advisers.
The fact that the CSA role was attached to the President directly gave it 
a high public visibility from the start, and the independence ‘to say the 
things the rest of the Commission cannot say’ – and thus the ability to 
trigger debate about issues that otherwise might have been politically too 
sensitive to address. It also enabled the President to have ad hoc and direct 
personal access to scientific advice, and – even though the CSA did not have 
any institutional power – the role had a strong convening power (albeit a 
limited power to act on this, owing to lack of resources). Its unique position 
enabled the CSA to have a helicopter view of all Commission services, and 
to spot missing in-house collaborations and foster others. Being attached to 
the President did not mean that I saw him a lot – but it meant that people 
listened to me and doors were opened which otherwise might have stayed 
closed. 
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Many people inside and outside the Commission appreciated the fresh 
approach of the CSA role. In fact, there was far more appetite for scientific 
evidence in Brussels than I had previously thought. While widespread 
support for the role from the scientific community could be expected 
there was also strong support from business, which came as a surprise – 
in particular considering the fact that I had openly made critical remarks 
about the transparency and public engagement of industry, and its role in 
combatting global warming. Although NGOs tried to discredit this support 
from industry by accusing the CSA of being an additional lobbying conduit, 
I had a genuine feeling that industry was interested in having an evidence-
based debate, and saw the CSA as a voice of reason that could help to make 
this happen.
The opposition from a few NGOs to the CSA role was disappointing and, 
at least in part, seemed motivated by my public remarks regarding the 
evidence around GM technology. The criticism from anti-lobby NGOs had 
a different nuance and was more focused on the way the role had been set 
up and the perceived lack of transparency. There is no doubt that such a 
visible role close to the President is prone to lobbying, and there is hardly 
any business association in Brussels that did not request a meeting with me 
in the past three years. I refused to meet many of them, in order to keep 
my stakeholder interactions balanced. It is therefore absolutely vital that 
the CSA role, if it were to be re-established in future, is allowed to be much 
more transparent, while respecting the need for confidentiality with the 
President. 
Also, the CSA should be made a formal part of Commission procedures. 
Most notably the role should be a member ex officio of the Impact 
Assessment Board, able to monitor whether impact assessments are based 
on the best possible evidence. Being part of Commission procedures 
also means being part of the information flow. In the past three years, 
the CSA was isolated from the Commission machinery: isolated from the 
policymaking procedures; isolated within the Bureau of European Policy 
Advisers; and, most importantly, isolated from the Commission’s in-house 
science service, the JRC. If the Commission were to consider having a CSA 
again, the role should be close to the President (or the Vice-President in 
charge of better regulation), but the CSA office and staff could be provided 
by the JRC, to ensure a closer link between the two.
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It became evident that the mandate given to me was not achievable with 
a team of just three senior staff (two of them seconded from outside the 
Commission) and two secretaries. By comparison, the CSA office in the 
UK has more than 60 staff and the Scottish CSA office has more than 10. 
Delivering the mandate with such limited resources (including a budget 
that hardly covered the travelling, yet alone meetings) was an impossible 
task. The sheer number of requests posed an unmanageable workload 
on my team, which routinely worked more than 50 hours a week without 
any public relations support. One could not expect that everything would 
be perfect when implementing the CSA concept for the first time in the 
European Commission. One would have hoped, however, that the role would 
have been set up with the adequate resources, and with a minimum support 
in-house, which was not the case. 
The CSA model is, of course, only one option for providing direct scientific 
advice to the President. The fact that President Barroso participated in all 
meetings of his Science and Technology Advisory Council while not being 
so forthcoming in his interactions with the CSA, might indicate that he felt 
more comfortable with a committee-oriented approach to science advice. 
To have a publicly outspoken science adviser, who challenges the evidence 
base of policies, requires political courage. Still, the President’s Science and 
Technology Advisory Council was never implemented as a formal advisory 
structure, unlike bodies such as the European Group on Ethics in Science 
and New Technologies. It therefore disappeared with the end of the Barroso 
mandate.
Despite these many frustrations, having been the first CSA in the European 
Commission has been a very rewarding experience, and with a small but 
outstanding team, had quite an impact. Giving voice to the excellence of 
European science for the benefit of its citizens has been a privilege. I am 
convinced that the CSA role in the European Commission deserves a second 
chance, given the many achievements and the wide support it received; 
the challenge would be to learn from the mistakes and build upon the 
successes.
Úrsula, almost blind at the time, was the only person who was sufficiently 
calm to identify the nature of that determined wind and she left the 
sheets to the mercy of the light as she watched Remedios the Beauty 
waving goodbye in the midst of the flapping sheets that rose up with her, 
80  SOME ADVICE ON ADVISERS
abandoning with her the environment of beetles and dahlias and passing 
through the air with her as four o’clock in the afternoon came to an end, 
and they were lost forever with her in the upper atmosphere where not even 
the highest-flying birds of memory could reach her.
Gabriel García Márquez, One Hundred Years of Solitude
Professor Dame Anne Glover CBE is Vice-Principal of External 
Affairs and Dean for Europe at the University of Aberdeen, and was 
the former Chief Scientific Adviser to the President of the European 
Commission, 2012–2014 (@AnneGlover_EU)
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WHY IT MADE SENSE TO SCRAP THE 
POST OF CHIEF SCIENTIFIC ADVISER
Doug Parr
When President Juncker took up office, a coalition of civil society groups 
called on him to abolish the post of European Commission Chief Scientific 
Adviser (CSA), which had been created by his predecessor in 2012. By 
contrast, many science institutions supported a continuation of the role. In 
this essay, I want to explain why the civil society groups took such a stance. 
An initial letter1 setting out some of the issues and calling for the post to be 
scrapped was signed by nine non-governmental organisations. There was 
then a strong reaction from scientists and other groups,2 who saw our call 
for the abolition of the CSA post as being an attack on the “integrity and 
independence of scientific advice”. 
Perhaps surprisingly for those who were defending the CSA role, far from 
quelling dissent, the group calling for the post to be abolished then tripled 
in size as more NGOs from the environment, health and governance 
sectors supported a second letter3 which elaborated why the CSA post had 
become an impediment to good science in policymaking. This second letter 
pointed out that “it is precisely this integrity and independence (of 
science advice) that we are seeking to uphold”. Many of the statements 
supporting the role of the CSA have come from leading scientists and well-
respected scientific institutions.4, 5 But, as was observed by public interest 
lawyer Alberto Alemanno, who has previously written about the CSA post, 
“most of these statements of solidarity mostly accused the NGOs of 
being anti-science in their stance rather than constructively engaging 
with the legitimate concerns they advanced”.6 
Evidence for abolition
So what are the issues that caused the NGOs to call for the CSA role to 
end? One of the key worries is that, to quote the first NGO letter, “vested 
interests have long realised that the more you concentrate scientific 
advice into the hands of one person, the easier it is to control”. A big 
and powerful early supporter of a renewed CSA position was Business 
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Europe7 which in its recommendations for the post notably did not suggest 
increasing its resources or its transparency. The same business lobby 
has identified a ‘hit list’ of gender-equality, environmental-protection and 
product-safety laws.8 Its regressive position and record on environmental 
matters are so poor that progressive companies like Unilever are choosing 
to terminate their membership.9 
Those who simply equate supporting the renewal of the CSA post with 
progressive positions on evidence and policymaking should take notice 
of whom, in the practical politics of Brussels, they are siding with. The 
political ecology of Brussels includes a heavy presence of corporate 
lobbyists10 – said to be second only to that in Washington. Society needs 
broad-based and open evidence gathering to act as a bulwark against a 
policy stitch-up in favour of vested interests. A real worry for civil society 
signatories to both the letters about the CSA is that simply in terms of 
lobbying muscle, corporate lobbyists are always going to win out against 
those acting in the public interest. Rigorous science processes are therefore 
needed as a defence. 
The CSA adds an extra layer (or centre of power) in scientific advice. As the 
second NGO letter put it, “the Commission already has a set of processes 
and institutions providing scientific policy advice. The general 
problem is not a lack of scientific evidence, but the inconsistency with 
which the European Commission responds to the evidence presented 
even by its own services”.
The EU already has a vast amount of science advice and evidence-gathering 
capability. The Joint Research Centre11 and European Environment Agency12 
produce a great deal of evidence and reports, both at the request of the 
Commission and independently, and existing Directorates have numerous 
advisory committees. 
This view is not confined to NGOs. At a hearing in December 2014 organised 
by the European Parliament’s Committee on the Environment, Public Health 
and Food Safety, Dr. Bernhard Url, the Director of the European Food Safety 
Authority (EFSA), was asked by UK Conservative MEP Julie Girling whether 
he thought President Juncker needed a CSA. Dr. Url replied that he thought 
that the European Commission had “a lot of scientific knowledge in its 
agencies and the JRC” and that there was “enough scientific capability 
around (...) without a Chief Scientific Adviser”.13 
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Alberto Almmanno makes a similar point: “the creation of this role seems 
to have created more problems than those that it solves”14 and “the 
burden of proof rests with the EU Commission to prove the merits, 
and more specifically, the rationale for having yet another source of 
scientific advice in the EU”.15 
A recipe for confusion
In fact, having an ‘extra’ source of science advice confused responsibilities 
and mandates, and made it unclear who was in charge, and where the 
crossover lay between science and policy processes. Take the example of 
endocrine-disrupting chemicals (EDCs).
A process was ongoing within the Commission to establish criteria to 
identify EDCs. In June 2013 the CSA received a letter from a group of 
scientists expressing concern about the EDC process.16 In the next few 
days the CSA, Anne Glover, sent a note to the Director-General of the 
Commission’s Environment Directorate asking him “to provide (her) with 
factual information to allow (her) to respond” to the critique.17 However, 
the note was also copied to several of the most senior decision-makers 
within the Commission, including the Secretary-General and President 
Barroso’s head of cabinet, and described the authors of the letter as being 
“very eminent experts”. 
Two weeks after this intervention, the Commission’s Secretary-General 
decided to delay the process of defining the criteria to identify EDCs.18 In 
fact, after having criticised the Commission’s work on defining EDCs, the 
authors of the letter dropped their opposition when they faced the experts 
working for the Commission at a meeting the CSA organised in October 
2013. Moreover, over half of the signatories of the original letter had links 
to industries that would be affected by the regulation of EDCs.19 But by 
then a Commission process had halted. From this example, we see that the 
intervention by the CSA: 
• Added strong political content to a science-based discussion through 
copying to high levels in the Commission 
• Bypassed scientific institutional processes within the Commission
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• Presented the signatories to the letter as being authoritative on the issue 
of EDCs
• Created the impression that there was significant scientific controversy 
regarding the definition of EDCs when there was not. 
The case study highlights the unclear mandate and relationship with other 
Commission processes of someone who is apparently senior but has no 
resources. This example should under no circumstances be seen as an 
allegation of bad faith on the part of Anne Glover. Think about the context: 
an unclear line between science and politics, lack of clarity about the 
relationship between CSA and Directorate processes, and an (apparently) 
authoritative group of scientists saying there is a problem on an issue which 
is outside your academic background. What would you have done? There is 
clearly an intrinsic difficulty in the nature of the role as it was created. 
What can’t a CSA achieve? 
Across the European Commission there is variability in the quality of 
science used in policymaking which needs to receive far more attention. 
There is currently no mechanism to deal with these weaknesses, and the 
CSA had neither the authority nor the capacity to address them. 
For example, the EU’s climate and energy policy relies for its impact 
assessment on an economic model known as PRIMES. Energy policies 
involve hundreds of billions of euros of investment, yet the PRIMES model 
has been heavily criticised by civil society groups20 and business groups as 
well as commission advisers21 for its lack of transparency and questionable 
methodology. 
Sometimes the gap between broad reviews of science and the resulting policy 
it delivers is large. Take bioenergy, for example.22 Science tells us that impacts 
on the carbon cycle in both the biofuels and biomass sector are complex but 
important. Yet the changes in land use indirectly caused by the production of 
biofuels,23 or the carbon debt arising from the use of wood as fuel24 are not 
represented meaningfully in sustainability standards, potentially undermining 
any benefit that those bioenergy sources could provide in tackling climate 
change. The problem here is the ability of decision-makers to incorporate 
principles and insights into evidence gathering and policymaking. 
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There may be a case for a centralised audit function to scrutinise science 
processes. However the CSA post is neither designed nor equipped to 
address these weaknesses in Commission science policy advice. Instead, it 
adds another scientific advisory post – and one that functions in a flawed 
way. Flawed, because some of the activities of the CSA so far appear to have 
run directly contrary to science advice principles like transparency and 
clarity of responsibilities. For example, Anne Glover’s advice to President 
Barroso was not public, and far from insisting on the robust levels of 
accountability required, she once commented that her advisory opinions 
should remain “not transparent” and “immune from public scrutiny”.25 
The GMO debate
The call from NGOs was interpreted in a number of media outlets as a 
request to have Anne Glover sacked because of her views on GM crops. It is 
worth returning to the actual wording of our initial letter:
While the current CSA and her opinions were very present in the media, 
the nature of her advice to the President of the European Commission 
remains unknown. We have not been able to obtain any information on 
what the Commission President has requested advice on, let alone what 
advice has been given. To the media, the current CSA presented one-
sided, partial opinions in the debate on the use of genetically modified 
organisms in agriculture, repeatedly claiming that there was a scientific 
consensus about their safety whereas this claim is contradicted by an 
international statement of scientists (currently 297 signatories) saying that 
it ‘misrepresents the currently available scientific evidence and the broad 
diversity of opinion among scientists on this issue’.”
The point the letter was making was about the CSA’s presentation to 
the media of a supposed scientific consensus, in contrast to the secrecy 
surrounding the actual science advice she was giving. Coming late in to 
the discussion, I would accept that this might have been better and more 
clearly articulated. Nonetheless it is still surprising the extent to which this 
paragraph, despite being given extensive context in the letter itself, was 
interpreted as being NGOs wanting Anne Glover sacked because of her 
views on GMOs.26, 27, 28 This may possibly be because one think tank in the 
UK composed its own open letter saying that the NGOs objected to the post 
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“specifically because they disagree with Professor Glover’s advice on 
genetically modified crops and organisms”.29 In fact, a number of the 
signatories to the first letter, and a larger number to the second, have no 
general position on GMOs. 
What should science advice look like in Brussels?
Following the controversy over the CSA post, a group of NGOs collectively 
developed a set of principles for science advice30 that we want to see 
incorporated into the new arrangements that President Juncker is now 
establishing. These principles are not prescriptive about the structure to be 
adopted, and they were developed after extensive exchanges between the 18 
NGOs who signed up to them. The key principles are as follows:
• Transparency of advice
• Clarity of the relationship between science advice and political choices
• Clarity of roles and relationships in the evidence-gathering and 
appraisal processes
• Independence of the advice from financial interests
• Full explanation of the reasons for policy decisions, and the role of 
science advice in coming to those decisions
• Public funding for information of public value. 
There is also an important overarching principle that the public should be 
involved in framing the questions at stake. And explicit attention should be 
paid to uncertainties and knowledge gaps. 
There is much to be done to establish a proper relationship between the 
plethora of scientific activity by EU research institutes and the policymaking 
apparatus. The CSA post actually muddied the waters rather than helping 
things, and its abolition is now an opportunity for a thorough appraisal 
of how these relationships can be better organised. Public involvement, 
transparency and independence must be central to any new arrangements 
that are put in place.
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LESSONS FROM FINLAND
Kari Raivio
As Commissioner Moedas undertakes his review of science advisory models 
for the European Commission, what insights can Finland offer? I was 
recently commissioned by the Prime Minister’s office to undertake a similar 
exercise in Finland.1 My terms of reference included a review of advisory 
structures in Finland and elsewhere, and a survey of the expectations 
of decision-makers. I was also asked to propose a new, more systematic 
framework for scientific advice. 
Basing policy decisions on solid scientific evidence is seen in Finland as 
one element of an ongoing reform of central government structures and 
functions, responding to a set of shared challenges that were identified by 
a joint working group of the governments of the UK, Scotland, Sweden, 
Austria and Finland.2 At a European level, the need for sound scientific 
evidence as the basis for the policies of the European Commission was 
emphasised in the mission letter of President Juncker to Commissioner 
Moedas.3 
Problems in policymaking 
‘Evidence-based policy’ was not part of the vocabulary of the Finnish 
government until quite recently. However, there is a growing recognition of 
the need to bring more and better scientific advice into political decision-
making. The quality of legislative proposals and impact assessments 
submitted by ministries to the Finnish parliament has been deteriorating, 
as highlighted by the National Research Institute for Legal Policy and the 
Audit Committee of the Parliament. In international negotiations, the voice 
of a small nation like Finland will only be heard if it offers a convincing 
message, backed up by scientific evidence. And according to opinion polls, 
Finland’s citizens trust scientists more than other professional groups, and 
would like to see scientific evidence play a stronger role in decision-making. 
In the interaction between politics and science, the demand for information 
should be matched by supply. However, in Finland, as in many other 
countries, we see problems on both sides. Those on the demand side 
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include decision-makers (Parliament, ministers), civil servants dealing with 
legislation and implementation (Prime Minister’s office, ministries), citizens 
and the media. 
Decision-makers need reliable information quickly and in a concise form. 
The difficulties they face include separating the wheat from the chaff in 
the flow of information, and sometimes a sour attitude among researchers 
towards engaging with policy. The message from science may also be 
ambiguous or hard to understand. As a result, parliamentary committees 
in Finland usually consult representatives of the civil service, labour 
organisations and NGOs, but rarely scientists. 
The schedules of civil servants are not as tight as those of politicians, and 
careful analysis of scientific information can be useful to their work. But not 
all ministries have the requisite expertise and capacity to critically review or 
commission research, even when resources are available. 
On the supply side, we are far from self-sufficient, since only 0.6 per cent 
of global research is produced in Finland. Our universities are autonomous, 
and their research interests rarely coincide with the needs of the society. 
Our state research institutes cover only certain selected fields of science, 
and have not effectively contributed advice to policymakers. This is one of 
the reasons that the government recently reorganised the research institutes 
and significantly cut their budgets: the savings (a total of €57 million 
per year) will be transferred into a new strategic fund, which will support 
solutions-oriented research aimed at addressing national challenges. 
Priorities will be set by the government but the funding will be competitive 
and peer-reviewed. 
Signals in the noise 
Organisations analysing and transmitting scientific evidence in Finland 
include consulting firms and lobbyists, non-governmental research institutes 
and think tanks. Most of these have their own agenda that they try to 
impress upon decision-makers. They are often selective in their use of 
scientific information, cherry-picking data that supports their messages and 
their prejudices. 
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In preparing legislation, the government often sets up committees and 
working groups, but their main function is to engage various stakeholder 
groups, not scientific experts. The Climate Panel set up by the Ministry 
of the Environment is the only example of a bona fide scientific advisory 
group.4 Its members are undoubtedly leading researchers in the field, and 
they serve voluntarily and willingly to advise in the preparation of climate 
legislation. The Ministry of Defence also has an advisory group that 
includes scientists, mainly for allocating modest amounts of funding for 
research. Academies of science and learned societies in Finland are active 
in promoting science (policy for science), but have not been engaged in 
advising the government (science for policy). 
So the most pressing problem in Finnish scientific advice is accessing 
reliable and impartial expertise, and creating channels for systematic 
analyses of scientific knowledge, or rapid advice in unexpected situations 
and crises. The advisory system could be made more efficient if decision-
makers, civil servants and the scientific community agreed to support 
reforms, but building trust between the different cultures of government 
and science takes time, patience and diplomacy. Improvements cannot 
wholly rely on external advice; scientific skills also need greater emphasis 
as part of the competence profile of the civil service, and in recruitment and 
ongoing training. 
A blueprint for reform
The report I submitted to the Prime Minister contains 14 specific proposals, 
each with a clear rationale, to establish a robust advisory system. My three 
most significant proposals are: to establish the post of a government Chief 
Scientific Adviser (CSA); to create a Research Director position in every 
ministry; and to set up a Science Analysis Unit within the Delegation of 
Finnish Academies of Science.
The CSA would be located in the Prime Minister’s Office, with a small staff, 
and would act as the hub of two networks, one extending to the ministries, 
the other to the scientific community. The former already exists as the 
Research-Foresight-Evaluation (RFE) group, chaired by the State Secretary, 
which includes a representative from each ministry. Its task is to coordinate 
horizontal projects across ministries, as well as commission short-term 
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studies and consultations to advance the government’s programme. The 
effectiveness of this working group would be improved if each ministry 
were represented by a Research Director with doctoral-level training; this 
is not the case currently. The CSA would be the natural chair for this group, 
but the alternative would be for the State Secretary to chair, and the CSA to 
be a permanent member of the group.
The other network is needed to bridge gaps between the administration 
and the scientific community. In many countries, academies of science 
play an important role as advisers to governments. This is because their 
membership is based solely on scientific merit, and they are independent 
and non-partisan organisations. Academy members usually participate in 
advisory functions on a voluntary basis, without monetary compensation, 
because this is considered a type of peer review that relies on the solidarity 
of the scientific community. In a few countries, such as the USA, the 
advisory role of the national academies is mandated by law; in most others, 
these activities are organised by the academies themselves, and scientific 
advice is offered to governments on request, or proactively at the initiative 
of the scientific community itself.
For historical and linguistic reasons, Finland is blessed with four academies 
of science, two of them including all fields of natural and social science as 
well as humanities, and two representing the technological sciences and 
engineering. These four already collaborate within the Delegation of Finnish 
Academies, which is partly financed by the Ministry of Education and 
Culture, and is responsible for the international relations of Finnish science 
(for example, membership of the International Council for Science). 
All four academies have expressed an interest in assuming new 
responsibilities for science advice to government, and are willing to allocate 
both intellectual and financial resources to this activity. The proposed 
Science Analysis Unit would organise systematic reviews of current 
scientific knowledge, drawing on the expertise of the best researchers in the 
country. It would also maintain and update a register of experts in different 
fields of science, who could be rapidly consulted if a need arises within 
the government. The CSA would act as a go-between in such situations. 
The basic financing of the unit would come from the academies, but the 
government would contribute by meeting the costs of reviews.
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Further recommendations
In addition to these new structures for scientific advice, my report 
contained a number of other recommendations. These included clearer 
documentation of the evidence used in legislative bills and in the reports 
and statements of parliamentary committees. This would improve the 
transparency of decision-making and strengthen the trust of citizens in their 
elected representatives.
The state research institutes, even after their significant budget cuts, remain 
a valuable resource for evidence-based policymaking. They are in the best 
position to compete for new resources for strategic research. However, 
the legal basis of their mission should be clarified, and any irrelevant 
obligations scrapped. 
Because of the importance of evidence in international negotiations, the 
role of science in and for diplomacy should be strengthened. Scientific 
experts should be invited to participate in international delegations if the 
issues under discussion have significant scientific implications. This is an 
unploughed field, since until recently the top brass at the Finnish Foreign 
Service did not even recognise the term ‘science diplomacy’. However, 
since traditional approaches to diplomacy have not produced particularly 
impressive achievements for our foreign service, fresh ideas merit 
consideration.
Finally, the more active involvement of citizens in policymaking is a goal 
shared by both politicians and voters. Social media offer new tools for 
such participation, but some structure and moderation is needed for public 
discussions on legislation under development, and on the various arguments 
presented by scientists and other stakeholders. Initiating and guiding public 
dialogue would fit well within the mission of the Committee for Public 
Information in Finland, which was set up by the government to promote the 
dissemination of scientific knowledge; and also the Federation of Finnish 
Learned Societies, which has a combined membership of thousands of 
(mostly lay) people. Systematic reviews of scientific information, whether 
commissioned by the government or proactively prepared by the Science 
Analysis Unit, should be open to public feedback. 
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The road ahead
Following the publication of my report, the Prime Minister’s office 
has invited comments from interested stakeholders on its content and 
proposals. As expected, reactions have been mixed. The principles of 
evidence-based policymaking and of the need for better mechanisms 
of scientific advice to government have not been questioned. More 
transparency and documentation of the basis for decisions is also uniformly 
supported, and most respondents have a positive view towards the idea of a 
competent Research Director in each ministry. 
Opinions vary on the need for a CSA and a Science Analysis Unit, although 
the reasons for negative attitudes are not always clear. The most critical 
comments came from the state research institutes, which do not see the 
need for any new developments. This may reflect their current problems 
with restructuring and budget cuts, but their track record in providing 
scientific advice to the government does not justify their defence of the 
status quo. 
Many stakeholders were afraid of increasing bureaucracy and costs, even 
though the budgetary implications of the proposals are modest compared 
with the amounts spent by ministries on commissioning research. My 
report may not have stated sufficiently clearly that the Science Analysis 
Unit should be seen as a project for which the academies of science are 
primarily responsible, with public funding only for reviews commissioned 
by government agencies.
Given the positive attitudes of politicians, civil servants and the public, 
strengthening scientific advice to the government should not be a 
controversial issue. How it will be implemented remains to be seen. 
 
Kari Raivio is the former Rector and Chancellor of the University of 
Helsinki (http://www.kariraivio.net/2).
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EASAC AND THE ROLE OF EUROPE’S 
NATIONAL ACADEMIES OF SCIENCE
Jos van der Meer, Christiane Diehl, Robin Fears, William 
Gillett and Sofie Vanthournout 
Background
In 2001, the need to improve the process of providing science advice 
to policymakers at EU level was recognised by the science academies 
of EU Member States, which led to the establishment of the European 
Academies’ Science Advisory Council (EASAC).1 The organisation was set 
up to maximise the coherence, efficiency and accountability of delivery of 
science advice to policymakers in EU institutions, notably the European 
Commission and the European Parliament. In doing this, EASAC was 
also expecting to bring economies of scope and scale to the process by 
facilitating the sharing of expertise and resources between the science 
academies of the EU, Norway and Switzerland. 
Policymakers have recognised for centuries the importance of having access 
to the best scientific understanding, and this is reflected not only in the 
existence of national science academies in most (25) EU Member States 
and in many other countries around the world, but also in the fact that 
these national science academies often receive some support from their 
governments. Having said that, the pressures on today’s policymakers are 
such that it is easy for them to forget that they have established these highly 
skilled centres of excellence and networking, and, as a result, the potential 
contributions of our national science academies to the policymaking 
process are not always maximised. 
Policymaking in today’s increasingly globalised economy is becoming 
ever more complex, and strategies need to be aligned across national 
boundaries in order to successfully address policy areas which have an 
international dimension. In recent years, the alignment of national policies 
and regulations has become particularly important for the EU in the areas 
of bioscience, energy and the environment. At the same time, scientific and 
technological developments have been moving, and continue to move, very 
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quickly in these areas. It is, therefore, crucial that policymakers should be 
regularly provided with the best independent scientific analysis and advice 
on developments in these (and other) areas. 
Being part of EASAC helps to strengthen those science academies in the 
EU which lack resources, by giving them the opportunity to work together 
with other academies to produce outputs of the highest quality for EU 
policymakers, and which they can then also use for national policymakers 
in their own countries. In addition, EASAC has been working with its 
academies to identify and develop the most efficient ways of providing 
science advice to policymakers at both European and national levels. It has 
then transferred this knowledge and experience to those academy fellows 
and staff who are engaged in providing policy advice, by drafting specific 
guidelines and by holding Science-Policy-Dialogue workshops.2 
A number of noteworthy assets add to the appeal of EASAC reports and 
recommendations for EU policy makers. Firstly, the advice has a clear 
focus on EU policy and offers a European perspective, but is at the same 
time endorsed at a national level by all the science academies of the EU 
member states. Secondly, the high quality of EASAC’s work is assured 
through EASAC’s network of excellence and an extensive peer-review 
process. Finally, EASAC can guarantee its independence from any political 
or economic interests.
What is EASAC?
There is a long tradition of academies of science in many parts of Europe. 
Whereas in previous centuries the role of these meritocratic groups 
consisted primarily in fostering scientific progress through close exchange 
of information among the best in their fields, the last few decades have seen 
a growth in the academies’ public role to mobilise the best of European 
science, as providers of independent advice to policymakers and sources 
of information for the public, thus strengthening the transparency and 
plurality of democratic decision-making processes. 
Until recently it would have been fair to say that, while many academies 
had developed an effective relationship with their national governments in 
advising on the scientific dimensions in policymaking, the development of 
an analogous relationship at the European level had been more difficult. Yet, 
the delivery of science advice to the European Commission, the European 
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Parliament, Council of Ministers and to successive Presidencies of the 
EU Council has become increasingly important. In Europe, EASAC is the 
alliance of the 25 National Academies of Science of the EU Member States, 
and the science academies of Switzerland and Norway, who have agreed to 
work together in a network with a very simple, jointly funded administrative 
structure and common working procedures for providing science advice to 
policymakers in the EU. 
The EASAC Council is made up of representatives of the participating 
academies and meets twice a year, usually in the academy of the country 
that will hold the EU presidency six months later. EASAC’s operations 
are managed by its Bureau, which consists of an elected President, four 
Vice-Presidents and the immediate Past President, who normally work – in 
an extended format – together with the chairs of EASAC’s three Steering 
Panels, the three Programme Directors and the Executive Director.
Figure 1: The structure of EASAC
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The three EU Member States that do not have a national academy of 
sciences and are thus not represented in EASAC are Malta, Luxemburg 
and Cyprus. However, Academia Europaea, the pan-European Academy of 
Science, and ALLEA, the association of all academies in geographic Europe, 
are represented in EASAC, and the Federation of European Academies of 
Medicine, FEAM, has observer status.
EASAC’s analysis and advice has to be scientifically excellent, independent, 
timely, relevant, comprehensible and endorsed by all its member academies. 
EASAC focuses on three main areas of policy for which high-quality, 
independent science advice is particularly important to policymakers:
1. Biosciences – including health and wellbeing, agriculture and food 
security
2. Environment – including climate change 
3. Energy – including sustainable energy and energy security. 
The member academies of EASAC take great pride in ensuring that EASAC’s 
advice is totally independent, and therefore EASAC does not accept funding 
from any political, industry or other sources that could be perceived as 
compromising its independence. 
EASAC’s budget comes from the membership contributions of its member 
academies and the InterAcademy Partnership (IAP),3 the global network 
of science academies. This network has over 140 member academies 
worldwide and receives support from UNESCO. EASAC is the affiliated 
regional network of IAP for Europe. 
EASAC’s working methods and guarantee of quality
EASAC is made up of its assembly (the Council), the President and Vice-
Presidents, the Bureau, and three Steering Panels for Biosciences, Energy 
and Environment. Proposals for new topics usually come through one 
of these routes. In addition, EASAC maintains contacts with the EU’s 
institutions and encourages them to express their interest in specific science 
topics; without compromising its independence, EASAC proactively takes 
into account the views of these institutions when identifying key issues for 
attention. Of particular importance for the quality of EASAC’s work are the 
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Steering Panels, which play a central role not only in the selection of new 
topics, but also in guiding and reviewing the work as it progresses. 
Once a new topic has been selected, a working group is established, for 
which the best expert scientists within the EU are selected with the help of 
EASAC’s member academies. The working group usually meets 2–4 times 
over a period of 9–18 months. When the draft report is ready, it undergoes 
peer review by independent experts. Each report must be endorsed by 
EASAC’s member academies before it is published in print and on the 
EASAC website.4 
To enhance the immediate impact of each EASAC report, it is usually 
launched at a dedicated event in Brussels. EASAC often also publishes 
non-technical summaries – ‘lay summaries’ – of its reports, for use by its 
member academies when setting up public debates on important issues.
Table 1:  EASAC reports and statements published between 2011   
 and 2014
Realising European Potential in Synthetic Biology  (Jan 2011)
EU Public Health and Innovation Policy for Infectious Disease  (Apr 2011)
Impact of Engineered Nanomaterials on Health  (with JRC, Oct 2011)
Infectious Diseases and the Future: Policies for Europe  (Oct 2011)
Concentrating Solar Power: its Potential Contribution to a  (Oct 2011) 
Sustainable Energy Future  
Addressing the Challenges of Climate Change  (Nov 2011)
Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture  (Dec 2011)
Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Testing  (with FEAM, June 2012)
The Need for More Emphasis on Systems Approaches in  (Dec 2012) 
Energy to Inform EU Policymaking
The Current Status of Biofuels in the EU  (Dec 2012)
Carbon Capture and Storage in Europe  (May 2013)
Planting the Future: Crop Genetic Improvement Technologies  (June 2013)
Statement on the SET-Plan  (Aug 2013)
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EASAC recognises that the publication of such a report is not the end of a 
project, but a resource to be used to catalyse further discussion and inspire 
action at the EU and national levels. Thus, the work on a particular topic 
may continue for years after the initial publication. A continuing challenge 
for EASAC, as for many of its member academies and other science bodies, 
is to find ways to stimulate and sustain public engagement alongside the 
interaction with policymakers. These challenges in the UK were highlighted 
in the recent collection by Doubleday and Wilsdon.5 
When the academies see the need to provide a rapid response to an urgent 
policy issue, a shorter EASAC statement may be produced. This can be 
done within a few months, but must still be endorsed by EASAC’s member 
academies before publication. 
The member academies use EASAC reports and statements in their national 
context, and also help to draw attention to issues at an EU level. Often, 
articles based on EASAC reports are published in scientific journals, such 
as Nature, The Lancet, Science Translational Medicine, and Nature 
Reviews Drug Discovery.6 
EASAC increasingly uses its portfolio of studies and reports as a basis for 
providing rapid advice, possibly within a few days, on issues that have been 
studied before. This growing resource allows EASAC to respond to public 
consultations of the European Commission, brief relevant Members of the 
European Parliament on topical debates or respond to ad hoc questions 
from any other organisations or individuals.
Extreme Weather Events in Europe  (Dec 2013)
Risks to Plant Health: EU Priorities for Tackling Emerging Pests  (Mar 2014) 
and Diseases
Management of Spent Nuclear Fuel and its Waste  (July 2014)
European Space Exploration: Strategic Considerations of  (Sept 2014) 
Human vs. Robotic Exploration
Antimicrobial Drug Discovery, Greater Steps Ahead  (Oct 2014)
Shale Gas Extraction: Issues of Particular Relevance to the  (Nov 2014) 
European Union
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EASAC’S contacts with EU institutions
While EASAC’s main Secretariat is based at the German National Academy 
of Sciences Leopoldina, it also maintains a Brussels Office at the Royal 
Academies for Science and the Arts of Belgium (RASAB). This Office 
facilitates interactions with EU institutions, helps to horizon scan for 
impending policy developments, maintains contact with key EU officials and 
organises launch events for EASAC reports and statements. 
EASAC maintains contact at all levels with the European Commission, 
and collaborates with the Joint Research Centre (JRC). Together with the 
JRC, EASAC has produced joint reports on the Impact of Nanomaterials 
on Human Health and on Management of Spent Nuclear Fuel and its 
Waste. EASAC also maintains close links with a number of DGs, as well as 
with European Commission bodies such as the ECDC and EFSA.7
Previously, EASAC established a good working relationship with the Bureau 
of European Policy Advisers, especially the Chief Scientific Adviser, and 
looks forward to using this experience to build a similarly good relationship 
with the new European Political Strategy Centre (EPSC). As noted at the 
recent UK meeting hosted by the Royal Society,8 in addition to building 
the capacity to supply science-based evidence to policymakers, it is also 
critically important to build the capacity to receive and use that evidence 
within the policymaking community.
EASAC also provides science advice to the European Parliament, both 
directly to MEPs and their assistants and through the Science and 
Technology Options Assessment Panel (STOA), which forms part of the 
European Parliament’s DG for European Parliamentary Research Services 
(DG EPRS). EASAC is looking to increase its collaboration with the other 
services of the DG EPRS and the Policy Departments that support the EP’s 
Committees.
EASAC also aims to inform the Council of Ministers and the European 
Council. This interaction is primarily channelled through its member 
academies, which are the first and preferred partner of national ministers 
and policymakers. By coordinating this interaction, EASAC guarantees 
that national science communities provide consistent recommendations to 
policymakers throughout Europe.
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Science advice for policy beyond Europe
Many scientists are more accustomed than their policymaking counterparts 
to working closely with international colleagues across the world. 
Similarly, many of Europe’s science academies are very well connected 
internationally, and EASAC itself participates actively in the global network 
of science academies (IAP) as a regional affiliated network for Europe. 
Working on science advice for policy beyond Europe is a two-way process, 
allowing EASAC to use experience from other continents and countries to 
strengthen its advice to EU policymakers, as well as to use EU experience 
as a basis for supporting other academies in giving advice to policymakers 
in other countries. Moreover, at the global level academies can collectively 
deliver strong messages to intergovernmental organisations and other 
stakeholders. With these aims in mind, EASAC collaborates with the three 
other regional networks of IAP: the Inter-American Network of Academies 
of Sciences (IANAS), the Network of African Science Academies (NASAC), 
and the Association of Academies and Societies of Sciences in Asia and 
Societies in Asia (AASSA). 
One recent example of such collaboration is EASAC’s work with NASAC 
on ‘Agricultural Biotechnology for Sustainable Development in Africa’ and 
on the ‘Smart Villages’ project for energy provision in off-grid villages 
in developing countries. EASAC has also collaborated with IAP’s other 
regional networks in delivering global statements on synthetic biology and 
on antimicrobial resistance.
Looking to the future
The need to provide science advice to policymakers at both EU and national 
levels is still growing, and the decision taken in 2001 to set up EASAC has 
resulted in a growing body of knowledge and expertise in the academies on 
how to provide such advice, especially at the EU level. 
Although the science may indeed sometimes be uncertain and the policy 
area controversial, what should always be clear is that the processes for 
generating science advice have been conducted with rigour, respect and 
responsibility. Collective initiatives do not mean adopting a low common 
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standard of evidence, but rather ensuring consistency in the generation 
of high-quality science advice. One of the strengths of EASAC is that our 
advice takes into account the different experiences across the EU Member 
States, and this diversity of backgrounds may suggest alternative ways 
to inform policy options. Among the lessons learnt since the inception of 
EASAC has been the need to maintain scientific robustness at every stage of 
a project: initial prioritisation of topic to ensure a distinctive contribution; 
early scoping work; creation of a balanced Working Group; careful handling 
of scientific uncertainties; and independent peer review. EASAC has also 
learned how to increase the impact of its outputs, by early and sustained 
engagement with policymaking and other audiences. 
EASAC is now firmly established as a committed EU stakeholder with 
growing visibility, a dedicated team, and a significant track record of 
producing timely, independent, clear and constructive advice for EU 
policymakers in the areas of biosciences, environment and energy. EASAC 
can and will also capitalise on opportunities to provide advice on topics 
outside these three core areas; for example, a report was recently published 
on European space exploration (cp. Table 1).
Support for the work of EASAC continues to come mainly from its member 
academies, including a particularly important contribution from the 
Leopoldina in Germany, which hosts the EASAC Secretariat, and from 
RASAB in Belgium, which hosts the Brussels Office.
EASAC has not yet exploited the full potential of the EU academies. As the 
demand for science advice for policy appears likely to continue to grow, 
and many of the national academies have limited resources as a result 
of the financial crisis, more funding will be needed to support EASAC’s 
work in the future. This needs to be provided without compromising the 
independence – or even the perceived independence – of EASAC’s advice.
The national science academies of Europe have an important contribution 
to make towards creating a better European dialogue between science and 
policy. They can help with setting up simple yet effective processes for 
feeding independent and timely advice from the science community to the 
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institutions of the EU. As a network, EASAC will be at its strongest when its 
individual member academies have developed their national science–policy 
dialogue to the fullest extent. In this way, EASAC could be said to reflect one 
of the key strengths of the EU as a whole.
Jos van der Meer is President, Christiane Diehl is Executive 
Director, Robin Fears is Director of the Biosciences Programme, 
William Gillett is Director of the Energy Programme, and Sofie 
Vanthournout is Head of Brussels Office at EASAC (@EASACnews).
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THE ROLE OF FOUNDATIONS AT THE 
SCIENCE–POLICY INTERFACE
Wolfgang Rohe and Jeannine Hausmann 
Private foundations are established members of the ecosystem of expertise 
through their role as funders of research. In addition, some foundations 
pursue specific social and political aims and therefore are connected to both 
the worlds of science and politics. As the relationship between science and 
politics becomes ever more significant, foundations have new opportunities 
for engagement at the intersection of research funding and policy advice. 
It is now timely to consider foundations’ room to manoeuvre and the 
principles that should guide their activity at the science–policy interface. 
As financially independent actors that are at the same time able to behave 
autonomously of any political agenda, foundations have a unique role 
to play in civil society. They can trigger social processes of change that 
transcend party boundaries, contribute to the pluralisation of debates, and 
provide evidence-based arguments that help shape the political agenda. 
Improving the substantive understanding of complex social challenges and 
elucidating arguments for positive change can help to increase the quality 
of future political decision-making processes. Due to their independence, 
foundations enjoy a scope of action that transcends the state, the economy 
and even the traditional sphere of NGOs. Indeed, by affiliating with different 
systems within modern society such as science, politics, education, law 
and civil society, foundations have the opportunity to transmit scientific 
knowledge that furthers progressive societal aims – without, however, 
representing any single (party-) political point of view. 
Foundations at the interface
Due to their limited resources in comparison to state institutions, 
foundations typically seek to allocate their funds to areas where they have 
a comparative advantage over other actors. One such area, which allows 
foundations to make the most of their distinct potential and capacity, is the 
science–policy interface.
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Welzel has cogently summarised the particular value that foundations can 
bring to bear:1 
As relatively independent organisations, they (foundations) have the 
opportunity to pose new questions, to work out recommendations and to 
spur initiatives for organisational constellations and coalitions. They do 
not always need to be involved themselves in scientific research, but often 
the contribution of foundations lies in their suggestions, translations, 
reductions of complexity, or cross-linking of scientific subjects.”
As forces of a pluralistic democratic society, foundations are able to 
introduce subjects to the political agenda that require treatment and yet 
may be familiar to only a few experts, or are perhaps ignored because they 
are politically inconvenient. Since foundations can highlight issues that 
governments tend to overlook, they are in a position to expand the scope of 
policy debates.2 
The contribution of foundations at the interface of science and policy is not 
limited to agenda setting. With regard to subjects that are already part of 
the policy debate, foundations can contribute to the plurality of perspectives 
on these subjects and to their substantive development. At the same time, 
they can also make an impact on the political culture of interpretation and 
public opinion. Foundations can thus contribute by promoting the diversity 
of potential solutions under consideration, and by helping to assess the 
effectiveness of different solutions. As politically independent actors, 
foundations are able to create new social constellations and include a wider 
circle of relevant groups. In short, they can generate input for societal 
processes of change beyond the mainstream, which is nonetheless adapted 
to political realities.3 Despite this critical function, however, German 
foundations have only played a role in policy advice for about 20 years.4 
Opportunities for innovation
There are numerous opportunities for foundations interested in engaging 
in scientific policy advice. One of these is to provide long-term support 
to independent think tanks, which make assessments for policymakers 
and work out possible solutions. In Europe, there are comparatively few 
foundations that provide institutional support to private think tanks; for 
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the most part, they support the work of think tanks only on the basis of 
individual projects. However, it is also possible to make a significant impact 
through financing specific research structures, since this allows entire 
thematic areas and not simply individual issues to be investigated over the 
long term.5 This is particularly relevant with regard to the so-called ‘grand 
challenges’ – in other words, temporally, socially and substantively complex 
issues such as climate change, food security and resource scarcity. By 
supporting think tanks that address grand challenges, foundations can bring 
about sustained examination of these complex, interrelated problems. 
The possible contributions that foundations can make here are not limited 
to generating politically relevant insights by advancing research. In order 
for there to be successful knowledge transfer from science to politics, 
personal relationships and networks between scientists and policymakers 
are essential. Foundations can facilitate this exchange by creating new 
forums and discussion platforms, and by developing new mechanisms of 
exchange. In this way, they are able to act as catalysts for policy-relevant 
ideas and evidence.
The sphere of action of foundations results from their unique ability to 
combine these two separate activities. On the one hand, they fund research 
that demonstrates to policymakers several alternative courses of action; on 
the other, they serve as mediators which can successfully bring together 
stakeholders from diverse fields. According to Thunert, think tanks and 
foundations can be highly effective at creating channels of communication 
and facilitating contacts between disparate actors.6 
Stiftung Mercator (the Mercator Foundation) has experimented with 
investments to support independent think tanks as part of its contribution to 
engagement at the intersection of science and politics. Our observations here 
will be limited to examples from our own work with the Mercator Institute 
for China Studies (MERICS), the Sachverständigenrat Deutscher Stiftungen 
für Integration und Migration (Expert Council of German Foundations on 
Integration and Migration) (SVR) and Agora Energiewende. In all three 
organisations, in order to achieve a higher level of congruency between the 
conducted research and policy, exchange and network components have been 
institutionalised to varying degrees, in addition to research.
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The Mercator Institute for China Studies (MERICS) is Europe’s 
largest institute for research and knowledge dissemination on modern-day 
China. It was founded in 2013 by the Mercator Foundation for the purpose 
of transmitting a more accurate and nuanced image of China and having 
a positive effect on policy. Through structured knowledge transfer, public 
relations and international exchange, conditions are established for enabling 
decision-makers – especially those in Germany – to make more informed 
decisions about issues relating to China. To this end, the research institute 
collects and analyses information within four thematic areas: policy, 
economy, society, and innovation and environment.
The Sachverständigenrat Deutscher Stiftungen für Integration und 
Migration (SVR) was formed out of the conviction that foundation-financed 
think tanks can be especially effective, and their credibility can be enhanced 
when they proceed on the basis of mutual cooperation with several other 
foundations, or jointly with public partners. The SVR was established in 
2008, along with six other German foundations, due to an initiative from 
the Volkswagenstiftung and the Mercator Foundation. Its focus is on 
offering scientific advice and support to policymakers and civic institutions 
in the areas of migration and integration, through research and policy 
recommendations. The SVR is not only dedicated to providing scientifically 
based recommendations, but is also engaged in their political realisation.
Agora Energiewende, a joint venture of the European Climate Foundation 
and the Mercator Foundation, aims to help transform the energy sector in 
Germany by promoting a process that connects and brings into dialogue 
experts and decision-makers from important energy-related organisations 
in government, the economy and civil society, as well as researchers and 
other influential actors. At the same time, it strives to elucidate different, 
scientifically evaluated paths such as how to successfully transform the 
energy sector into a system that is almost completely based on renewable 
energy. The alternatives presented by Agora Energiewende provide a 
basis for the political decision-making process. To ensure that its work 
is scientifically grounded, the organisation has an independent research 
budget and network of researchers. Agora Energiewende thus combines 
the goal of developing and offering for discussion scientifically founded 
courses of action with the creation of an exchange platform that transcends 
individual sectors.
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Ensuring quality of research and policy advice
Drawing on its recent experience, the Mercator Foundation has begun to 
reflect on the distinctive quality requirements of both research and policy 
advice: in order for foundations to become involved at the science–policy 
interface, they need to adhere to practices for achieving credibility in both 
areas. With regard to the funding of research, it is necessary to respect 
the rules and norms of scientific inquiry. Even when foundations pursue 
particular socio-political objectives, the research they fund must meet the 
quality criteria of the respective scientific disciplines. 
It is not enough, however, to adhere to the quality standards of scientific 
research; foundations must also uphold the standards of proper scientific 
policy advice.7 They should not fall prey, in other words, to the desire to 
merely convince policymakers of a particular truth. As Edenhofer and 
Kowarsch discuss in their essay, the role of science in the area of policy 
advice is to support and prepare the way for decision-making processes by 
informing policymakers of alternative, evidence-based policy pathways, and 
laying out their respective implications, costs, risks and time constraints. 
Foundations should likewise encourage this model of opening up alternatives 
if they are engaged in supporting scientific policy advice. In this way, 
foundations are able to encourage the relevant discipline to explore different 
courses of action and support policymakers in their decision-making. 
In cases where the approach of exploring alternative policy pathways is 
no longer pursued, scientists frequently only resemble lobbyists, and over 
the long run this can undermine confidence in scientific expertise. As a 
result, a foundation’s promotion of scientific research should not be limited 
to pursuing one hypothesis alone; instead, multiple courses of action and 
decision-making alternatives should be developed, justified and evaluated 
in terms of their consequences, costs and implications. Assessments that 
include a systematic feedback loop between the objectives and the means 
for achieving them can play an important role in this regard (see the essay 
from Edenhofer and Kowarsch). 
Every initiative aimed at promoting and spreading scientific policy advice 
must keep in mind that science always produces uncertain knowledge and 
that the process of knowledge acquisition is never finished. While this may 
appear at first to be a disadvantage, it is in fact an advantage. Politics, after 
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all, must contend with continually changing conditions, especially when it 
comes to complex problems. And every decision necessitates new follow-
up decisions, which in turn demand scientific evidence and grounding. This 
continual exchange between political and scientific modes of reasoning, 
especially in scientifically complex and politically significant areas such 
as climate change, gives rise to a process that is both synchronous and 
mutually stimulating.
Supporting future directions for advice at a European level
At the interface of science and policy, foundations should assume the 
role of an ‘honest broker of policy alternatives’.8 This does not exclude 
the possibility of pursuing socio-political aims that foundations will often 
espouse as actors in civil society. If the aims are located within a social 
consensus or have already been established by means of policy (e.g. in the 
area of CO2 reduction), foundations can be active as advocates for the issue, 
or also serve as mediators, by demonstrating to policymakers scientifically 
based courses of action or alternatives for achieving certain goals. It is due 
to their roots in civil society and capacity for bringing together a diverse 
range of actors that foundations are especially well-equipped for this 
intermediary role.
In general, actors in civil society are able to achieve goals not only by 
actively exploring alternative courses of action, but also by focusing on and 
advocating one particular option at a societal level. Taking a stance like this 
makes an actor an ‘issue advocate’.9 A foundation needs to consider whether 
or not it might be able to achieve its goals over the long run most effectively 
by embracing this approach and, if so, how it should then explain its choice of 
this specific option to the public. In those cases where a foundation involved 
in funding research generally does not direct its partisan advocacy toward 
solving complex social problems, but rather toward the implementation of a 
certain solution, it is acting as a lobby organisation.
So far, relatively few foundation initiatives have focused on giving 
scientific policy advice to EU institutions. The EU has indeed enunciated 
its efforts and interest in better integrating intermediary organisations 
from civil society into the political process, and foundations in particular 
are supposed to be encouraged to be more active in the area of policy 
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innovation. These aims, however, have had little resonance; most European 
foundations still address policy on the national level, and as a result have 
at most an indirect impact on the decision-making processes in Brussels. 
However, due to the considerable impact of political decisions at the EU 
level on individual societies within the EU community, and the fact that 
almost every political field has in the meantime acquired a European 
dimension, a more substantial sphere of action has opened up for private 
foundations at the European level in the area of scientific policy advice. 
The Mercator Foundation strives to bring this level into clearer focus in 
its work. Along similar lines, Agora Energiewende has been strategically 
expanded by means of structured and wide-ranging processes of dialogue 
with key Member States and relevant European institutions, with the aim of 
improving the contribution of scientific advice to EU energy policy.
Wolfgang Rohe is Executive Director of Stiftung Mercator and 
Jeannine Hausmann is a Project Manager at Stiftung Mercator  
(@MercatorDE).
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EXPERTS AS CARTOGRAPHERS OF  
POLICY PATHWAYS FOR EUROPE
Martin Kowarsch and Ottmar Edenhofer 
The European Commission faces a number of controversial issues in energy 
and climate policy with substantial implications for European economies 
and societies. These include post-2030 energy policy targets, issues of 
energy security, and the EU’s contribution to long-term global efforts to 
mitigate climate change. For example: should we reduce EU emissions by 
80%, 90% or 95% by 2050? Should we use nuclear power or energy from 
renewables? There are similar debates about reform of the EU’s Emission 
Trading System (ETS). Are quantity-based approaches, such as the Market 
Stability Reserve, the best option for reform? Or would a price collar be 
more appropriate to stabilise the expectations of investors? Should the 
transport sector be included?1 
In tackling such debates, multiple policy fields – including the economy, 
finance, energy, environment, health, agriculture and security – as well 
as many interest groups and multiple governance levels are affected by 
complex interdependencies. The EU has to manoeuvre through highly 
challenging and complex political spaces, characterised by competing 
objectives and trade-offs on different levels. 
Framing questions and offering answers
The sciences, through systematic and deep-rooted methods, can assist 
decision-makers and support broader public discourse on energy and 
climate policy issues at the European level. They can help to better 
understand problems, as well as potential solutions, future scenarios and 
specific policy options. Ignoring evidence on natural and social system 
interdependencies when deliberating on, for example, optimal emission 
reduction levels and technology choices, might result in uninformed 
decisions and unexpected policy outcomes.
However, policymakers and the media sometimes place strong pressure on 
the sciences to come up with simple answers to complex questions. These 
demands for clear-cut, one-dimensional recommendations, preferably 
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expressed in single quantitative targets, extend the battle zone of political 
debate and consensus-seeking into the scientific realm. Though scientific 
experts do sometimes provide clear recommendations regarding such 
complex questions, they can only do so by disregarding some of the deep 
uncertainties, including disputes over value-laden issues. 
Energy and climate policy can be seen as “a problem from hell”, according 
to the economist Martin Weitzman,2 as it is characterised by large-scale, 
non-marginal risks and irreversible outcomes; deep uncertainty; global and 
intergenerational dimensions; and questions of justice and ethics related to 
a global problem of commonly pooled resources. 
Normative judgments are sometimes opaque in scientific studies; they 
can include, for example, the choice of intergenerational discount factors, 
equity weights, the valuation of technological risks or the treatment of 
uncertainty. Yet scientific experts lack the legitimacy to make decisions for 
society at large on far-reaching, disputed, value-laden issues, particularly 
if they act as what Roger Pielke Jr. calls “stealth issue advocates”.3 
Consequently, as desirable as scientific expertise is in supporting EU energy 
and climate policy, fundamental challenges and pitfalls have to be dealt with 
at the science–policy interface. We therefore need an appropriate division 
of labour between scientific expertise and policy that allows for rational and 
evidence-based policies, but leaves social choices where they belong: in the 
hands of legitimate political institutions.
Insights from the IPCC
In this essay, we aim to draw some lessons for EU science–policy 
interactions on energy and climate policy from the experience of Working 
Group III (WG III) of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC). The IPCC, established in 1988, was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize 
in 2007 for building up and disseminating knowledge about climate change 
and response options. Its assessments are large-scale processes of social 
deliberation where multiple experts and stakeholders assemble, discuss and 
synthesise existing knowledge on complex issues to inform public policy. 
IPPC WG III, as a widely respected institution, analyses options for energy 
and climate policy at the global level, which is even more complex than the 
European level. 
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IPPC WG III recently employed a novel science–policy model which we 
will introduce below. To better understand its novelty, we first need to 
understand the predominant models and their weaknesses in responding 
to the question of how scientific assessments can be policy-relevant and 
credible, but not illegitimately prescriptive.
Proponents of the technocratic model of the science–policy interface argue 
that complex problems such as climate change cannot be understood and 
resolved by politicians, but only by scientific experts. Such technocratic 
optimism relies heavily on the assumption of constant progress in science 
and technology, as well as on a presupposition that science is value-neutral 
and objective. 
The result of employing this model is that policy objectives and associated 
means are determined by experts, without any perceived need for 
substantial contribution and discussion by other parts of society. In 
our experience, the technocratic model is more widely held than one 
might wish, and risks ending in what Max Weber called the “iron cage 
of bondage” for society. This refers to a situation in which democratic 
institutions that are strongly relying on expert authority are not given 
alternatives, even though they exist, but rather are told to implement a 
single policy based on implicit value judgments made by the experts.
Weber vehemently demanded a division of labour concerning policy 
objectives and means, assuming that facts and values could be clearly 
separated in science. In the so-called decisionist model, policymakers and 
citizens discuss and decide upon the value-laden policy objectives through a 
democratic process, while the scientists’ role is limited to finding the means 
(such as the policy instruments, technologies or measures) to achieve these 
objectives.
However, this model suffers from the same misleading assumption as the 
technocratic model. Facts and values cannot be fully separated in scientific 
studies, and nor can the evaluation of policy objectives and means; they 
are always entangled.4 Assume, for example, that politicians formulate an 
ambitious emission-reduction target as part of climate policy. Research 
has shown that such paths only become feasible if there is intensive use of 
bioenergy; however, this may involve direct competition with food security, 
and could risk accelerating deforestation of rainforests, thereby threatening 
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biodiversity. In this way, certain means implemented to address the objectives 
of climate policy may undermine other social or environmental objectives. If 
more suitable means to overcome these trade-offs cannot be identified, the 
initial policy objectives must be revaluated, amended or even abandoned in 
light of the practical implications of the means. Objectives and means are 
interdependent via their implications, and cannot be proposed or evaluated 
separately. Researchers should not simply explore possible means to given 
policy objectives because the objectives alone do not necessarily justify the 
means, especially with the potential for such undesirable side effects. Rather, 
objectives should be critically and systematically reflected upon in light of the 
diverse implications of the means.
The ‘Pragmatic-Enlightened Model’ (PEM) of expertise in 
policy
Because of these weaknesses in the dominant science–policy models, IPPC 
WG III employed a novel ‘Pragmatic-Enlightened Model’ (PEM) of scientific 
expertise in policy. The PEM builds on John Dewey’s pragmatist philosophy5 
and the interdependency of policy objectives and means via the implications 
of the means, as explained in the example above. The PEM claims a critical 
inquiry into such implications is needed because they can substantially 
change previous evaluations of policy means or objectives. This implies 
analysing the whole range of relevant consequences in terms of manifold 
(quantitative and qualitative) direct effects, synergies and undesirable side 
effects.
According to the PEM, scientific hypotheses, such as those on policy 
options, necessarily imply normative assumptions. Nevertheless, they 
can – theoretically – become objective when they have repeatedly turned 
out to be reliable for resolving the well-defined problematic situation or 
question at stake. The inclusion of different stakeholders in the assessment 
process is crucial to facilitate learning and deliberation, and in order not to 
exclude important policy objectives, evaluative criteria or aspects of policy 
implications.
Moreover, under the PEM, the interdependency between policy objectives 
and means implies exploring and comparing alternative public policy 
pathways (i.e. different combinations of policy objectives and means) and 
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their implications, in order to learn about and compare their strengths 
and weaknesses. Due to the huge uncertainty over disputed and value-
laden policy issues, PEM-guided assessments should map out alternative 
policy pathways and their implications. This significantly reduces policy 
prescription in scientific assessments, while potentially still achieving high 
policy relevance and scientific credibility.
The role of the cartographer
Scientific experts therefore assume a role akin to that of the cartographer.6 
Jointly with stakeholders, they explore the political solution space by 
mapping out different pathways and their trade-offs or overlap, while clearly 
marking implied value assumptions and uncertainty along the way. Maps 
do not replace travelling; it is the policymakers who remain the navigators. 
Sound scientific advice does not provide one-dimensional recommendations 
for complex policy problems, but instead provides information on 
alternative policy pathways, each with its own trade-offs and obstacles.
The PEM portrays political decision-making as a perpetual learning process 
of self-reflection. It aims at transparent and iterative deliberation of the 
trade-offs – or overlap – between different policy objectives and means in 
co-production with stakeholders. When policymakers make a decision and 
implement one of the policy alternatives, the chosen policy will still need 
to be amended to account for errors and obstacles discovered ex-post. The 
sciences can only offer an early warning system for potential risks and 
trade-offs that can be expected along certain paths. 
The PEM differs from the European Commission’s regulatory impact 
assessment (which employs a refined cost–benefit analysis), in that it 
claims a systematic feedback loop between the objectives and means; the 
objectives (as well as related values and evaluative criteria) are thus never 
regarded as fixed. Moreover, the full range of practical implications is to be 
assessed, including the non-quantifiable consequences. Instead of fostering 
endless disputes about abstract values or denying normative assumptions 
in the sciences, the PEM potentially allows for a rational and more 
constructive debate about highly value-laden political issues, by exploring 
the implications of alternative policy pathways.
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Putting the PEM into practice: the experiences of IPCC
The PEM recently provided some guidance to the IPCC WG III in its 
assessments.7 The contribution of WG III to the IPCC’s Fifth Assessment 
Report8 assessed future pathways to alternative climate change mitigation 
goals in terms of underlying technological, economic and institutional 
requirements. This was done instead of recommending a specific mitigation 
goal or avoiding these disputed political issues altogether, acknowledging 
that researchers alone cannot settle these issues but have to assess 
alternative policies. 
Adopting a multimetric perspective, the research community had conducted 
sophisticated multi-scenario analyses to explore the implications (including 
co-benefits) of alternative climate policies, timings and metrics. The 
Assessment Report also includes a chapter on ethical issues, to allow for a 
more explicit discussion of this crucial dimension of climate policy. IPCC 
WG III was successful in the analysis of future scenarios: costs, risks and 
(co-)benefits of alternative policy pathways were assessed, and governments 
accepted and appreciated this in the approval process. 
But the approval process for the Summary for Policymakers (SPM) of 
the Assessment Report also revealed challenges for the PEM approach, 
particularly with regard to retrospective (ex-post) analyses. For instance, 
the country classifications for the report’s assessment of progress in climate 
change mitigation had immediate relevance for political negotiations, 
resulting in the fact that governments objected and the figures and 
associated text were removed from the SPM. 
Governments’ concerns over the grouping of countries arose despite 
efforts to provide a balanced assessment of how emissions have grown as 
countries developed, and how these patterns have shifted over time. Some 
governments feared that approval of any country classification other than 
the one currently used in the negotiations could be disadvantageous in 
upcoming negotiations for a new international climate regime.
This IPCC’s experience reveals that, while a policy-relevant, credible and 
legitimate ex-ante assessment may be successful, ex-post analyses come 
with undesirable political implications for several countries. Governments 
do not always want their policy decisions to be publicly evaluated in a 
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scientific assessment. However, ex-post analyses could be in the best 
interest of governments, since much can be learned for future policy design. 
In some cases, due to complexity and uncertainty, the only way forward 
may indeed be an iterative process between experts and policymakers, with 
ex-post analysis which allows for learning from policy experiences – which 
presupposes climate policy actions will be taken by governments despite 
uncertainty and risks.
A further challenge to the application of the PEM within the IPCC was 
the lack of research available to fill the manifold gaps on the ‘map of 
knowledge’ that was being created. For instance, future IPCC assessments 
could explore in more depth what the world might look like in the event of 
a global temperature rise of 1.5°C, 2°C or 3.5°C, systematically combining 
impacts and vulnerability with adaptation and mitigation strategies and 
linking these to existing, disputed policy narratives and value beliefs. Pre-
studies and ‘pre-assessments’ are required to provide the knowledge for 
assessment processes.
Lessons learned for science–policy interfaces in Europe
The promises and challenges of the IPCC’s cartography of the political 
solution space may also have interesting implications for Europe’s science–
policy interfaces.
Lesson one: Organise integrated assessments
Individual, smaller-scale studies and reports, though highly valuable, 
cannot adequately address the complexity associated with EU energy and 
climate policy, and their frequently far-reaching policy recommendations 
are not always sufficiently substantiated. Although more effort is needed, 
assessments are required because they arguably provide the most elaborate, 
comprehensive and formally structured knowledge synthesis for highly 
disputed public policy issues. The IPCC assessments, for instance, can 
be seen as unparalleled and stimulating learning platforms that allow for 
extraordinary – though sometimes painful – learning experiences. 
Large-scale assessments could also be a model for the role of scientific 
experts in Europe’s discussions on complex energy and climate policy 
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issues – on which there is as yet no serious assessment available. However, 
this does not necessarily require producing thick, comprehensive volumes 
over a very long period of time, as the IPCC does. Rather, the EU only 
needs to better organise and coordinate the scientific cartography of the 
political solution space in terms of: (i) standard metrics and definitions to 
allow for comparison and integration into a single synthesis; (ii) incentives 
for interdisciplinary knowledge synthesis regarding policy-relevant 
questions; (iii) quality assurance, for instance by enabling the rejection of 
entire assessment chapters or reports if they are deemed unsatisfactory by 
scientific peer review; and (iv) more systematic identification of research 
gaps. Undertaking assessments of policy-relevant issues should be accepted 
as a highly respectable and serious scientific task in and of itself, for 
instance by accepting such assessments as high-ranking, peer-reviewed 
publications.
Lesson two: Use the PEM as a guiding vision
Scientific assessments often face trade-offs between policy relevance, 
credibility and legitimacy.9 The PEM’s approach of mapping a broad 
range of effects and co-effects of alternative policy pathways jointly with 
stakeholders may help to tackle these trade-offs. In light of the insight 
that there are basically no facts without values, the PEM allows for a 
scientifically credible and rational discussion of even highly value-laden, 
policy-relevant issues, without straying into policy prescription. Though 
further evaluation is needed, this model can potentially serve as a strong, 
new guiding vision for European science–policy interfaces, particularly in 
cases of highly complex, uncertain, value-laden and disputed policy issues.
Lesson three: Initiate more policy analysis
Surprisingly, there are numerous gaps in research on EU energy and climate 
policy options, such as the Emission Trading System, and their implications, 
particularly from a social science perspective. One potential solution would 
have national academies of science and science foundations providing – 
ideally prior to large-scale assessment processes – higher incentives for 
the research communities to (i) produce and synthesise solution-oriented, 
policy-relevant research, both ex-post and ex-ante; (ii) enhance policy 
assessment methodology; and (iii) ensure the highest scientific quality. 
Though the maps of socio-economic knowledge regarding policy analysis 
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are still incomplete, they provide sufficient orientation for EU policymakers 
to act under uncertainty, which would allow for ‘learning by doing’, for 
instance regarding carbon pricing.
Lesson four: Work on the science–policy culture
Some policymakers and experts resist supporting such a cartography of 
policy pathways due to (i) adherence to their disciplinary cultures and a 
focus on methods rather than problems; and (ii) a lack of will to engage in 
such an onerous learning process, which often requires painful changes in 
opinion about policy objectives and means. Policymakers must learn how 
to appreciate maps of knowledge, including ex-post policy evaluation. A 
clear mandate for assessments is required from the policy side to support 
the cartography of the political solution space – which could potentially 
include the assessment of promising pathways that are deemed infeasible in 
political terms, or of pathways that are inconsistent with one’s own political 
interests and values. 
Researchers, on the other hand, must learn how to create such maps of 
knowledge and learn about political and ethical implications in their research 
in order to make them more transparent. Closing down debates through 
political decisions is necessary at some point in time, but prior to that there 
should be an open and participatory deliberation of the implications of 
alternative policy pathways. Then assessments could allow EU policymakers 
to manoeuvre through the complex terrain of energy and climate policy 
issues, exploring possible solutions to the ‘problem from hell’.
Martin Kowarsch is head of the working group on Scientific 
Assessments, Ethics, and Public Policy at the Mercator Research 
Institute on Global Commons and Climate Change (MCC).  
Ottmar Edenhofer is Director of the MCC, professor of the 
economics of climate change at the Technische Universität Berlin 
and Co-Chair of Working Group III of the Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change (IPCC) (@MCC_Berlin).
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SOCIAL SCIENCE EXPERTISE IN  
EUROPEAN INNOVATION POLICY 
Ulrike Felt1 
Europe, more than ever, sees its future as “connected to its power to 
innovate”.2 This vision is not only firmly entrenched in the current 
formulation of the Innovation Union as “an action-packed initiative for an 
innovation-friendly Europe”,3 but is also reflected in expressions such as 
“innovat(ing) Europe out of the crisis”,4 and is translated into European 
and national research and innovation programmes organised around 
“societal challenges”. In such a policy scenario, European citizens are 
expected not only to accept the steady flow of innovations, but also to help 
stabilise “the innovation trajectory” through their unconditional support. 
With this shift towards innovation policy, a more central and active role 
is also envisaged for the social sciences and humanities. One of the core 
ideas is to “embed (…) the Social Sciences and Humanities across all of 
the Societal Challenges of Horizon 2020”,5 as recently expressed by the 
European Commissioner for Research, Innovation and Science, and to use 
them to support the sciences and engineering in order to better succeed in 
developing and implementing innovations. While such a reassessment of the 
role of the social sciences should in principle be greeted positively, obvious 
tensions quickly surface: social sciences, even when they are portrayed as 
crucial for attaining the innovation goals, are often cast in the role of the 
junior partners – a role captured by the very notion of ‘embedding’ – and 
leadership remains largely with the sciences and engineering when it comes 
to framing the central problems at stake and developing solutions. 
Thus, the question needs to be raised of the rightful place for the social 
sciences in making Europe and European policies, and their place in the 
research programme Horizon 2020. It becomes all the more important 
to reflect why social science expertise is central for policymaking in 
contemporary democracies, what kinds of expertise we can expect from the 
social sciences, and what the challenges are in realising this. This essay will 
argue for the need to engage in new kinds of knowledge relations and to 
open up novel ways of policy learning, beyond the technocratic modes that 
are so deeply entrenched in the culture of policymaking.
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Making policy, imagining Europe’s future 
There are two reasons why social science expertise is essential. First, at a 
moment when Europe’s future is more than ever imagined as dependent on 
and driven by innovations, careful consideration is needed as to how the 
very idea of ‘societal progress’ is imagined and practised. What meanings 
are attached to the notion of innovation – technoscientific and/or social? 
How do institutional contexts have to be reshaped to better address societal 
challenges? And how is innovation best brought about and stabilised? 
Making the future cannot be seen purely as a technoscientific challenge, 
but is also a societal, and above all a democratic challenge, raising the 
questions of societal participation and responsibility. As Michel Callon and 
his co-authors remind us, “if the end justifies the means, only debate 
can justify the end”.6 The social sciences thus enter the scene as analysts, 
and, through actively addressing these democratic challenges, add an 
indispensable perspective to policymaking in a complex, turbulent and 
inherently uncertain world.7 
Second, the close intertwinement of Europe’s future and the future of 
European research demands consideration. Policy visions of the direction 
in which societies should develop always have tremendous impacts on 
the kinds of knowledge-generation activities that receive support and, 
vice versa, the kinds of knowledge-related activities that obtain funding 
clearly express preferences for a specific form of society to be developed. 
Understanding our knowledge system as a complex and fragile ecosystem 
in need of subtle and continuous care in order to become sustainable, 
policymaking has to develop increased sensitivities towards the long- and 
medium-term impact of choices, and move beyond focusing on short-term 
innovation gains. At stake is nothing less than a ‘sociotechnical imaginary’ 
of a common Europe, i.e. a shared idea of futures that ought to be attained, 
which are then “reflected in the design and fulfilment of (…) scientific 
and/or technological projects”.8 As technoscientific projects “encode and 
reinforce particular conceptions of what a nation (or Europe) stands 
for”, it matters deeply who is engaged in making them, what spectrum of 
knowledge and experiences should be considered, and how cooperation can 
be realised between the social sciences and science/engineering, but also 
with civil society.
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Framing the policymaking process
In order to understand the need for, but also the difficulty of, integrating 
social science expertise into the policymaking process, it is essential 
to identify the core concerns that seem to guide the process of making 
Europe’s future. 
The first concern addresses international competitiveness. Europe feels 
a continuous pressure to keep up with its competitors. The recent shift 
towards making innovations sustainable, smart or green can be seen as one 
move towards distinguishing Europe’s approach from others. In this context 
it seems essential not to take these notions for granted, but to investigate 
what values they stand for and how these values are understood in different 
cultural contexts. At the same time, it is crucial to acknowledge that this 
drive for competition also impacts on dynamics within Europe: instead 
of Europe being seen as a single innovation space, it predominantly gets 
represented through rankings of Member States in terms of their capacity to 
produce, support and distribute innovation. As a consequence, a European 
core and peripheries are continuously reimagined on the European 
innovation map, weakening the very idea of cohesion. Thus we witness the 
simultaneous construction and deconstruction of the Innovation Union. 
Urgency is the second concern. Expressed through multiple variations 
of the metaphor of the global race, Europe is pictured as at risk of falling 
behind, giving rise to the trope: ‘We need to act now, before it is too late’. 
Any reflection on, or expression of concerns about, the direction that 
innovations take – as often expressed by social scientists or civil society 
actors – are seen as unreasonable doubts and delays, and are met at best 
with mixed feelings, and at worst with open hostility and accusations of 
technophobia. Opening up wider societal choices, or engaging in more 
reflection, are often equated with taking too much time and lacking 
the correct orientation towards key goals. Keeping several innovation 
trajectories open is not seen as a valuable strategy for sustainability but as a 
threat to efficiency. 
Finally, there is frequently expressed concern about a lack of societal 
support for innovations. European citizens ideally should not pose 
too many questions or demand too much time to consider the impact 
of transformations on their value systems. Scientific and technological 
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innovations are simply decreed as public goods. Therefore we find an 
intensification of science communication, not for the sake of opening up 
technoscientific developments to public scrutiny, but rather convincing 
citizens to accept them.9 
When looking at these three concerns from a social science perspective, a 
tendency to narrow down possible choices is evident. What gets forgotten 
are two kinds of obvious discrepancies: first, between understanding 
the Innovation Union as being mainly realised through technoscientific 
achievements, and an awareness that Europe’s attractiveness as a place to 
live and work lies in its diverse cultural heritage; and second, between the 
valuation of science and technology as public goods by larger segments of 
society, and its evaluation within the systems supporting the development of 
innovations.
These tensions highlight the importance of analysing, making visible and 
carefully considering how societal and technoscientific value systems work 
and how they might diverge in important ways. The social sciences can 
make an important contribution to the understanding of these tensions 
and become key actors in addressing them, as they lie at the core of any 
democratic concern in technoscientific societies.
Horizon 2020: a space for social science expertise? 
Within the framework of Horizon 2020, two new notions have made a 
high-profile appearance: ‘social innovation’ and ‘responsible research 
and innovation’.10 Both support a rethinking of research and innovation, 
opening it up to a wider range of inputs from different societal actors, while 
engaging in new kinds of relationships between social sciences and the 
sciences, engineering and medicine.
Such a move is welcome from a societal perspective, as it ideally would 
support a broader vision of science as public good. Yet it simultaneously 
raises the question of how the social sciences can become integral partners 
within the predominantly technoscientific structure of most projects. It 
seems essential that such policy expressions find a correspondence in 
research and funding realities, which do not limit the role of the social 
sciences to being strategic supporters, reporting, anticipating or sense-
making agents, or reflective add-ons to what is being developed as the core 
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business – namely, scientific and technological innovation following its 
own logic. Only a full integration will allow policymakers to profit from the 
added complexity in analysis and in the identification of potential solutions 
to problems. 
In this context, it is crucial to consider the position from which the social 
sciences enter such partnerships with the technosciences and engineering. 
European social sciences have a long, rich history and are rooted in a 
broad variety of national and cultural traditions, thus opening up a diversity 
of problem framings and understandings. While a narrow understanding 
of standardised knowledge-making might see this as a weakness, it is in 
fact an important strength and an opportunity to develop new forms of 
policymaking which reflect the multiple ways in which Europe is ordered, 
and find adequate ways to address these differences. 
Diversity in the Innovation Union
Indeed, handling European diversity seems to be a challenge for 
policymaking. Although diversity in European policy discourses and beyond 
is frequently hailed as a key richness of Europe, the ways in which our 
scientific and societal worlds get addressed in the science policy realm (i.e. 
through rankings, mapping exercises, comparative statistics and the like) do 
not reflect this understanding in practice. Instead, we find ‘epistemic maps’ 
which order disciplinary territories and show which of the disciplines are 
central to the innovation logic at work. Often, maps of Innovation Europe 
highlight the places where the intensity of science-and technology-related 
activities is high, where the institutions and single researchers of high 
reputation are located, or where most of the ‘excellence funds’ (e.g. ERC 
funding) are concentrated. University rankings and assessment exercises 
also express clear value orders. 
While ordering the innovation world in this way is not a problem per se, 
it becomes problematic when the effects are not carefully considered 
and when there is inadequate reflection on how deeply they frame the 
imagination of what is possible, and where and whom should be paid 
attention to. In short, the issue of responsibility for creating and distributing 
such visions of order, and for the impacts they have, is rarely addressed 
in policymaking. These visions tacitly govern access to and distribution of 
resources, and serve as an orientation for researchers at an international 
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scale, yet they also frame the imagination of individual researchers, 
research institutions and national systems of innovation.
Policymakers addressing the full complexities of this picture would need 
to ask: what is made invisible and unaccountable through specific forms of 
representation? What if we chose to use other kinds of tools for orientation? 
Bringing in the broader perspective of social sciences reminds us that 
things could be different: that making futures – and in particular innovation-
driven futures – is a fragile and complex activity, and that we do not live in 
a neatly scientised and engineered world. Rather, the world is messy and 
embattled, culturally formed and reformed, as well as guided by different 
orders of worth. 
Acknowledging diversity in ways of knowing and living in this world is thus 
a crucial first step towards realising the very idea of ‘responsible research 
and innovation’ – namely, seriously addressing the societal aspects of 
innovation. And it could be precisely the role of social scientists – drawing 
on a broad range of methods and analysis – to create space for such 
complexities, as well as to insert them in the all-too-clean maps that are 
being produced and used to determine technoscientific developments.
Collective responsible innovation
Such reflections also point to how much place matters in the development 
of innovations. Considering that many of the developments in science 
and technology are not directed to a specific aim or to a concrete set of 
applications, it is essential to reflect on the visions and values that go into 
such developments. Policymaking should create the space to articulate such 
values and visions, and to foster collective responsible experimentation. 
The notion of experimentation points to the co-evolution of societal and 
technoscientific developments, the concrete outcomes of this process 
always being open, unpredictable and messy. 
Simultaneously, the space in which experimentation takes place is no longer 
confined to the classical laboratory; innovations are taking place well 
beyond the controlled and isolated conditions of a laboratory, reaching out 
into society.11 Collective experimentation points to the fact that, with the 
laboratory of society, we need to reflect on who can participate in shaping 
the experimental design and interpretation of outcomes, and who can 
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exercise the right to veto. Overall, it means allowing a larger set of actors 
to have a say in the values embedded in innovations, as well as potential 
directions to follow. 
Responsible experimentation in turn points to the need to create spaces 
to articulate and reflect on the potential consequences of orders imposed 
on society through technoscientific policies. It also means thinking across 
disciplinary borders, as well as across the divide between science and 
societal actors. This needs us to articulate different kinds of knowledge-
generation practices in research and funding; it means extending knowledge 
production to accommodate more inter- and transdisciplinarity (beyond 
the frequent lip service paid to this notion); it means acknowledging the 
diversity of models and rationalities of knowledge generation in social 
sciences and science/engineering; it means integrating social scientists as 
knowledge-able and value-able partners on an equal footing into the core 
of technoscientific innovations, but also into the policies making them 
possible. 
Such collective responsible innovation would also need to reconsider the 
basic premises on which research and innovation are based. It would 
challenge the notion of the innovation race by asking questions about 
possible directions, rather than simply arguing about speed. And it would 
move away from the idea that there is a single stable future to be attained, 
shifting instead towards an understanding of the future as a process.12, 13 
For policymaking, this means reconsidering the way science and technology 
are institutionally organised and funded, to foster a stronger integration 
of social sciences with the natural sciences. It will be essential to create 
working environments (e.g. career structures, assessment exercises and 
accountability rituals) for researchers which allow them to engage in 
such experimentation without risking their careers, as well as educational 
approaches which move beyond narrow disciplinary models.
Europe as a unique laboratory 
In one sense, Europe can be understood a privileged space, a unique 
laboratory where diverse models of society, cultural values, valuation 
practices, political traditions and histories co-exist, with different national 
ideals being realised through science and technology.14 In this context, 
research policy becomes “a testing ground, a laboratory, or arena for 
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the invention of Europe”.15 Rather than seeing Europe’s diversity as an 
obstacle to the smooth development and deployment of innovation (e.g. 
because of different perceptions of GMOs, nuclear energy or vaccination 
issues across Member States), it should be seen as a key resource for 
developing new understandings of sociotechnical innovation processes in 
both their global and local dimensions. As a consequence, European research 
funding, but also science policymaking more broadly, needs to explicitly 
identify and embrace the opportunities that the European knowledge space 
offers for the better integration of social scientific and technoscientific 
research, in order to fully capture the advantages of such differences.
Two important elements need careful consideration in any further 
development of research and innovation. First, a more comparative 
approach is required to identifying problems and designing solutions, 
combining social sciences as well as sciences/engineering. European social, 
cultural and value diversity should invite more research and development 
inspired by a comparative approach, to make Europe a unique space of 
collective responsible experimentation with ‘the new’. This would improve 
understanding of how innovations can develop in different settings and how 
they can integrate different societal structures and value systems, e.g. in the 
governance of the life sciences or the energy sector. 
Second, resistance or frictions with regard to innovations which occur 
in specific national contexts should not merely be seen as a problem 
or obstacle to smooth technoscientific development. Rather, they are a 
resource for understanding how innovations get socialised, adapted and 
stabilised, and how they acquire different meanings in different contexts. In 
the end, this allows us to develop innovations more capable of adapting to 
their environments, and thus more resilient sociotechnical systems.
A new role for the social sciences in Europe
Drawing my lines of argument together, I want us to reconsider the kinds of 
knowledge relations contemporary societies rely on, as well as how social 
science expertise should matter when addressing the grand challenges that 
lie ahead of us. 
In proposing the notion of knowledge relations, I want to draw attention to 
the fact that all societal relations, including in policymaking, increasingly 
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rely on specific sets of expert knowledge. Beyond simply according a key 
role to technoscientific knowledge, social science knowledge and expertise 
can contribute complementary ways of seeing and explaining the world, 
and developing options. This means making use of the whole spectrum 
of knowledge-making practices, and a serious engagement with novel 
articulations of different types of knowledge – be they created by different 
disciplines or civic groups – in the process of developing innovations and 
accompanying policies.
But it also means conceptualising social science expertise in a broader 
manner, as more than an increase in routine expertise, i.e. more of the 
same in well-entrenched ways. Rather, social sciences could contribute to 
the policy process through other forms of expertise. In a complex world 
deeply entangled with technoscientific developments, more interactional 
expertise is needed in the policy process, meaning a deeper understanding 
of, and engagement with, the ways in which technosciences and societal 
developments co-evolve.16 
Also, given the rich environment Europe has to offer, social sciences could 
contribute adaptative expertise, i.e. the capacity to address new and 
complex problems in policymaking through creatively “transferring and 
transforming elements of diagnoses, interpretations, and solutions 
across contexts”.17 
Finally, social sciences do not simply reflect on developments, but should 
be seen as offering a specific kind of contributory expertise to ways of 
thinking about societal futures, innovations and their directions.
Science and technology need to be understood as complex sociotechnical 
phenomena. The social sciences open up new ways of learning, explicitly 
inviting us to think in new and unexpected ways informed by societal 
contexts. Building such insights into policymaking will allow Europe to 
better respond to the challenges and opportunities posed by complex and 
inherently technoscientific worlds.
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POWER, TRUTH AND PROGRESS:  
TOWARDS KNOWLEDGE DEMOCRACIES 
IN EUROPE 
Andy Stirling 
Knowledge and power are comprehensively and intimately entangled. It is 
no coincidence that it was a key pioneer of the scientific method, Francis 
Bacon, who famously recognised1 that “knowledge itself is power”.2 The 
political implications for – and of – science remain seriously under-discussed. 
In this essay I focus on issues that have arisen in European Commission 
policymaking around the concepts of ‘the Knowledge Society’ and ‘the 
Innovation Union’, and unpick some key dilemmas and responses for the 
governance of science and technology – and for democracy more generally.
A starting point is to note that Bacon’s observation was not just incidental 
to the emerging form of European science;3 a central interest of science in 
power also featured in Bacon’s telling methodological injunction in order 
to make of scientific progress, “to put nature on the rack and torture 
her secrets out of her”.4 The resulting emphasis on reduction, isolation 
and control has left a lasting legacy, and this has arguably come at the 
expense of complementary modes of knowledge and action, more reflective 
of holism, connectedness and care.5,6 Again, the implications extend 
well beyond science itself, reaching into the encompassing – and deeply 
interpenetrating – world of politics.
Alongside the observed configurations of nature itself, then, the kinds of 
agency in which knowledge is embedded stretch and fold the fabrics of 
the understandings so produced – highlighting here, sidelining there, and 
emphasising some connections over others. So – to start with the present 
topic – ostensibly lofty and disinterested European policymaking for “the 
Knowledge Society”7,8 conceals much more particular, practical and worldly 
allures of political action and reward. The associated anticipated fruits of 
“the Knowledge Economy”9 embody many assumptions not only about 
institutional means, but also political ends and their encompassing social 
conditions. 
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The highlighted structures of the particular economy envisaged in the 
Knowledge Society present a very specific – and highly political – vision for 
“the reinvention of Europe”.10 Far from being disinterested and neutral, 
this vision is often actually very partisan in technological and institutional 
terms. For instance, certain kinds of knowledge are privileged over others 
in the prioritisation of a ‘bioeconomy’ rather than an equally knowledge-
based ‘eco-economy’. And these already-restricted imaginings of knowledge 
are then in turn typically taken to further privilege even more specific kinds 
of advanced biotechnology like transgenics. This effectively marginalises 
even other advanced biotechnologies (like genomic or marker-assisted 
technologies), let alone wider innovations. 
The political veil
Other examples abound of such visible imprints of power in ostensibly 
neutral knowledge. By contrast with some branches of ecology, the 
dominant reductionism of modern biology has had the effect of 
exaggerating the role of apparently atomised genes over their systemic 
relations. This is not unrelated to the relative facility of appropriating 
intellectual property – genes are more patentable than the contexts which 
actually make them work. Likewise, aspirations to manage planetary 
control variables in order to secure expedient but unprecedented 
forms of environmental stability arguably reflect the interests of newly 
globalising expert institutions much more than they do the realities of the 
uncontrollable and ever-changing planetary environments themselves. 
And knowledges concerning the relative merits of different possible future 
energy infrastructures routinely incorporate assumptions about costs 
that are direct functions of expectations of the very investments these 
knowledges are supposed to inform. So apparently objective assessments 
can embody powerful circular driving forces, helping to bring about the 
very futures they ostensibly analyse. The point is not to dismiss these 
particular examples of knowledge, but to illustrate that all forms of 
knowledge alike are typically imprinted with their social conditions of 
production.
But the real dilemma in all such cases is that knowledge serves power most 
effectively when these political aspects remain most veiled. Only by donning 
the clothes of ostensibly singular and transcendent neutrality can knowledge 
effectively deliver the precious political commodities of legitimation and 
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justification. The result in policy circles is a carefully-nurtured obscurity 
concerning the intrinsically political nature of the forms, foci and fabrics of 
knowledge. To appreciate this is not to adopt some caricature position that 
‘anything goes’ in science. However, even though there remains a multitude 
of ways of being wrong, there are also typically many different ways of 
being right – and hearing this can be very inconvenient to power. So this 
requires voices like those of Gramsci,11 Foucault,12 Wynne and Jasanoff13 to 
provide repeated reminders that knowledges don’t simply confer power, nor 
do they just constitute it. The crucial neglected fact is that knowledges are 
also themselves deeply shaped by power.
To see this is to spin on its heels the conventionally accepted predicament 
in analysis for policy of candidly ‘speaking truth to power’.14,15 For this 
is only one side of a relationship in which it is also the case that “power 
inscribes knowledge”.16 Although sometimes uncomfortable, it is relatively 
easy to acknowledge that there are many perils and pressures around 
the apparently noble and apolitical callings of the expert in delivering 
supposedly authoritatively pristine knowledge. These challenges are real. 
But to end it at this is entirely to miss the other side of the relationship. 
What is scientifically ‘true’ may nonetheless admit a variety of equally valid 
but contending political interpretations. And an ‘ought’ cannot uniquely be 
derived from an ‘is’. As many have experienced in ‘evidence-based’ policy 
processes, to speak this general truth about power is an altogether more 
perilous form of candour than merely to speak some particular truth to 
power. 
Inconvenient truths
Across multiple forms of power in many different settings, these basic 
processes remain the same. The most inconvenient truth to speak is that 
whatever the knowledges on which local commitments rest, they are 
themselves in any way ambivalent or susceptible to social influence. For this 
is how knowledge loses its crucial, political load-bearing qualities. Then, 
both message and messenger become terminally unwelcome. 
To take one small example on the theme of European governance of 
science, it was for exactly such reasons that the European Commission 
in 2008 disbanded the Expert Advisory Group on Science and Society 
(EAGSIS), for which I was rapporteur. As was confirmed in its final report, 
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published later,17 EAGSIS was closed down because its members refused 
to succumb to pressure simply to legitimate an existing ‘hardwired’ 
programme of social science research on science policy, rather than 
discharge their responsibility to advise on its strategic direction. EAGSIS 
had politely – but clearly and repeatedly – pointed out a rather inconvenient 
truth in a succession of earlier reports:18 most of what was presented as a 
programme of two-way public engagement ostensibly aimed at informing 
the overall direction of Commission research was better understood as 
an instrumental process of science communication aimed at promoting 
entrenched priorities. 
In this tiny example of a much more general pattern, the recalcitrant 
experts were disciplined in a succession of ways: first, by being ignored; 
then by being variously chastised as unwise, naïve or impolite; then by 
being threatened that future prestigious expert advisory positions would 
be jeopardised; and, finally, by being effectively fired. With EAGSIS thus 
disbanded and its offending reports side-lined, the ongoing programme 
continued without the fig-leaf of legitimation-posing-as-oversight. The loss 
was not widely noticed!
Panel politics
Another personal experience represents a further small – but unusually 
clearly viewable – drop in a much larger, deeper and more murky ocean. 
Before the above episode, in 2003 to 2004 I was a member of the UK 
Science Review Panel examining genetic modification. Here, I tried to draw 
attention to some particular power dynamics in policy science which led 
to the tendency systematically to suppress various kinds of uncertainty. 
In the end, these efforts helped lead to an unusually open final report 
which systematically acknowledged in every chapter ‘uncertainties’, 
‘disagreements’ and ‘gaps in knowledge’ alongside the usual preoccupation 
simply with risk.19 Concluding in the voice of the UK Chief Scientist (who 
chaired the Panel) that science of itself could deliver “neither a red light 
nor a green light” for GM crops, the report was a rare instance of candour 
under pressure simply to provide justification. The onward ripples were not 
insignificant for UK government policy on GM crops over the ensuing few 
years.
But this did not occur without friction; I was quietly informed by a member 
of the secretariat of an entirely separate social science advisory committee 
ECOSYSTEMS OF EXPERTISE 139
that Commission officials were being strongly lobbied by a leading scientific 
figure in UK regulation of GM crops to drop me from this EC committee on 
the grounds of my being a ‘troublemaker’. Fortunately, this is an example 
where the science advisory system also displayed some integrity; after 
some tense encounters, the UK Chief Scientist of the time agreed formally 
to repudiate in the minutes of the Science Review Panel this attempted 
exercise to exert pressure against a member. 
To my knowledge, this remains the only example of an official UK science 
advisory body formally acknowledging what is almost certainly a much 
more widespread (and often more serious) reality. After all, both stakes 
and pressures are typically lower for a social scientist like the author than 
for natural scientists, who are more dependent on large-scale laboratory 
funding and whose expertise is more focal to the science directly in play. So 
it would be a strange coincidence if this unique official acknowledgement of 
attempted coercion should indicate that the only instance of such pressure 
had occurred in exactly a situation where it was most readily resisted and 
revealed. Anecdotal evidence suggests the phenomenon is more widespread 
– but less visible – throughout natural science.
Whatever the context, it is out of mutually reinforcing self-interest that 
those giving advice tend to share with those being advised a (literally) 
power-full policy etiquette. By all means talk of the responsibilities of 
‘speaking truth to power’ – but don’t mention the reverse relations by which 
power helps (partly) to shape the knowledge it receives. In this way, it is 
permissible to negotiate in private the terms under which the inevitable 
compromises are made between the contending imperatives of power and 
knowledge. But – like the proverbial making of sausages – to produce 
policy-relevant knowledge in public risks revealing such unsavoury sights 
that the final product is spoiled, and no-one ends up looking good. So, like 
Victorian attitudes towards sex, all are complicit in the dynamics of power, 
accepting that knowledge is spoken about in private between elite peers, 
but not in front of servants, children … or the public at large. 
Speaking truth about power
So, these issues are rarely acknowledged within public research and 
innovation policy documents. Nevertheless, the importance of these 
dynamics of power is actually raised rather frequently, on occasions when 
the social science of science itself is invited to give its own ‘independent’ 
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expert policy advice. Just looking back over the past decade, there is no 
shortage of examples where European science governance institutions have 
(to their credit) commissioned and received exactly this message. What is 
notable, however, is not that the message is not sought (or consequently 
heard) by policymakers; what is striking is that this evidence for the 
implication of power in knowledge is so common in commissioned advice 
yet so systematically neglected in policy itself. To appreciate this, it is 
(fittingly!) necessary simply to consider the evidence. Let us look, therefore, 
at social science advice provided to support Commission research and 
innovation policy over the past ten years.
In 2007, a report by a diverse group of historians of science20 began by 
emphasising exactly the points made above. “We first stress the obvious: 
that science, whatever its achievements, is human-made; that science 
has always been linked to powers and interests; that science has 
limits and is not socially ‘neutral’.” The report goes on to highlight that 
“power relationships and interests are central in the science business” 
and that as a result, “social scientists and historians are part of power 
games, notably games of legitimisation”. And power is a central focus of 
attention, not only between policymaking and science, but within and across 
different academic disciplines themselves: 
The fact that science is not a unified system and that it is made of 
quite different species (clinical medicine vs. experimental biology vs. 
epidemiology for example) leads us to recommend particular attention 
when policymakers have to consider the implications of a new technology 
or product. Organising the confrontation between these species in a fair 
way … (a way that counteracts the systemic asymmetries of power) is 
central.”21
Engagement on whose terms?
A second, roughly contemporary report22 drew on contributions from 
a large number of researchers in the contrasting field of science and 
technology studies (STS), and synthesised the findings from an entire 
programme of Commission research. Reflecting experiences of exactly 
the kind related above, this document focused on the practice of public 
engagement. It observed that:
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there is – despite the rhetoric – a persistent tendency on the part of senior 
people in powerful government and industry bodies often to see exercises in 
‘participatory process’ simply as an effective means to justify (and so help 
deliver) what were referred (to) as ‘pre-decided policies’.”23
Elaborating this, the report found that:
The type of discussion that can arise in public engagement may itself pose 
significant challenges. The focus often centres in one way or another on 
the exercise of political and economic power in the field of science and 
technology. The resulting queries over ‘who?’ and ‘why?’ may sometimes be 
rather uncomfortable for incumbent decision-makers and institutions. Who 
is accredited to engage in discussions of science and technology? Who asks 
the questions to be researched? Who prioritises the allocation of resources? 
Who makes the assumptions in interpreting the answers? How and when 
are results to be communicated and to whom? Which knowledge is held 
privately and subject to proprietary rights and which is placed in the 
public domain? What is stated and what left unsaid?
A significant obstacle to public engagement often lies in the prevailing 
attitudes of senior figures – and wider cultural perspectives – in the 
institutions concerned with the governance of science and technology. In 
particular, there is in some such quarters a persistent scepticism over the 
status of public knowledge and understanding. There are tensions between 
institutional priorities and more widespread public values and interests. 
There is a reluctance to commit to open self-reflection and the sharing of 
power and influence.”24 
Thus detailed in more specific forms, this is exactly the syndrome pointed to 
at the beginning of this paper. A third influential report, also largely drawing 
on STS scholarship, was produced in 2007 by a smaller Expert Group on 
Science and Governance.25 Focusing directly on challenges presented by 
“the Knowledge Society”, it said:
The way we think and talk about science and innovation is still dominated 
by questions of scale – ‘how much?’ and ‘how fast?’ – but we’re not so good 
at talking about directions – the outcomes to which all of this investment 
and activity is being directed. The metaphor of the race exerts a powerful 
stranglehold on these debates. And the choice we are often presented with in 
that race is faster or slower, forward or back, but with no option to change 
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course. We do not devote enough attention to considering the plurality and 
diversity of possible directions.”
Again, the crucial dynamic in focus is the use of knowledge to legitimise 
and justify the commitments of power.
Innovations and expectations
Moving away from STS, even when relationships between knowledge and 
power are addressed by traditionally more instrumental disciplines with 
less self-consciously critical identities, and interests focused more directly 
and operationally on ‘innovation systems’ as they actually exist (rather than 
as they might be wished), the message remains very similar. In a fourth 
report from scholars of innovation studies published in 2009,26 the same 
essential problem is identified, under which the “scope and variety of 
involved organised actors such as science organisations, industries, 
governmental agencies, parliaments, non-governmental organisations 
can be broad and heterogeneous, too. They have different interests, 
resources and power, and they negotiate in various inter-linked arenas 
on all kinds of rules and policy instruments”. 
Again, the importance of politics and power are highlighted in the 
ostensibly technical business of research and innovation. “Various 
methods exist to support the construction of priorities including more 
systematic approaches such as foresight, impact assessment and 
evaluation of past performance, and more political processes such 
as the various forms of negotiation and lobbying between different 
loci of power and influence involved in the formulation of a research 
programme.”27 Even under instrumental perspectives, it is impossible to 
ignore the importance of power and vested interests.
In advance of the landmark Lund Declaration in 2009, a fifth report was 
commissioned from another large group of researchers,28 this time in 
fields relating more broadly to interdisciplinary science and integrated 
assessment. Discussing dilemmas in mission-oriented research, this 
aimed to address global ‘grand challenges’ of the kinds on which the 
Lund Declaration focused. Yet here, again, neither the wider scientific 
perspectives nor the imperative of shared social goals were found to be 
enough to remove the challenges presented by the dynamics of power 
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in knowledge and innovation. Complicating the apparently self-evident 
missions presented by grand challenges, this report noted:
(…) the presence of strong vested interest with considerable lobbying 
powers, as well as the policy logic of existing institutions which might 
work against more fundamental reforms. (As a result) many of the 
participants expressed opinions concerning the priority setting process. 
The design process was described as non-transparent, undocumented 
and heavily influenced by lobbying groups. As a result, the interests of the 
already powerful are reinforced, and it is difficult for outsiders to make 
their voices heard. One reason for this is the governance structure with 
a formal ‘proposition monopoly’ given to the Commission. This creates a 
discussion with the Commission in the centre instead of the member states, 
which might reduce the number of voices that have a real influence over 
the research agenda. Reforms that increase both the transparency and the 
influence of the member states were called for.”29 
In 2009, there emerged a sixth report on the related issue of scientific 
indicators.30 This made a pithy observation directly addressing a similar 
point concerning the concentrating of power in research governance. “The 
adage that science is too important to be left to scientists captures 
the normative challenge of integrating science in society, allowing 
for societal participation, but in such a way that its creative power 
is not subsumed by immediate interests.” Again, this underscored the 
recommendations made in all the previous reports concerning the importance 
of opening up more collaborative approaches to research and innovation. 
It was in this vein that the 2007 Expert Group on Science and Governance 
had noted that “democratic governance has become dislocated in ways 
that cannot be remedied by technical methods and tools alone”. It 
concluded that “policymaking should not stop at simple or mechanical 
solutions; it should address the complex issue of science and 
governance honestly, thoroughly, patiently and with humility”. 
And the ‘science in society’ report had argued for related qualities: 
“European activities in (science governance) should be informed 
by, and should themselves incorporate, more effective forms of 
symmetrical two-way deliberation, empowering inputs from a wide 
diversity of social actors. In short, this might be thought of as a move 
towards a new style of ‘cooperative research’.” 31 
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Opening up and closing down
Yet simply to extol the virtues of honesty, humility, dialogue and cooperation 
says little unless we address the power relations under which such qualities 
are constituted, interpreted and accredited. Even Bacon’s “torture” is, 
after all, a form of dialogue! As a seventh report for the European Science 
Foundation (ESF) found in 2012,32 merely to recognise or advocate the 
“co-production of knowledge” can beg many questions. After all, “co-
production may use a large series of interactions, at different scales of 
space and time, and concrete forms”. 
So, as was stated in 2013 by an eighth report,33 also commissioned by the 
ESF: “science and technology are now governed at an increasing number 
of sites, involving ever more diverse sets of actors in more disparate ways. 
This leads to complex and new forms of distribution of power and constant 
struggle over the directions to take.” Where knowledge is recognised to be 
co-produced in collaborative dialogue, the need to address issues of power 
is accentuated, rather than attenuated. Noting that “engagement and 
governance therefore represent locations (or spaces) where values and 
norms and thus power relations are negotiated”, this most recent ESF 
report argues against pretending at the absence of power, but rather that its 
terms should be made more transparent. 
The 2009 report for the Lund Declaration affirmed some particular details 
of this. Discussing the need for “devising new political mechanisms 
and policies”, this report identified a need for “the kinds of institutional 
arrangements that are conducive to citizens’ empowerment – that is, 
their autonomy of power and their ability to influence the decisions 
of public authorities. Some institutional arrangements are likely to 
increase efficacy and participation, while others are likely to reduce 
them.”34
One possible guiding imperative in the negotiation of such institutional 
arrangements was noted right back in the 2006 STS report. Rather than 
romanticising notions of academic neutrality and notional independence 
from wider power structures, this urged a form of positive discrimination 
as a crucial constituting principle in what it called ‘transdisciplinary’ 
or ‘cooperative research’. “Where notions of independence embody 
recognition of the need to counterbalance prevailing patterns of 
privilege and power, then it may be perfectly legitimate deliberately 
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disproportionately to attend to some of the more marginal or ‘excluded’ 
(rather than conventional mainstream) viewpoints”.35 So: the nearest 
that knowledge may come to neutrality is in collectively deliberate cultivation 
of a plurality, explicitly constituted to counter dominant interests.
The overall message is clear. Where attention is devoted (as here) to a 
rather complete range of social science advice commissioned over the last 
decade by European science governance institutions, what is remarkable 
is that every single instance focuses directly – in one way or another – 
on the crucial roles played by power in knowledge. This is true of every 
quoted passage above. Not only are these dynamics strongly emphasised in 
diagnosis, they also form a priority focus for the policy prescriptions. On 
the face of it, then, with power relations within science and innovation given 
such a strong emphasis in the evidence base supposedly informing policy, 
one might reasonably expect to find the same broad issues highlighted in 
the official policies themselves.
Polite policy etiquettes
A few brief phrases in the background ‘mood music’ do seem to bear 
this out. For instance, in a 2008 EC document on public engagement in 
science,36 Research Commissioner Janez Potočnik acknowledged that 
“it is our task to set up new ways which both empower the public 
and reward those scientists who engage constructively with civil 
society”. Implying no particular commitment or concrete intervention, 
other such ‘apple pie’ statements are readily found. Moreover, the example 
of the disbanded expert group described at the beginning of this essay 
illustrates how such references to public engagement may say one thing, 
yet do another. What is more remarkable about the actual Commission 
policy documents setting out concrete instruments for the governance of 
science and innovation over this period, is that they have virtually nothing 
whatsoever substantive to say about the need directly to address power 
relations in the production of policy knowledge. No deliberate policy 
interventions are proposed explicitly as a means to deal with this. 
This picture specifically in the field of science policy contrasts strongly 
with EC policy discussions of governance more widely. For instance, the 
formative and influential 2001 White Paper on European Governance37 
(supposedly underpinning all European governance activities, including 
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on science) is very explicitly and directly concerned throughout with 
addressing what it acknowledges to be serious imbalances of power in 
the general politics of democratic governance. And power relations are 
also a very clear and explicit object of attention in official discussions of 
international arenas bearing on European innovation policy.38 So there 
seems no noticeable general policy inhibition around discussing power – 
as long as the power and interests in question are those of other political 
actors. 
It seems disproportionately in relation to dynamics of power within 
European science and innovation systems that too explicit a mention of 
power becomes awkward and indiscreet. So, the curious neglect of any need 
for remedial action in relation to power concentrations or lock-in in the field 
of science and technology does not reflect a general institutional culture 
or policy climate. Nor does the gap seem to reflect any general difficulty 
in operationalising such a broad concept as ‘power’. As discussed in the 
first section, this policy etiquette of aversion even to the mention of power-
in-knowledge seems particularly prevalent in the field of research and 
innovation policy – where addressing power would take its arguably most 
sensitive forms – those which are imprinted in knowledge. 
Again, the detailed evidence seems to bear this out. When official 
Commission research and innovation policy documents are systematically 
reviewed, a striking general pattern becomes clear. In all the labelling and 
branding, there are plenty of signs of the overt influence of power in the 
promotion of science and technology towards particular ends: “research 
and innovation as sources of renewed growth”,39 “Science 2.0”,40 
“innovation: creating knowledge and jobs”,41 “responding to societal 
challenges”,42 “reaping the benefits of globalisation” and “the future 
of Europe is science”.43 In addition, fears are raised over the growing 
scientific and technological strengths of competing countries – significantly 
involving frequent explicit discussion of external power relations.44 
Also, where it is necessary in very technical terms for the purpose of 
implementing concrete legal frameworks, issues of power are dealt with 
very clearly and directly.45 But across many thousands of pages of text in 
wider science and technology policy documents, issues concerning the 
actual dynamics of political power in research and innovation systems 
themselves are barely even mentioned, let alone subjected to deliberate or 
explicit attention. Overt questioning and criticism of the kind exemplified in 
the advisory literature reviewed above is almost completely absent.
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Consultation in power vacuums
Many specific examples may be given to illustrate this. Consultation 
documents are issued with apparently no interest in the implications 
of vested interests or incumbent powers.46 Research work programmes 
are designed as if power relations in knowledge production were of no 
particular interest – and policy action plans make no mention of them.47 
Technology platforms are developed for the promotion of particular 
strategies, as if the field were bereft of contending vested interests. 
Schemes are put forward for regional programmes and partnerships, 
without any attention to the relative degrees of power enjoyed by different 
actors.48 Technological performance is anxiously surveyed and scoreboards 
devised, but none of the metrics seek to gauge issues like lobby activity, 
concentrations of power or asymmetric levels of influence.49 Economic 
and business assessments are conducted, neglecting questions of market 
concentration or lock-in.50 And voluminous statistics cover numerous 
obscure issues in research and innovation systems, but fail to indicate 
crucial issues concerning the concentration of resources to certain 
particular research or innovation trajectories within a given sector rather 
than others.51
Numerous very detailed public opinion surveys are conducted in the field of 
science and technology and issues of instrumental interest are exhaustively 
explored, like the degree of trust placed in experts, public acceptance, 
or the readiness for innovation.52 But nowhere are respondents asked 
systematically for their views or understandings concerning the actual 
or appropriate distributions of power in research and innovation. And 
perhaps most remarkable of all is the picture given in documents on the 
burgeoning field of responsible research and innovation (RRI). Plenty of 
attention is given to exhortations and claims concerning the desirability of 
ethical or inclusive behaviour, but there is virtually no specific discussion of 
how to address the ubiquitous dynamics of power, vested interests and the 
strategies of incumbents, within which these qualities are set – and subject 
to which they are interpreted.53
What is arguably most telling about this quite comprehensive official 
neglect of the dynamics of power in science and technology policy are the 
rare exceptions. For, on the very few occasions when power is explicitly 
mentioned, it is disproportionately in reference to the notional power of 
civil society, rather than the more obvious power of incumbent actors. 
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For example, one report on embedding society in science and technology 
policy54 makes significant reference to Chinese experience. Advocating the 
‘non-political’ stance of official structures, this paper attributes partisan 
bias only to those groups outside of innovation systems, like NGOs, 
who “are sometimes unwilling to pay the high price (in terms of 
image or power) of compromising their position in the debate”. This 
reflects a far more general discourse on research and innovation in elite 
policymaking circles: the challenges of vested interests, strategic behaviour 
and accountability are typically far more comfortably addressed in relation 
to the relatively tiny resources of civil society than the manifestly more 
massive instances of similar challenges displayed by incumbent business 
and governmental actors themselves.
Towards knowledge democracies
This has been a relatively long essay. But my conclusions can be quite 
briefly stated. Not least, this is because simply to talk of power in 
research and innovation (as we have been doing) is arguably a large part 
of the solution. Power is a very complex, multidimensional and situated 
phenomenon, and to seek to analyse it and address its consequences need 
not of itself be seen as critical – let alone revolutionary. Power can obviously 
often be a force for good, but what this means in any given context – and 
to what ends – is best understood and negotiated by those most directly 
implicated or affected. And those who are generally most advantaged 
by such openness about power in its diverse forms are those who are 
most remote from it (and consequently most marginal or vulnerable in 
other ways). So, it is in keeping with the shared progressive strands in 
scientific and democratic traditions with which this chapter began not 
only to illuminate power, but also to challenge it. To do so is not to seek 
idealistically entirely to dispose of power, but very pragmatically to get the 
best out of it.
The problem is that where power remains unspoken and invisible, as it 
typically does in European research and innovation policy, then it becomes 
much more difficult to enact these everyday processes of democracy. 
And without speaking of power, illuminating it and challenging it, some 
of the other kinds of exhortation and virtue recommended in the many 
reports reviewed here also risk being subverted. Qualities like humility, 
responsibility, precaution, transdisciplinarity, co-production, cooperation 
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and reflexivity, for instance, are only able to exert their intended effects 
where the associated power structures are explicitly accountable (rather 
than implicitly denied). Without accountability, there seems little reason to 
suppose these virtues will be any less vulnerable to legitimatory pressures 
than the romanticised positivist values criticised here, such as expert 
objectivity, sound science or evidence-based policy. 
What is interesting is how immanent this message is, even in the early 
provocative Baconian framings of power and knowledge with which this 
chapter began. For, despite his predilections for metaphors of torture, 
Bacon also recognised that “we cannot command Nature except by 
obeying her”. And herein lies an abiding dilemma in the exercise of 
power: behind the discourses of control, what passes for power is often 
a euphemism for privilege. In a complex and dynamic world, maintaining 
incumbency is often more about surfing waves of contingent events 
through successful rhetoric than it is about having any real control over the 
underlying currents. The setting of directions for research and innovation 
is therefore not necessarily best understood as an end in itself. The picture 
here is similar to the pressures discussed above to justify decision-making 
in general (as much as any particular decision). In science and technology, 
as elsewhere, power is perhaps best understood as the privilege of generally 
presiding over unfolding trajectories of change, rather than specifically 
controlling them. 
If unfolding trajectories are to be steered in directions that are (as so much 
policy advice reviewed here calls for) more responsible, precautionary or 
progressive, then the virtues of humility, cooperation and reflexivity (also 
advocated in this literature) may yield altogether different benefits. Rather 
than being ends in themselves, these qualities are potential means to the 
greater end of democratic struggle. Here again, Bacon made a salient point 
with regard to money, that might equally be applicable to power: “it is 
like muck, not good except it be spread”. This observation by a founding 
figure in science reinforces the widely recognised ‘Mertonian’ aspirations 
of science itself – to communalism, universalism, disinterestedness and 
organised scepticism. Communalism is about the sharing of power; 
universalism is about directing it towards collective ends; disinterestedness 
is not about denying power, but balancing contending interests; and 
scepticism is about challenging power in all its forms. So, it is science 
itself that seems – ironically – to chart a very clear challenge for European 
governance of research and innovation. 
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If European science and technology are to progress in directions that 
best reflect and address diverse and contested social needs, then what is 
needed is not the power-denying polemics of the ‘Knowledge Society’, still 
less the even more overtly structured interests of an ‘Innovation Union’. 
Where such hopes lie more is in resisting the suppression of politics in both 
these discourses. Instead of closing down around an engineered technical 
or deliberative consensus, what are needed instead are the many means 
to opening up more democratic struggle over the directions of research 
and innovation trajectories. Here, there are no panaceas: neither methods, 
principles, values, discourses or institutional designs will of themselves 
or alone fully embody such struggle. What is crucial are the interactions 
between these arenas. It is by distributed compasses rather than universal 
gridlines that the small everyday capabilities and heuristics of challenging 
power may most readily effect their diverse ends. 
At a practical level, the struggle for knowledge and innovation democracies 
means challenging (and building alternatives to) a number of currently very 
prevalent pressures. European research and innovation governance should 
be wrested free of burgeoning instruments of justification and legitimation. 
Monovocal talk of ‘sound science’ and ‘evidence-based policy’ (as if these 
determine particular decisions) are neither politically nor scientifically 
credible. Pressures to put in place individual chief scientists through whom 
to channel all expert policy advice similarly suppress the complexity, 
diversity and context-dependency of knowledge. And the language of ‘pro-
innovation’ policy, without saying which innovation or why, is particularly 
erosive of accountability. 
Alternatives to these monolithic discourses and institutions lie in the myriad 
methods and practices reviewed in the literatures summarised here. In 
short, these allow more rigorous and accountable plural and conditional 
understandings of which directions for research and innovation align 
best with which values and interests, and why. Instead of hierarchically-
structured multidisciplinarity, or mission-directed transdisciplinarity, there 
is a need for explicitly power-challenging ‘hyperdisciplinarity’. In the end, 
what these offer are ways to resist the self-application of Bacon’s doctrine 
of torture – not just on nature but on science itself. Since nature is so 
complex, diverse and indeterminate – and scientific understanding is so 
successful through fostering communalism, plurality and scepticism – why 
should science be forced to speak in a single voice? Engaging equally 
with the subjects and objects of knowledge, there seems to be the same 
disposition to control. 
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It is in these senses that science and democracy are ranged against the 
same forces: they are not so much in contention as mutually reinforcing. 
Like science itself, knowledge and innovation democracies are best seen 
not as destinations, but as struggles; and it is arguably in celebrating and 
nurturing such democratic struggles that the most pressing imperatives can 
be found for European governance of science and technology.
Andy Stirling is Professor of Science and Technology Policy at the 
University of Sussex (A.C.Stirling@sussex.ac.uk). 
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“We post a signpost: no deep thinking here. Things are bad enough 
already.” What John Rawls once wrote in an unpublished footnote1 
could qualify as the motto of the behavioural movement in public policy 
across Europe and elsewhere. Behavioural experts are not getting tired 
of emphasising the beauty of simplicity. Cass Sunstein, Professor of Law 
at Harvard and former ‘regulatory czar’ heading the White House Office 
of Information and Regulatory Affairs, even argues that the future of 
government depends on it.2 
Indeed, there are good reasons for declaring simplicity the mantra of 
modern government. Behavioural studies have shown that simplifying 
messages and reducing complexity may have large effects on people’s 
behaviour. For example, making registration forms or information letters 
clearer, and options more salient, can move decisions in desired directions, 
e.g. by encouraging people to enrol into pension schemes or change energy 
providers. Even if these ‘nudges’3 do not work, proponents argue that their 
costs are extremely low and they cause no harm. Just like signposts.
In its most recent World Development Report, Mind, Society and 
Behavior,4 the World Bank discusses the advantages and challenges of 
behavioural governance. While highlighting that behavioural insights and 
interventions can improve the design and implementation of development 
policies, the report also points to the complexities of the approach: multiple 
cognitive, socio-cultural and policy factors have to be taken into account 
to make behavioural governance work. The uncertainties and unintended 
side effects related to these factors are not fully understood. Moreover, 
behavioural experts and policymakers need to account for cultural 
influences on their own choices, critically re-examining the normative 
implications and unquestioned certainties of behavioural approaches. 
Paraphrasing the proverb well known to economists: there ain’t no such 
thing as a free nudge.
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A world of choices
Behavioural governance is understood here as every mode of governing 
which is informed, designed or implemented by focusing on psychological 
as well as cognitive mechanisms of behaviour, in both individuals 
and collectives. There is a behavioural element to public governance 
when policymakers seek to change people’s behaviour – e.g. in non-
smoking policies or food safety – or when people’s behaviour affects the 
effectiveness of certain policies. Behavioural governance is based on two 
core insights: 
Firstly, when situations are complex or ambiguous the behaviour of 
individuals is influenced by heuristics and biases. In contrast to standard 
models of rational choice, people often use mental shortcuts and simple 
solutions even if this means acting against their own interest. In their 
seminal studies on decision-making under uncertainty, Tversky and 
Kahneman identified three central heuristic principles – representativeness, 
availability and anchoring – that have formed the basis of behavioural 
approaches until today.5 According to their research, people trying 
to predict the future intuitively rely on similarities and stereotypes 
(representativeness); the probability of risks is assessed by the ease with 
which instances or occurrences can be brought to mind (availability); and 
in many situations, estimates are biased by an initial value or a starting 
point that works as a default (anchoring). People may ignore the fact that 
they do not know enough, or fail to learn from new information. When 
consumers’ decisions in credit markets, for example, are influenced by such 
mental shortcuts, they may resort to borrowing at extremely high interest 
rates, while in the aftermath of an earthquake, more people are likely to 
purchase insurance. Heuristics shape the ways risks are perceived.6 More 
information rarely solves the problem; it can just add to the existing amount 
of information, while increasing uncertainty.
Secondly, the social environment in which people make decisions may 
trigger some of these heuristics and inhibit others. The way books in a 
bookstore are presented, or the order of the items on a restaurant menu, 
make certain decisions easier than others. Everyday action is embedded 
in informational infrastructures that simplify the presentation of options, 
evoke certain associations or make certain options more visible than 
others. In their popular book Nudge, Sunstein and Thaler speak of “choice 
architectures”. Choice architectures are ubiquitous: the order of traffic 
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lights, the display of food in a cafeteria, the design of a web page, all shape 
the salience of options and the likelihood of certain choices. Since choice 
architectures are inevitable, policymakers are advised to actively engage 
in designing arrangements that support desirable policy goals and reduce 
behaviour seen as suboptimal. This is the core argument of behavioural 
approaches: avoiding pre-structured contexts is not an option. Following 
this line of thought, both policymakers and experts should seek to become 
choice architects.
Simplicity and its (side) effects
One of the most prominent examples of designing choice architecture at 
the European level is the EU ban on pre-ticked boxes for online purchases. 
Orthodox economics predicts that decisions should not be influenced by 
a pre-selection with respect to certain products or add-on components, 
e.g. in travel insurances. By contrast, behavioural economics has shown 
that defaults significantly increase the probability of specific purchasing 
behaviour. As of 13 June 2014, the EU Directive on Consumer Rights 
prohibits pre-ticking, targeting problems connected to anchoring heuristics. 
In this case, simplification simply means removing defaults.
There are multiple other examples of actively setting choice architectures. 
Sunstein and Thaler famously call them nudges, defined as interventions 
that do not force anyone and preserve freedom of choice, but still have the 
potential of promoting welfare. Indeed, recent studies on evidence from 
randomised controlled studies suggest that some of them are working well: 
text message reminders to bank account holders to save money increased 
savings balances by 6 percent; emails to homeowners comparing their 
electricity bill with that of their neighbours and rating them (‘great’, ‘good’ 
or ‘below average’) led to reductions in power consumption equivalent to 
energy price reductions of 11–20 per cent; and automatically enrolling 
people in pension plans dramatically increased participation and retention.7 
Unfortunately, we do not know much about the side effects and unintended 
consequences of nudges. As simple as they may sound, they still intervene 
in a complex environment. For example, a recent Swiss–US study on 
a behavioural energy conservation campaign found that giving people 
feedback on their water use successfully reduced water consumption, but 
this coincided with an overall increase in electricity use. An explanation 
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for this unforeseen outcome is what researchers call the ‘moral licensing 
effect’: the people who saved water felt entitled to be wasteful in another 
area.8 Moral licensing is well known in many areas of behavioural 
governance such as obesity policies or fitness campaigns. It is just one of 
the cognitive factors that form part of the complexities which behavioural 
interventions are confronted with.
Mental models and policy mix 
The recent World Bank report points to a second set of factors that might 
influence how behavioural governance works.9 Anthropologists and 
ethnographers have demonstrated that cultural contexts have an effect on 
the formation and expression of heuristics and biases. Mental models, the 
interrelated schemes of meaning that people use when they act and make 
choices, are shaped by economic relationships, religious affiliations and 
national contexts. This needs to be recognised when designing nudges, so 
that they are communicable in different communities. 
On a more basic level, cultural context may also influence certain 
behavioural heuristics. Experiments based on a classical vignette from 
behavioural economics among representative samples in capital cities 
around the world revealed significant differences in choices depending 
primarily on the economic status (not nationality) of respondents. The 
choices of poor people in Jakarta or Lima mirrored the choices of poor 
people in the USA. Cultural stereotypes may work similarly. During an 
experiment in India, high-caste and low-caste boys were randomly assigned 
to groups that varied the salience of caste identities. When their caste 
was not revealed, the performance of high-caste and low-caste boys in 
certain problem-solving tasks was statistically indistinguishable. Making 
caste salient to the individuals changed their problem-solving capacity 
significantly, triggering a vicious circle of competence loss and confirmation 
of stereotypes. Thus, economic status and cultural mind maps exert a 
strong influence on individual behaviour, suggesting caution when making 
assumptions about decisions in different contexts.
A third set of factors is related to the embeddedness of nudges in a wider 
mix of policy instruments. More often than not, behavioural interventions 
are interwoven with classical policy instruments such as prohibitions, 
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standards or tax incentives. The US CARD Act, signed into law by President 
Obama in 2009, is an example. It was designed to counter practices by 
US credit card companies that took advantage of self-damaging consumer 
decisions, as described by behavioural economists. (Evidence suggests that 
consumers ignore future costs when considering immediate purchases; 
are overly optimistic when assessing fees that they may incur; and tend to 
anchor repayments to information on minimum payments.) The Act bans 
certain types of hidden fees, and mandates lenders to include an explicit 
calculation on bills that compares minimum repayments and the costs 
of repaying over 36 months. As a combination of hard regulations and 
nudging, it is especially difficult to evaluate. While a first study seems to be 
encouraging, there is not enough evidence to fully assess its impact.10 
Of course, the difficulties of appraising the dynamics and effects of mixed 
policy instruments are well known to evaluation researchers; this is not a 
specific problem of nudges. It does, however, shed some light on the limits 
of simplification. All in all, much more research is needed to get a better 
understanding of the cognitive, socio-cultural and policy-related factors 
influencing how behavioural governance works. The complexity of these 
factors also explains the current insistence on simplification. While nudges 
may work in carefully orchestrated and isolated settings, it is difficult to 
know how they behave in the real world.
Changing ecosystems of expertise in Europe
While the design of behavioural interventions and their complexities have 
become important topics in current discussions, there is one aspect that has 
received less attention: the factors influencing the choices of behavioural 
architects themselves. A recent report by the European Commission’s 
Joint Research Centre (JRC)11 makes it clear that applying behavioural 
approaches to EU policymaking requires a better understanding of the 
ways expertise and evidence can be used in policy processes. In order 
to incorporate the findings of behavioural science, policymakers need to 
be aware of political as well as methodological limitations. The timing 
of the application of behavioural studies within the policy process is just 
as important as knowledge about the pros and cons of different types 
of studies (e.g. experiments, randomised controlled trials, surveys and 
qualitative research studies). The authors conclude that behavioural study 
“will not offer a silver bullet to solve policy problems”. 
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Indeed, the rise of behavioural economics is already changing the 
“ecosystems of expertise”12 in Europe and beyond. In the UK, it is 
associated with the Behavioural Insights Team (BIT), an organisation that 
has gained both national and international influence by experimentally 
developing and disseminating behavioural interventions.13 BIT conducts 
experimental trials, designs behavioural interventions and advises other 
organisations on how to apply behavioural insight in the public domain. 
It has become a paradigmatic example, inspiring the creation of similar 
project units in other countries, e.g. the Social and Behavioural Sciences 
Team at the White House’s Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) 
and, most recently, the project group Wirksam Regieren (governing 
effectively) at the German chancellery.14 
In contrast, Scandinavian approaches to behavioural governance are 
characterised by bottom-up networks such as iNudgeyou in Denmark and 
GreeNudge in Norway.15 Situated at the interface of applied behavioural 
science, public institutions, NGOs and private stakeholders, these initiatives 
engage in research projects focused mainly, but not exclusively, on 
environmental policy and public health (e.g. reducing food waste, litter 
or smoking). As experiments in ‘guerrilla research’ they seem to point to 
certain problems with simplification, namely that it favours simple solutions 
designed by behavioural experts over more complex questions asked by 
consumer groups, environmental activists or lay people. While there are 
no studies of the organisation of behavioural expertise yet, it is plausible 
to assume that the modes by which behavioural findings are translated 
into nudges also determine the criteria by which desirable behaviour is 
distinguished from suboptimal decision-making. 
There ain’t no such thing as a free nudge
The diversifying dynamics of behavioural expertise in Europe provide 
an important lesson: there is no best practice to incorporate behavioural 
findings into policymaking. In each country, science–policy interactions 
are structured by cultures of expertise: the more or less unquestioned 
ways in which public knowledge claims are validated and perceived as 
politically relevant. These cultural preferences may affect the resilience and 
receptiveness of knowledge production, influencing the ability to learn from 
mistakes and decide accordingly.16 At the same time, advisory systems have 
a choice architecture of their own, including certain heuristics and biases. 
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When implementing behavioural governance in Europe, both experts and 
policymakers need to critically re-examine the unquestioned certainties and 
normative implications of behaviourally informed policies. 
This should include a reassessment of the role of social sciences in 
understanding decision-making under uncertainty. As the World Bank 
report shows, human society adds a layer of complexity to the analysis 
of individual behaviour. The structures of social norms and institutions 
heavily influence both individual decisions and the organisation of choice 
architectures. Considering them is essential to making behavioural 
approaches work and preventing unintended consequences and side 
effects. This could mean that nudging is much more time-consuming and 
costly than some of its proponents insinuate. The effort, however, might 
be worthwhile if it helps to redesign public policy beyond rational choice 
models, by cautiously taking into account the human factor.
Dr. Holger Strassheim and Rebecca-Lea Korinek are researchers at 
the WZB Berlin Social Research Center, where their work includes 
the SCOPE project on ‘Studying the Changing Orders of Political 
Expertise in Germany, Great Britain and the US’  
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INNOVATION: MANAGING RISK,  
NOT AVOIDING IT 
Claire Craig and Mike Edbury
Different nations, as well as institutions from the European Commission 
to the United Nations, have constructed different ways of getting the 
science advice they need. The common requirements are for impartiality 
and authority, timeliness and the willingness of both the scientists and the 
decision-makers to respect the constraints and objectives of the other. 
In October 2014, the UK celebrated the 50th anniversary of the formal 
appointment of a Government Chief Scientific Adviser (GCSA). To mark 
this anniversary GO-Science published the first themed Annual Report by a 
GCSA.1 The topic of that report, Innovation: managing risk, not avoiding 
it, was deliberately chosen to reflect the enduring challenges for science 
advisers everywhere.
This short article draws on the findings of the Annual Report, findings that 
were informed by a series of chapters by eminent figures from a wide range 
of disciplines, as well as by workshops in Copenhagen, Berlin and Paris.2 
The European economy is critically dependent on growth driven by science 
and innovation. Innovative economies are more competitive, respond 
better to change, see higher returns on investment and create increased 
living standards. Innovation is also essential for security and resilience, and 
will be needed to help meet challenges such as those posed by infectious 
diseases and the need to reduce carbon emissions. Yet all innovation 
requires change, and any change has within it the potential for both benefit 
and harm. 
From the future of nuclear power to nanotechnologies, the choices that 
EU nations make, collectively and individually, matter greatly. They have 
an essential role in shaping the legal frameworks, institutions and policies 
that in turn shape the risks and incentives faced by others. It is this 
balance of risks and incentives that determines what choices innovators, 
entrepreneurs, investors, inventors, bureaucrats and citizens will make. 
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However, innovation is not an unalloyed good. Discussion of innovation has 
become almost inseparable from discussion of risk, and paradoxically, this 
discussion has become more prominent precisely because the innovations 
of previous generations have made our lives much safer. People living in 
advanced economies have become more risk-averse compared to previous 
generations.
The task of designing systems of regulation and practice that are based 
on rigorous evidence and well-informed public debate is difficult. In some 
areas, regulatory systems have become sclerotic and stifle growth. In 
others, uncertainty about ‘who is accountable for what’ acts as an inhibitor. 
Debates about risk are often highly technical, while at the same time being 
at least as much about values and choices, about who benefits and who 
pays. Social, political and geographical contexts matter hugely, and this 
is especially true when seeking to establish frameworks across national 
boundaries. When governance goes wrong, we can miss out on major 
potential benefits, or suffer needlessly.
Innovation, risk and government
Despite these challenges, there is much we can do to frame debate and 
decisions more effectively. Debates about new technologies are rarely 
helpful when conducted in the abstract: where there is little evidence and 
few specifics to consider, people’s views are naturally determined primarily 
by their existing worldviews and views about the origins of the innovation, 
rather than what is actually known about its benefits and risks. So, for 
example, in the case of GM organisms the most effective questions are: 
‘what gene?’, ‘in what organism?’ and ‘for what purpose?’. More generally, 
the issue at stake is rarely a simple question of ‘yes or no?’ or even ‘how 
fast?’, but more often, ‘in which direction?’, ‘what are the alternative 
choices?’, ‘who leads, gains and loses?’ and ‘why?’. 
Sometimes decision-makers seem to assume that acknowledging 
uncertainties and the breadth of opinion and debate on an issue will 
inevitably lead to delay and complexity. This is not the case; we all 
constantly make decisions based on imperfect information, both 
professionally and personally, and that is ultimately the only way to get 
things done. 
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How to frame discussions of risk and innovation 
Science is usually one lens amongst several through which to examine 
innovation and risk. It is an essential lens, but not the only one: economic, 
social, and political lenses may also need to be used. Debates about risk 
are also debates about values, ethics and choices; about how benefits and 
risks are judged; and about fairness, or who benefits and who carries the 
risk. If these broader questions are ignored, conflicts can become intensive 
and disabling. It is important that scientists working with decision-makers 
recognise the breadth of the discussion; and equally important for decision 
makers to realise that science is a vital component of that discussion. 
Widening the conversation is a democratic necessity and an expression of 
responsible citizenship.
The science of risk and risk communication
Confusion sometimes starts with misperceptions about concepts as basic 
as those of hazard and risk. An important distinction needs to be made 
between hazard and risk. A simple illustration can be found in the contents 
of our kitchens. These are full of hazards: sharp knives, boiling kettles, 
exposed electric filaments in toasters, salt, bleach and other noxious 
chemicals. We avoid the risks posed by these hazards by reducing our 
exposure to them. So we avoid poking metal conductors into our toaster, 
or pouring bleach into our stew. Risk is a product of the hazard and our 
exposure to it, and therefore a hazard to which there is no exposure poses 
no risk. 
Understanding this terminology really matters, and getting it wrong leads 
to poor debate and decision-making. An extreme example of the need to 
consider carefully the distinction between intrinsic hazard and practical 
risk is the case of radiation: the response of many countries to the nuclear 
reactor disaster at Fukushima in 2011 was more a reaction to a deep-
seated fear of radioactivity rather than a careful analysis of actual radiation 
exposures, which were very small outside the site of the power station itself.
Another example is provided by the regulation of Bisphenol A (BPA), a 
chemical used to make plastics, including materials used in direct contact 
with food. Risk assessments indicate that health concerns from exposure to 
BPA are low. However, regulatory provisions introduced by the European 
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Commission, and now in train in some EU member states, lead to risks 
of their own due to potential issues with the safety and effectiveness of 
replacements for BPA. 
A first step in making a scientific assessment is to review existing evidence. 
Good examples are the Cochrane Reviews of the evidence underlying 
different medical practices. Similarly, the EU Joint Research Centre, the 
European Academies Scientific Advisory Committee and bodies under the 
auspices of the UN such as the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC) play an important role. The approach taken by all of these is the use 
of ‘meta-analysis’ – a rigorous review of all of the evidence available on a 
particular topic.
But reviewing the evidence is just the beginning of the discussion of 
risk; how this evidence is communicated is equally important. Scientific 
knowledge is contingent knowledge – it is dependent on the nature and 
reliability of existing evidence, and subject to modification and improvement 
by the emergence of new evidence. 
When science meets values
Our individual responses to innovation and risk are shaped by our family, 
friends and colleagues, and by our national identity and values. These social 
and cultural factors influence our decisions on which dangers to accept 
or avoid; inform our views on the fairness of the distribution of risk and 
benefit; and, crucially, influence who is blamed when things go wrong. 
As a result, there are large variations in tolerance to different types of risk 
between countries and cultures, and therefore the approach to risk and 
to judgments about risk may differ within and between countries. In some 
cases these factors influence the way in which a country may approach and 
manage its whole system for considering risk and innovation. In other cases, 
apparently similar systems of governance, evaluating similar technologies, 
may produce different analyses of risk and different judgments.
We can only have a high-quality discussion about innovation if we 
understand that the discussion must be about both science and values. 
There are some areas of technology and innovation that trigger particularly 
strong and immediate value-based responses, and these typically vary 
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between different communities and countries. Obvious examples in biology 
and medicine are animal research, stem cell research and reproductive 
technologies. In energy, almost all technologies can trigger strong emotions, 
whether we are considering fossil fuels, wind technologies or nuclear. In 
the environment, major arguments are triggered by the consequences of 
the release of waste and by-products created by humans, ranging from 
oestrogen contraceptives excreted in urine to the over 10 gigatonnes of 
carbon emitted into the atmosphere each year by the burning of fossil fuels. 
In the food industry, GM organisms, pesticides, industrialised processes for 
agriculture and animal husbandry, and mechanisms for the control of animal 
and plant diseases, each cause strong responses in some communities and 
some countries. 
In many of these areas there are profound differences in the attitudes of the 
populations from different countries, and one of the consequences of having 
a European Union of 28 nations is that almost every technology evokes 
immediate and strong reactions in one or more nations. We need to be 
more aware of these differences, so that we can have healthier and clearer 
debates that make better policy at all levels. 
The precautionary principle, like many principles, is both simple and at 
the same time subject to variable interpretations and expectations.3 As one 
of the participants at recent workshops run by GO-Science said, it was 
originally designed as a form of amber ‘pause’ signal, and is now often used 
as if it were simply a red ‘stop’ signal. 
The implications of this drift in use become particularly stark when 
combined with a further theme in the Annual Report: the need to consider 
the implications both of action and of inaction. This theme is central 
to debate on issues as controversial as pesticides, vaccines and GM 
technologies. For instance, if we choose not to develop GM crops at all, we 
are intentionally reducing our options for creating greater food security and 
tackling the implications of climate change and population growth.
Institutions and trust
Concerns about risks are often rooted in concerns about the adequacy of 
the institutions that produce, predict and manage them. This is likely to be 
particularly important for risks that are pervasive, not visible, and whose 
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technological or environmental causes may only be understood by acquiring 
particular types of expertise. We therefore rely on judgments about the 
values and behaviours of those in charge. The trusted expert or institution is 
typically expected to act with care for those affected, to be competent and 
to be free from self-serving bias. For the ordinary member of the public, the 
best frame of mind may be ‘critical trust’: neither outright scepticism nor 
uncritical acceptance. 
The array of challenges presented to regulators is in many ways sector-
specific; regulating medical products poses completely different challenges 
to regulating telecommunications, for example. However, some issues are 
generic, and one of these is the asymmetric incentives that are presented to 
many regulators. Put simply, a regulator which allows something to happen 
that causes harm will probably be in deep trouble, whereas a regulator 
which stops something from happening that would have caused benefit will 
likely suffer no consequences. 
This is a very difficult problem to solve, because proving the counterfactual 
to a preventative decision by a regulator is well-nigh impossible. The best 
hope that we have to deal with this problem is to do our best to make 
regulators accountable for all decisions, both positive and negative. 
Ultimately, a decision has to be made
Because of the new insights outlined in our report and elsewhere, we 
are optimistic. Even where an area is complex, uncertain and highly 
contested, there are examples of very effective decision-making that rely 
on working with interested publics and scientists. A UK example is the 
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority, developed to regulate the 
application of embryology research to reproductive technologies. It is an 
outstanding example of regulation working alongside legislation in the face 
of emerging scientific understanding and competing values. 
These and other experiences show that a sophisticated regulator, 
empowered to conduct public debate as part of its work, can deliver advice 
over a prolonged period whilst both science and technology continue to 
evolve. 
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The challenge for the EU arises from the diverse national perspectives on 
different innovative technologies. That is an issue for politicians rather than 
scientists, but nevertheless scientists should expect science to be seriously 
considered, evaluated and communicated as part of the discussion.
Therefore the European Commission needs continually to strive to ensure 
rigorous scientific input, which should inform the processes of preparing 
legislation in Council and Parliament. It follows that, like other regulators, 
European regulators should seek independent advice. They should foster 
and promote public discussion and debate, and the outcome of that debate 
should inform the regulator itself, policymakers and legislators. Meanwhile, 
GO-Science will work with existing EU networks to pursue further 
opportunities to exchange ideas and good practice on these issues at the EU 
level. 
Note: The views expressed in this article do not represent the views of the UK Government. 
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BIOMEDICINE AND THE LIFE SCIENCES: 
CORE ISSUES FOR SCIENCE–BASED 
POLICY ADVICE 
Jörg Hacker, Stefan Artmann and Sandra Kumm
In democratic and pluralistic knowledge societies, science-based policy 
advice fulfils three functions. First, it provides political decision-makers 
with state-of-the-art scientific knowledge that is reliable, relevant to societal 
concerns and transparent with respect to uncertainties. Second, science 
advice can systematically analyse policy options for the solution of societal 
challenges and evaluate them in the light of given objectives. Third, it 
contributes to public debate on policy goals and objectives by probing the 
rationality underlying differing normative ideals and concepts of common 
welfare.1 
There are as many topics for science-based policy advice as there are public 
problems that can be analysed by scientific methods – including societal 
challenges caused by developments in science and technology. During 
the last forty years, the tremendous progress in biomedicine and the life 
sciences has been one of the core issues of science-based policy advice 
and it is, in our view, a good bet that this will not change in the foreseeable 
future. Biomedicine and the life sciences present a special class of public 
policy issues, but they can be understood as a test case that illustrates some 
of the opportunities and challenges for future directions of scientific advice 
in Europe. 
Biomedicine and the life sciences are revolutionising our 
understanding of life and health 
We are all concerned about our bodily integrity and health. More or less 
consciously, any human being evaluates her or his corporeal abilities 
against some standard of wellbeing that varies according to many cultural, 
social and individual factors. This comparative evaluation almost always 
influences, with a strong normative force, decisions about how to lead one’s 
life.2 It is therefore understandable that we nourish high hopes – and foster 
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deeply engrained worries – about any research that has the potential to 
expand, for good or bad, the power to control our bodily functions and to 
change our conceptions of health.
Since the 1940s research into the molecular foundations of living systems 
has been advancing our understanding of the nature of life and the clinical 
abilities of physicians at an ever-accelerating pace. Examples of this 
progress are abounding; we will just mention some of the topics that have 
been considered by the German National Academy of Sciences Leopoldina 
and the European Academies’ Science Advisory Council (EASAC) in the 
last few years. These topics include the efforts to combat infections that 
can pass between animals and humans, the impact of climate change on 
infections, the challenges facing antibiotics research, and the European 
public health policy for infectious diseases. Statements have been 
published on predictive genetic diagnostics as an instrument of disease 
prevention, and on the effects of a limited legal approval in Germany of pre-
implantation genetic diagnosis. Challenges and opportunities for taxonomy 
(a discipline with a long history) and for synthetic biology (a promising 
new field of research) were analysed. Scenarios for the future development 
of high-throughput (‘omics’) technologies in Germany have also been 
developed.3 
Any reader of the statements published by EASAC and the European 
national science academies will surely conclude that not only do 
biomedicine and the life sciences involve many of the most promising 
research programmes of our time, they are also revolutionising the art of 
medicine – and thereby transforming human self-understanding.
In constitutional democracies, citizens who are interested in, or concerned 
about, the consequences of biomedicine and the life sciences can freely 
speak out for or against public policies on scientific research, technological 
innovation and healthcare. This usually results in a broad spectrum of 
opinions – e.g. on the regulation of stem cell research – that are discussed 
in the public sphere and taken into consideration in political decision-
making. This pluralism of legitimate interests voicing their diverse views is 
a fundamental characteristic of democracies, and pertains also to normative 
(juridical and moral) dimensions of public policies on science, technology and 
health.4 In open societies, these interests are part and parcel of the bargaining 
processes at the end of which decisions about public policies are made.
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A well-functioning science policy advice system can help supply state-of-
the-art information on those high-impact sciences. Cool-headed advice 
is needed on options for dealing with hotly debated issues, and critical 
competence is required in scrutinising goals and objectives of public 
policies on ethically challenging issues. Science-based policy advice can 
make a strong contribution to fulfilling those needs.
Enhancing evaluation, cooperation and the appreciation of 
values
Reflecting on the experience of the Leopoldina in contributing advice on 
biomedical policy, two general aims have emerged. The first is to offer 
scientific advice to help evaluate distinct policy options to achieve an agreed 
goal. The second – perhaps more fundamental – is to help provide a forum 
and vocabulary to enable different value positions to be articulated and to 
explore room for compromise. 
The first type of these aims can be applied to any kind of allocation 
problem; given an agreed policy goal, it is necessary to determine the 
optimal use of different kinds of resources in terms of costs and benefits. 
A good example comes from giving advice on antibiotic resistance. There 
is a broad agreement on the principal goals of public policy on antibiotics: 
the spread of antibiotic resistances must be reduced and new antibiotics 
have to be developed. The general means to reach these goals are also 
relatively uncontroversial: more research is needed, the transfer of scientific 
discoveries into clinical application must happen more smoothly, and 
the proper use of antibiotics by physicians and the general public should 
be encouraged. But it is a great challenge to advise on how the human, 
institutional, financial and other resources of science, innovation and public 
health systems should be optimised in order to stop the spread of antibiotic 
resistances and to develop new antibiotics. Not only does this involve 
questions of funding and organising science, from basic research to clinical 
studies; it also implies legal frameworks (e.g. the certification conditions for 
new active agents), social aspects (e.g. health education on the sensible use 
of antibiotics) and economic factors (e.g. tax incentives for research and 
development).
In 2013, the Academy of Sciences and Humanities Hamburg and the 
Leopoldina published a statement, Antibiotics Research. Problems 
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and Perspectives,5 that proposed a scientific agenda and made eight 
concrete recommendations, ranging from strengthening basic research 
and facilitating clinical research, to restricting the use of antibiotics in 
veterinary medicine and consistently implementing antibiotic consumption 
records, to intensifying socio-economic research and establishing a national 
round table on antibiotics research. In their statement, the Academies 
emphasise that:
The concerns of antibiotic resistance and the lack of antibiotics can only be 
resolved or at least alleviated if the policymakers in the fields of science, 
politics, society and industry decide to cooperate and act on a national and 
international level to pursue a variety of concerted efforts.”6 
Following this example, a general aim of science-based policy advice 
on allocation problems should be to enhance cooperation between all 
stakeholders in order to optimise the use of resources for public policies 
on research and health. The two main instruments to reach that aim are 
communicating to stakeholders the best available scientific information 
about what we know and what could be done, as well as evaluating, against 
given policy goals, the options for action as impartially as possible.
Negotiation of compromises and the appreciation of values
The second type of aim for science-based policy advice covers any sort 
of value conflict; given the need to define policy goals, it is necessary 
to support the negotiation of compromises in the appreciation of values 
needed for the definition of public policies.
A good example of such a value conflict is pre-implantation genetic 
diagnosis (PGD). PGD is a diagnostic procedure that allows parents at high 
risk of having a child with a hereditary disease to have a child unaffected by 
the disease. The procedure involves examining in vitro fertilised embryos 
for the presence of particular genetic changes indicating hereditary 
diseases. In Germany, an intense public debate on PGD arose in 2010 after 
the Federal Court of Justice had delivered a judgment that a ban on PGD 
could not be derived from the Act on Embryo Protection.
In 2011, the Leopoldina, together with the German Academy of Science and 
Engineering (acatech) and the Berlin Brandenburg Academy of Sciences 
174  THE APPLIANCE OF SCIENCE
and Humanities (BBAW), published an ad hoc statement Preimplantation 
Genetic Diagnosis (PGD). The Effects of Limited Approval in 
Germany,7 which recommended that PGD should be placed on an equal 
legal footing with prenatal diagnosis, and that the German legislative should 
vote for a limited approval of PGD. The statement covered not only medical 
but also juridical and moral aspects of the issue, and summarised its 
normative conclusions as follows:
If it is assumed that avoiding having a child cannot be demanded by the 
state under any circumstances, then legally approved embryo selection by 
a woman within the context of a limited approval of PGD may contribute to 
the avoidance of terminations of pregnancies, including late terminations. 
Furthermore, unaffected in vitro embryos could then be ‘saved’, since 
they could, with the consent of the woman, be transferred. As a result, 
limited approval of PGD would mean that the procedure would no longer 
be associated with the inevitable death of unaffected embryos. At the same 
time, the dignity of the woman would not be violated since she could make 
the decision herself in accordance with her own conscience. Even if the 
dictates of her conscience do not concur with the moral or religious views 
of others, the fact still remains that respecting the conscience of individual 
persons and accepting moral beliefs, but not stipulating these attitudes in 
a legal sense so as to render them generally binding, is a characteristic 
of a free democratic constitutional state. Should specific morally binding 
attitudes exist, a decision based upon conscience would preclude the 
performance of PGD.”8 
This citation concisely exemplifies the general goal of science-based policy 
advice on value conflicts, which are amongst the hardest problems in the 
context of biomedicine and the life sciences. The aim of the advisers should 
be to develop strategies of fair bargaining between all stakeholders in order 
to support the negotiation of compromises in the appreciation of values. 
Such compromises allow the involved parties to define the goals of public 
policies on research and health as consentaneously as possible. Against the 
background of the best available scientific information about what we know 
and what could be done, the most useful method of science-based policy 
advice for the development of fair bargaining strategies is to reconstruct 
and to analyse – as impartially as possible and as sympathetically as 
necessary – the actual principles that connect the value preferences, the 
policy evaluations and the political actions of each stakeholder.
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Scenario-building to help guide advice on policy options
Science-based policy advice in constitutional democracies ought to 
respect the division of labour between politically responsible decision-
makers and advisers who want to help find reasonable ways of defining 
and implementing public policies. Winston Churchill reportedly once 
said, “Scientists should be on tap, but not on top”.9 ‘Expertocracy’ or 
technocracy must, therefore, not be a future direction for science-based 
advice – even if we currently observe a trend, particularly when it comes 
to the contribution of science to sustainable development, to blur the 
distinction between advice and decision.10 In democratic societies such a 
trend would lead to an erosion of legitimacy for political decisions as well as 
to a loss of trust in the impartiality of science-based advice.
If we want to draw a clear demarcation line between advising and deciding, 
it is best to think about science-based policy advice as suggested by the 
Hungarian-American economist and 1994 Nobel Prize winner, John C. 
Harsanyi, in respect to ethics – “in terms of hypothetical imperatives”,11 
i.e. in terms of propositions of the general form ‘If you want X, do Y’.
Thinking in terms of hypothetical imperatives about the optimal allocation 
of resources, given certain policy goals, means to develop and apply 
techniques for cost–benefit analyses of public policy. How to model the 
probable effects of alternative science policies and how to study empirically 
the real effects of implemented science policies – both questions are an 
essential part of the task that the presidium of the Leopoldina described 
in its 2013 discussion paper The Sustainability of the German Science 
System. Supporting the Future Development of Research, Teaching and 
Knowledge Transfer, as follows:
The societal impacts of science, the growth of knowledge and its substantive 
and institutional differentiation present science with significant challenges 
that can only be surmounted when its relationships to other areas of society 
are examined using the methods of scientific enquiry, thus allowing a more 
substantiated approach to the management of these relationships.”12 
Recently, a Leopoldina working group on the challenges presented by 
omics technologies for Germany’s infrastructures in research and teaching 
used the technique of scenario-building to handle complex questions of 
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science policymaking.13 Harnessing the full potential of high-throughput 
technologies for scientific and medical ends requires, above all, the massive 
introduction of new training programmes for young scientists, the fast 
development of a nationwide IT infrastructure, and the goal-oriented 
cooperation of universities and non-university research institutions. The 
working group developed two scenarios for the establishment of a national 
omics and IT infrastructure as a network of distributed, topically-focused 
omics centres. These scenarios specify some main characteristics of 
that infrastructure – namely access, financing, linkage to European and 
international infrastructures, and training and career possibilities.
We know, of course, that the comparison between two scenarios for the 
development of research infrastructures is just a first step in advising on 
complex planning issues in science policy. Yet it seems to us that it is a 
promising step, going in one of the directions that should be taken by 
science-based policy advice on biomedicine and the life sciences in the future.
Practising the role of the impartially sympathetic adviser
New research programmes in biomedicine and the life sciences usually do 
not raise only questions of the optimal allocation of resources; first and 
foremost, they have a high potential to pose problems in the appreciation 
of values. An example is synthetic biology, the merger of biology, 
chemistry and engineering that further develops genetic engineering and 
biotechnology in order to purposefully modify existing living systems or 
to construct new ones from scratch. Synthetic biology is quite a young 
research programme that will, to our mind, become an even more important 
topic for science-based policy advice in the near future.
Together with the German Research Foundation (DFG) and acatech, the 
Leopoldina published a statement on synthetic biology in 2009, which 
has been adapted to the European level by EASAC.14 The first-mentioned 
statement explicitly addresses the necessity of a systematic appreciation of 
values as regards synthetic biology:
THE APPLIANCE OF SCIENCE 177
Moral arguments in favour of producing artificial life are based on the 
anticipated benefits for medicine, agriculture, energy generation or the 
environment, thus making the exploitation of synthetic biology not only 
permissible but even advisable. Although synthetic biology is justified by the 
economic advantages and ultimately by the freedom of research, according 
to the general consensus it should, however, be subject to other basic rights 
such as the right to physical integrity.”15
The public debate about what goals public policies on synthetic biology 
should pursue will not lead to a consensus between all stakeholders. 
Neither is it a legitimate aim of political decision-making in constitutional 
democracies to suppress moral pluralism. Nor is it necessary for science-
based policy advisers to wait for unanimity about normative questions 
before they begin their work; they can start with a task that Harsanyi has, 
mutatis mutandis, described as follows:
If two codes of behaviour are equally self-consistent, the choice between 
them is not a matter of logic alone, but rather primarily a matter of 
personal attitudes. However, analysis by moral philosophy of alternative 
codes of behaviour can help us to make our choice more intelligent.”16 
Some future directions for science-based advice in 
biomedicine and the life sciences
“Making a choice more intelligent” should mean taking into account the 
internal consistency as well as the consequences of different normative 
systems when choosing between them. If stakeholders with different moral 
standards are involved in making political decisions about science and 
health policies, the best science-based policy advice can reasonably hope 
to do in making those decisions more intelligent is to develop bargaining 
strategies between the stakeholders that raise the probability of achieving a 
compromise, e.g. regarding the regulation of synthetic biology by law. The 
science-based policy adviser thus becomes a good host, or an impartially 
sympathetic referee in “a properly managed debate with understandable 
and reliable communications that addresses the challenges of synthetic 
biology”.17 We are suggesting that any step towards such an ambitious, 
yet realistic, understanding of the role of the scientist as an adviser is a 
step in the right direction for science-based policy advice – in Europe and 
elsewhere.
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FUTURE DIRECTIONS FOR  
SCIENTIFIC ADVICE IN EUROPE
Edited by James Wilsdon and Robert Doubleday
Across Europe, scientific evidence and advice is in great demand, 
to inform policies and decision-making on issues such as climate 
change, new technologies and environmental regulation. But the 
diversity of political cultures and attitudes to expertise in different 
European countries can make the task of designing EU-wide 
advisory institutions and processes both sensitive and complex.
In January 2015, President Juncker asked Commissioner Moedas 
to report on options for improving scientific advice within the European 
Commission. At a time when these issues are higher than usual on the 
political agenda, it is important that the case for scientific advice and 
evidence-informed policy is articulated and analysed afresh. 
To support these efforts, this collection brings together agenda-setting 
essays by policymakers, practitioners, scientists and scholars from 
across Europe. Authors include Anne Glover, Ulrike Felt, Robert 
Madelin, Andy Stirling, Vladimír Šucha and Jos van der Meer. Their 
contributions outline various challenges but also constructive ways forward 
for scientific advice in Europe.
This project is a collaborative initiative of four partners: University of 
Cambridge’s Centre for Science and Policy; Science Policy Research Unit 
(SPRU) at the University of Sussex; the European Commission; and Stiftung 
Mercator. It is also a linked activity of the new International Network for 
Government Science Advice (INGSA).
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